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JUDGE JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.: AN INTRODUCTION
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN*
FEW in the room will know what a prize it is for any recent law schoolgraduate to spend a year clerking for a federal judge, a person vested
with the “judicial power” of the United States.  A federal judicial clerkship
is the brass ring, a prize that eludes even many distinguished graduates of
the most elite law schools.  In modest hope of such a prize and opportu-
nity, and following the customary practice, in the middle of my second
year in law school I sent out a stack of applications to federal trial judges
and federal appellate judges all across the country.
In a display of either pride or humility (I’m still not sure which it
was), I wrote in my application to Judge Noonan that he was my first choice
in the nation.  I meant that.  I did not yet know Judge Noonan personally,
but his legendary scholarship had recently been the object of my admiring
study as a graduate student in the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
in Toronto, and I had subsequently applied to serve as his research assis-
tant—a job I didn’t get—when, in the fall of 1990, I arrived to start law
school at U.C. Berkeley, where he continued to teach after entering upon
judicial service in 1986.  I sensed from Noonan’s many writings across vast
and varied terrains of great interest that there was no federal judge I could
learn more from as a clerk, and it turned out that I was correct about that,
though in some ways that I never could have anticipated.
Well, after an interval of a week or ten days, which seemed forever, I
received a call from Judge Noonan’s chambers offering me an interview.  I
* John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law,
Villanova University School of Law.
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was elated, of course, though realistic enough to recognize that I was un-
doubtedly one among many more interviewees than the judge could hire
(Circuit judges ordinarily are allowed three clerks).  At the suggestion of
the Judge’s assistant, we scheduled the interview for some ten days later.
That was, I think, a Monday.  So far, so good.
The following afternoon, the phone rang.  I answered it (this was long
before caller ID, of course) and was astonished to hear an elderly but
booming voice say (and I’ll never forget this): “This is Judge Stanley Wei-
gel.  You have applied to clerk in my chambers in San Francisco.  I can
interview you on Thursday afternoon.  I will see you then.”  And then,
hearing a click, I knew in a flash what my problem was, and there didn’t
seem to be any terrestrial way out of it.  Stanley Weigel had been serving
since his appointment by President Kennedy in 1962 and was legendary as
a District Judge for brooking no compromise.  Two days later, at the end
of my interview with Judge Weigel, he further astonished me by offering
me a clerkship in his chambers if I would accept it “on the spot,” an unu-
sual move for which I was utterly unprepared.
Gathering my wits or losing my mind (again I’m not sure which it
was), I sputtered that I would accept “on condition” that Judge Noonan,
with whom I’d already scheduled an interview, not offer me my “first
choice” clerkship.  I won’t describe what happened next in Judge Weigel’s
chambers, but you can perhaps imagine my relief when a few days after my
interview with Judge Noonan he called to offer me the job of a lifetime.  It
would have been a great honor and, I suspect, a pleasure to clerk for
Judge Weigel, but the clerkship with Judge Noonan was a dream come
true.
And it was, indeed, a life-changing experience, above all because I saw
up-close, and learned from the example of, something approaching the
Platonic Form of a Judge or what Aristotle referred to as “animate justice.”
Judge Noonan’s chambers was free of ideology—there wasn’t talk about
textualism, originalism, liberalism, conservativism, etc.  Judge Noonan
knew the facts of every single case like the back of his hand, and he used
legal method and legal reasoning to reach sound judgment.  Easy ques-
tions were treated as easy, hard questions were treated as hard and suscep-
tible of only probabilistic justification.  No trace of authoritarianism
lurked or threatened.  Day in and day out, Judge Noonan was quietly
resolving what he once famously described as “the central problem . . . of
the legal enterprise[,] [ ] the relation of love to power.”1  This was no
loose or sentimental enterprise, but rather the working out in history of
the demands of the God who created human persons in His image and
likeness.  I shall quote at length from Judge Noonan’s perhaps most mem-
orable statement of the task as he understood it, the context being Judge
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS xx (2002).
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Noonan’s contribution to a Harvard Law Review symposium studying the
very different approach of Judge Richard Posner:
Love is not simply an emotion, a sentiment captured by valen-
tines.  It is the Love “that moves the sun and the other stars” that
also moves Dante, who declares, “Neither Creator nor creature
ever was without love.”  When God is said to love human beings,
an emotion is not being attributed to God.  Love is the “word
known to all men,” Joyce observes in Ulysses.  The love that
unites man and wife in matrimony is more than a sentiment.
Love is a movement of the rational will seeking the good.  That
movement manifests two human desires, always mixed: the desire
to meet the needs of one’s own insufficiency and the desire to
share one’s goodness.  The two “great commandment[s]” of
Christ inculcate love.  They are “the law and the prophets.”  It is
by reflection on the promptings of love that morality begins, that
the requisite human response to the human stranger—somewhat
mysterious in Posner—becomes clearer.  “Love, and do what you
will,” advises Augustine, not dispensing with distinctions and dis-
cipline but giving love its rightful place.  By experience, by anal-
ogy, by more inclusive seeing, and also by argument, reasoning,
and moral theorizing, morality is developed, and the great com-
mandments become dynamic and move to realization in
completeness.2
Love, and do what you will: Dilige, et fac quod vis.
It was a tall order, and Judge Noonan led by example.  When inter-
viewing potential clerks, Judge Noonan always warned them that, unlike in
most other federal chambers, he wrote all of his own opinions.  The judge
wanted his clerks not to be disappointed that they would not see their own
prose in the F.2d (as it was then).  It was unmistakable and unexceptiona-
ble that the mind that did the judging was to be the mind that explained
the judgment.  Judge Noonan, moreover, insisted upon doing work that
most other chambers left to staff attorneys.  When a case was to be decided
by a memorandum of disposition written by a Circuit staff attorney, Judge
Noonan wanted to hear both sides, not just the result and its rationale.
“Audi alteram partem,” he would say.  Unlike Judge Weigel, Judge Noonan
did not hire on the spot at my interview, explaining instead that he wanted
to give additional thought to how the candidates he had interviewed
would get along with one another and his permanent staff.  Judge Noonan
commented memorably that he “place[d] a great premium on collegiality
in the chambers,” and I am grateful that he did so.  What a lively place it
was!  There was no carbon copy of a Noonan clerk.  One of my co-clerks
was a bon vivant, the other a serious student of mediaeval history.  The
2. John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner’s Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1768, 1775
(1998) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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former was tireless in finding ways to have fun when the Judge was out of
the chambers, the latter spent his commute to and from the East Bay on
BART reading one Noonan tome after another.  The three of us got along
famously, liberated by the recognition that the Judge didn’t play favorites
with his clerks.  The three of us admired and liked one another.  Judge
Noonan listened to what each of us had to say about the cases, pressed us
hard with acute questions, and then made up his own judicial mind.
A final vignette will encapsulate the experience of Judge Noonan the
judge.  One weekend, well enough into my clerkship that I foolishly felt
that I was master of the ropes, I went into the chambers on a Sunday after-
noon to get ahead on my work so that I could ask the Judge for a few days
off to take a camping trip with some good friends.  At the top of the stack
of papers for which I was responsible was a set of briefs in a case that, after
a couple hours of study, I thought was easy to decide.  It was ranked a
three, and I was sure I knew both that it wouldn’t be set for oral argument
and, furthermore, how the Judge and his colleagues on the panel would
come out on the merits.  Instead of writing an analysis for the Judge in the
form of a memo, as I should have done, I wrote a Memorandum of Deci-
sion and placed it in the Judge’s in-box on my way out the door late on
that Sunday.
Monday afternoon, after a morning of oddly chilly relations in the
chambers, Judge Noonan strode into my office, closed the door, plopped
the Memorandum of Decision on my desk, and said, “Mr. Brennan, there
is one Judge in this chambers, and it is not you.”  I had been wrong to
usurp, and I knew it as soon as he said it.
The influential American jurist Ronald Dworkin once told the story of
how Judge Learned Hand, another of the twentieth century’s great judges,
tried to teach his young clerk a similar lesson: he threw his inkwell at him.
It is arguable that Dworkin failed to learn what we can imagine was the
lesson intended by Hand, however, as his own jurisprudence was later con-
structed around an omniscient imaginary judge infamously known as Her-
cules.  As Judge Noonan once queried, “why should this imaginary
construct be used to explain the actions of real judges?  It is strange to talk
of Hercules when your starting point is Harry Blackmun.”3
Judge Noonan’s judicial practice makes unmistakable that the starting
point is particular human beings and the need for them to dedicate them-
selves to what is good for the persons they affect.  The good always is partic-
ular, of course, and it is discerned and pursued one step at a time, one
decision at a time—the better so the more one is aware that it is the good
that one ought to be after, the good that perfects human beings as an end.
Judge Noonan’s work was that of causing good in others, for that is what love
does.
John T. Noonan, Jr.’s brilliance and erudition are apparent from afar
through the printed and televised word.  Those who have been privileged
3. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 174.
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to know the man in person, and even to work with him day by day, can
testify, though, that John Noonan understands and shows himself to be a
pilgrim in the law, but before that a pilgrim in a pilgrim Church, a Church
that teaches (here in the words of Josef Pieper) that “[b]eing created by
God actually does not suffice . . . the fact of creation needs continuation
and perfection by the creative power of human love.”4  In the shadow of
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., at work in the law, one can see how in fact,
quietly but certainly, “the great commandments become dynamic and
move to realization in completeness.”
4. JOSEF PIEPER, FAITH, HOPE, LOVE 174 (1997).
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JUDGE JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.: AN INTRODUCTION
WILLIAM CARDINAL LEVADA*
THE John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture hastaken for today’s subject the writings of Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.,
who continues to serve as a senior judge for the Ninth Circuit on the
United States Court of Appeals.  He has written widely on jurisprudence,
legal history and ethics, and church law.  He has paid special attention to
questions where law and morals converge.  As a Catholic jurist, he has
throughout his career been known as a firm and consistent opponent of
legalized abortion, for which I express today my personal gratitude, and
on behalf of our Church community and so many of his fellow Americans.
Noonan has developed a life-long interest—as his many books and articles
attest—in the history of the Church’s moral doctrines.  This Conference
has been tasked in particular to look at his broad contributions, with a
special emphasis on the “thread that unites all of [Noonan’s] work—the
development of doctrine.”1
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to provide a brief introduc-
tion to John Noonan to begin our Conference.  I had become acquainted
with some of John’s books during my own theological studies, and I was
very pleased to have many opportunities, especially during my years as
Archbishop of San Francisco, to share meals and conversations with John
and his wife Mary Lee, either at their home in Berkeley or on my side of
the Bay.  With you, I regret that his health did not permit him to come to
Philadelphia to be with us today.
Kevin Starr, prolific historian of the State of California and its distin-
guished citizens, introduced a piece on John Noonan some years ago with
these words:
Philosopher, theologian, historian, and poet, Noonan has been,
first and foremost, a scholar of the law. . . .  [T]he law, so seem-
ingly complete in itself as a system of thought and expression, is
an essential branch of general literature.  A science, however in-
exact, the law is a humanistic pursuit as well, and no one in the
past four decades has pursued the law with such humanistic fer-
vor—a humanism enlivened by religion—as John Noonan.2
* Prefect Emeritus of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, The
Holy See.
1. See Press Release, The Eighth-Annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law,
Politics, and Culture: Exploring and Celebrating the Legacy of The Honorable
John T. Noonan, Jr., VILLANOVA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Oct. 24, 2013), http://
www1.villanova.edu/villanova/law/newsroom/pressreleases/2013/1024.html.
2. Kevin Starr, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.: A Brief Biography, 11 J.L. & RELIGION
151, 151 (1995).
(655)
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John Noonan grew up in Boston, with his brother Jim and his sister
Marie.  His lawyer father is fondly remembered for his love of Shakespeare
and literature in general, and in such an environment John developed
early on his life-long love of faith, politics, and literature.  Throughout his
life, John has been known to entertain guests by inviting them to join in
reciting plays, which he or they would select.  He and Mary Lee have long
enjoyed the custom of John reading to her from his latest literary discovery
while dinner was being prepared!  In his latest book, Shakespeare’s Spiritual
Sonnets, John fulfills a life-long fascination, showing in these sonnets the
testimony of Shakespeare’s Catholic faith shining through in a time of
profound religious and political change.
Always a precocious student, John entered Harvard University as an
undergraduate in the middle of his senior year of high school.  By study-
ing both during normal semesters and also summers, he graduated summa
cum laude at the age of nineteen with a major in English literature, whose
study he continued in a post-graduate year in England at St. John’s Col-
lege, Cambridge.
In an autobiographical section of his 1998 book The Lustre of Our
Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom, he says his studies
abroad “confirmed what I already felt in my bones, that Catholicism was
the largest intellectual force in my life, yet I knew so little about it.”3  John
decided to enroll in the Catholic University of America in Catholic studies
and canon law, receiving there his M.A. and Ph.D.  John then returned to
Harvard Law School, where he received his LL.B. in 1954.
John began his legal career in his father’s firm in Boston.  In 1960, he
was invited by Fr. Ted Hesburgh to join the faculty of the University of
Notre Dame Law School.  In 1967, John and Mary Lee began their mar-
ried life in California, their home ever since, where John became Profes-
sor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley.  UC Berkeley had
acquired a vast canon law library, and John was the perfect fit.  In 1985,
President Reagan appointed him judge in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit.
As a professor, Noonan has had many occasions to reflect on the
judge’s role in society.  He calls “judging” a unique function: “It is not very
much like farming, banking, woodworking, or football.  It is not much
closer to the legal activities which have schooled the lawyer who becomes a
judge, not much like counseling clients, trying a case, or even teaching
law.”4  In his view, “[j]udging, being unique, has unique responsibilities.”5
He has even dared to compare the role of judge to God, the Supreme
3. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 25 (1998) [hereinafter THE LUSTRE OF OUR
COUNTRY].
4. John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Winston, Preface to THE RESPONSIBLE
JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS, at xiv (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Win-
ston eds., 1993).
5. Id.
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Judge.  According to Noonan, “[o]nly at this very high level did it seem
possible to attain the incorruptibility, the unchangeability, and the impar-
tiality that human beings believed that judges should have.”6
Today we honor Judge Noonan, among his other accomplishments,
for the high ethical standard he has set for himself throughout his long
career.  Such standards are one of the principal reasons why the judiciary
of the United States enjoys prestige and respect worldwide.
In his 2005 book A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The Develop-
ment of Catholic Moral Teaching, Noonan sought to pull together results of
the research and insights he had gained in exploring the history of several
of the Church’s moral teachings, going back to apostolic times: on usury
and bribery, on abortion and contraception, on marriage and annulment,
and on religious freedom.  On the last question, for example, he states,
“John Courtney Murray, whose teaching on religious freedom was now vin-
dicated, commented as the [Second Vatican] [C]ouncil ended its third
session, ‘Development of doctrine is the issue underlying all the issues at
the council.’  The promulgation of [the Decree] Dignitatis [humanae] per-
sonae was a triumph of development.”7  In an earlier comment, he had
acknowledged personally, “I grew up in a church that formally denied free
exercise and live now in the same church that has come to champion it.”8
For students of theology, since the nineteenth century, the idea of the
development of doctrine is no longer a novelty.  In our courses on Chris-
tology and on Trinity at the Gregorian University in Rome, for example,
Jesuit Fr. Bernard Lonergan spent the first half of each course examining
the history of the developments that led to the defined doctrines con-
tained in the Nicene Creed and in the decrees of the Council of Chalce-
don in the fourth and fifth centuries.  In dogmatic theology, the place of
positive, historical theology was taken for granted.  But in my undergradu-
ate courses in moral theology in those years just before the Second Vatican
Council, there was no corresponding historical approach in the teaching
of moral theology.
I say this to emphasize the originality of the contribution John Noo-
nan has made in his studies.  He has not written works of moral theology
as such; instead, he has raised the questions about how and why some
moral teachings do develop, for example, the development of teaching on
religious freedom, or on slavery, which for Noonan is the “prime case” in
the development of moral doctrine.  Of course, anyone could pose the
questions about how and why.  What is distinctive in Noonan’s work is the
vast research that illustrates the often complex, sometimes surprising path
that development has taken, making each case unique and defying any
attempt to provide a “guide” to the development of doctrine.
6. Id.
7. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 157 (2005).
8. THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 3, at 3.
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Although Blessed John Henry Newman is not (yet) a doctor of the
Church, nor a “canonized” saint, he still is recognized as the intellectual
“patron saint” of the development of doctrine.  It hardly seems a coinci-
dence, then, to find in the first chapter of A Church That Can and Cannot
Change a juxtaposition of Newman and Pope John Paul II on the question
of whether slavery can be called intrinsically evil.  Noonan’s ultimate “rule
of faith” in discerning true development is summed up in the words of St.
Paul’s Letter to the Philippians: “That your love abound more and more
in knowledge and insight of every kind to help you determine what is
best . . . .”9  In such a “rule,” we can see how Noonan’s focus on the
Church’s teaching of morals in every age highlights her new ways of
presenting the great commandment of love taught by Jesus, pointing faith-
ful Christians to the human dignity of every person, as well as to the com-
mon good of humanity.
Ian Ker, Newman’s biographer, calls the last of Newman’s Oxford Ser-
mons his most brilliant; it contains the seed that he will develop further in
his classic of theological literature The Development of Christian Doctrine.  In
this 1843 sermon, Ker writes:
Taking as his text ‘Mary kept all these things, and pondered
them in her heart’, Newman points to the Virgin Mary as ‘our
pattern of Faith, both in the reception and in the study of Divine
Truth.  She does not think it enough to accept, she dwells upon
it . . . not enough to assent, she developes it.’10
I don’t suppose that finding the “rule” for the development of doctrine in
Philippians and in Luke 2:51 would be a problem either for Newman or
for Noonan.
9. Philippians 1:9–10.
10. IAN KER, JOHN HENRY NEWMAN: A BIOGRAPHY 266 (1988) (alteration in
original).
10
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SEVEN TEACHERS IN THE TRADITION
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.*
ON this auspicious occasion I should like to acknowledge and com-memorate seven persons who gave me a sense of the scope, complex-
ities, and difficulties of the Catholic intellectual tradition—the tradition of
attempting to understand, to apply and to develop what is conveyed to
believers by the teaching of the Catholic Church.
In 1947, I had graduated in English from Harvard and had pursued
English studies at Cambridge University.  I had read E´tienne Gilson’s The
Unity of Philosophical Experience and known enough Latin to dip into theo-
logical manuals.  But any formal instruction in Catholicism had ended at
seventeen.  On this subject—my beliefs as a Catholic—I was scarcely be-
yond the level of high school.  I was actively conscious of the gap between
my education in English and my education in the intellectual tradition of
the Church.
I was advised by my professors at Harvard that there were three places
I might supply this deficiency: Louvain, Toronto, or Washington.  Louvain
seemed too distant; Toronto, meaning the Institute of Medieval Studies,
seemed too narrow.  I chose Washington, which meant The Catholic Uni-
versity of America and its School of Philosophy.
There was a difficulty, however.  I couldn’t enter on a graduate pro-
gram in philosophy without ever having had a course in philosophy.  An
alternative suggested itself, inspired no doubt by my experience of tutori-
als at Cambridge.  Why not engage tutors at Catholic University to instruct
me in the areas, not just philosophy, that bore on the Catholic intellectual
tradition?
Three of these tutors I commemorate today.  Two were priests, who
would accept no remuneration for their work.  One was a layman with a
family to support, and I paid him a modest stipend.  My father was its
source, as he was for my living expenses, so that I devoted all my energies
to this new area of study.
With Vincent Smith, I began the reading of the Summa Theologiae of
Thomas Aquinas.  It was like being thrown into a bath of very cold water.  I
had never read anything like it before.  What a way to present an argu-
ment, to put the objections first!  As the objections were often strongly
stated, they caught one’s mind and held it.
Smith was a wonderful teacher.  He let me assail him with the objec-
tions.  Never dogmatically, always quietly reasonable, Smith replied.  No
doubt I was open to persuasion.  What struck me most about Smith was
that he took philosophical principles seriously.  They were not catchwords,
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
(659)
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not mere academic formulas.  They were truths that he had incorporated
into his mind, truths by which he lived.  He was not simply a professor of
philosophy.  He was a philosopher.  I learned something from the Summa.
I learned very much more from Vincent Smith.
Commemorating him today, I cannot refrain from recalling my last
encounter with him.  I had gone on to practice law and he had become a
faculty member at St. John’s University in New York.  For reasons now ob-
scure, the University had discharged thirty-one of its faculty.  I was asked
by the Association of American University Professors (AAUP) to investi-
gate.  I did and found flagrant actions by the administration that led to
sanctions by the AAUP.  In the course of my investigation, an unexpected
witness was Vincent Smith.  He was not one of the thirty-one fired faculty.
He had resigned to protest the firings.  For a man with a family to feed, it
was a courageous action, animated by principles that were part of Vincent
Smith’s being.
Edward Arbez, the second of my tutors, was a Frenchman, born in
1881.  At an early age, he had entered on studies for the priesthood, and
he had become a Sulpician, or a member of the congregation of St. Sul-
pice, devoted to the education of priests.  He had committed himself to
the study of Scripture, surviving although regretting the strictures placed
on Catholic exegetes in the exaggerated official reaction to the Modernist
heresy.  He was a co-founder of the Catholic Biblical Association and a
guide to the new era of scriptural scholarship following the encyclical
Divino Afflante Spiritu in 1943.
I began the study of Scripture with Arbez.  I was familiar, of course,
with the excerpts from the Gospels and the excerpts from the Epistles read
at Mass.  Like most Catholics at the time I was not familiar with the Bible
as a whole.  The Evangelicals put us to shame.  The idea of picking up the
Bible and reading it had not occurred to me.  When I read biblical texts at
Sunday Mass, I understood them as they were expounded by the Sunday
homilist—then, as now, with a remarkable degree of literalism.
Arbez gently introduced me to a different approach.  I do not remem-
ber now what I read with him.  I do recall that at times I was a ferocious
literalist.  For example, as to the reference in 1 Kings 10:22 to “ships of
Tarshish,” I wanted to know if Tarshish was really a seaport.  With ques-
tions of this sort I probed the texts for literal accuracy.  Arbez was never
dogmatic, never unresponsive.  He led me to new comprehensions of the
large variety of communications conveyed by Scripture.  The divine breath
had breathed on many tongues and pens.  The word of God had not
dropped from the sky.  Scriptural communications came with contexts,
histories, stylistic idiosyncrasies, linguistic innovations.  You could not pick
up the Bible and read it like a newspaper.  Scripture was charged.
The third of my teachers at this time was a theologian Edmund Darvil
Benard, a priest of the diocese of Springfield, Massachusetts and a gradu-
ate of Le Grande Se´minarie in Montreal.  Benard was deeply conscious of
his American identity.  He enjoyed singing The Battle Hymn of the Republic.
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In preparing this paper, I discovered that in high school Benard was a
runner-up in a national contest of students speaking on the Constitution
of the United States.  Despite this American identity, he had a Gallic qual-
ity, a finesse of feature and of mind, a quickness of intellect, and a re-
sourcefulness in argument that made every argument with him
exhilarating.
He taught a course at Catholic University that was, I believe, entitled
“Apologetics,” and apologetics is what I undertook to study with him.  The
name, not very common today, suggests apology, but in its Latin root apolo-
gia it means “a rational defense” as in Newman’s autobiography, Apologia
pro Vita Sua.  Benard was adept in a rational defense of the doctrines of the
Church.
Once more I cast myself as the questioner, the aggressive questioner,
more so with him than with the other two because he enjoyed it more.  I
invited him out at times to dinner.  He introduced me to his friend Eu-
gene Burke, a Paulist, and sometimes I went golfing with them.  Our
friendship continued over the next several years as I settled into the philo-
sophical graduate program at Catholic University.
What stands out in particular memory is a trip I took back to Washing-
ton from North Carolina, where I had been visiting John Kennedy (not
the president).  Benard and Burke had been on vacation, playing golf at
Pinehurst.  I met them by prearrangement and rode back with them.  All
the way, or so it seemed to my clerical companions, I argued with them
about John Courtney Murray’s new argument for religious liberty.  How
was religious liberty for all reconcilable with the teachings of Leo XIII, of
Pius IX, of Gregory XVI, not to mention the teachings and actions of me-
dieval popes?  Benard never shut off my challenges, although I think that
he tired a bit on this trip of six or seven hours.  “You ought to talk to
Murray yourself,” he said, and I eventually did at Woodstock in Maryland.
At this time, and for some time to come, I had a narrow sense of the
development of doctrine.
Benard, I should add, was an authority on Newman and wrote a book
about Newman.  Newman’s name was scarcely unknown to me, but I
should credit Benard with leading me to a greater appreciation of New-
man’s range and depth as the best of all theologians writing in English.
Smith, Arbez, Benard.  I turn from the special pleasure of touching
on memories of my twenties to teachers I learned from later.
My fourth teacher in the tradition I met only once, but the occasion
and the lesson were memorable, and I was taught in addition by his books.
About 1950, I was still in graduate studies at the School of Philosophy at
the Catholic University when I heard that Jacques Maritain was teaching a
graduate seminar in philosophy at Princeton.  Maritain was widely re-
garded as the preeminent Catholic philosopher in the world.  I deter-
mined to attend at least one session of the seminar at Princeton and did
so.
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The subject of the session was “evil”, most specifically “moral evil.”
How did it occur?  How could it occur in a universe created and ruled by a
good God?  Maritain presented a view that was faithfully Thomistic: Evil
was an absence of good, a failure of the will, a kind of nothingness.  But
why did an all-good and all-powerful God permit this kind of failure to
occur?  Why had God created such fallible creatures?  Why did God not
foresee the failures and eliminate the occasions on which the evil would
arise?  To questions such as these Maritain had no answer.  Evil was a mys-
tery incapable of rational explanation, a blankness of unintelligibility.
The book of Maritain’s that I most valued was entitled The Person and
the Common Good.  In it he distinguished between “the person”, that is, each
human being with an end transcending this life, and what he termed “the
individual”, that is, each human being considered as part of humanity with
no end higher than the preservation of its life in this world.  In this frame-
work each of us was both a person and an individual.  As an individual, we
were properly subjected to the constraints necessary for society to func-
tion.  As a person, each of us had a drive and a destiny exceeding our
temporal condition and requiring respect from those shaping social con-
trols.  Recognition of the personhood of each human being did not by
itself create a charter of human rights, but rather offered a perspective
and possibilities for the development of such rights.  It was no accident
that Maritain was a key draftsman of the United Nations Charter of
Human Rights and a principal mentor of Pope Paul VI.
I valued what I learned from Maritain as well as what I learned from
E´tienne Gilson, who came to teach for a while at Berkeley and whom I
came to know and to entertain.  He told me one story of how he and
Maritain were given an audience by Pope Pius XII.  The audience went on
for over an hour.  A papal attendant then approached the pope with two
large medals to be awarded the philosophers.  “No, no,” the pope said.
“The usual ones.”
I turn to two teachers I met at the time of the Second Vatican Coun-
cil—Josef Fuchs and Bernard Ha¨ring.  Both were German.  Each was a
member of a religious order.  Fuchs was a Jesuit, Ha¨ring a Redemptorist.
Each was a master of moral theology.  Each I came to know at a time that
the lawfulness of contraception was becoming a controversial topic in the
Church.
Ha¨ring is the only theologian, or at least the only prominent moral
theologian, to have published an autobiography.  How essential it is to
know the experiences that have shaped the moralist!  Ha¨ring’s book, Em-
battled Witness, focuses on his experience as a medic drafted into the Ger-
man army at the beginning of World War II.  Violating army regulations
that denied his priestly status, he frequently celebrated mass and heard
confessions, becoming adept in disobeying obligatory rules in order to
serve a higher end.  At times he compromised with the military system.
“Not Quite Like Christ” is the title of one chapter in which he painfully
puzzles over his compromises.  In sum, this slim volume affords an insight
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into someone whose major work—The Law of Christ—was a breakthrough
in Catholic moral theology.
I met Ha¨ring when he was teaching at the Alfonsiana, a graduate
center.  The story was told in Rome that Joseph Ratzinger had visited the
school and had asked for student responses to his talk on the harmony of
theology.  “The harmony might be there if the trombone was not so loud,”
one student volunteered.  The reference to Roman interventions was
unmistakable.
Ha¨ring himself was looked at with suspicion by supervisory figures in
the Holy Office.  “We will catch that herring,” they were reported to have
said.  They never did.  Just as he had not always obeyed army regulations
and yet escaped discipline, so Ha¨ring knew his way around ecclesiastical
censorship.  He still experienced a burden.  Once, later in our friendship,
as I was driving him from South Bend to Chicago, he told me of some of
his early difficulties.  In Rome under Pius XII, the most that a moralist
could say about a college or high school dance was that it was not always
sinful.  I didn’t hesitate to tell him that in America Catholic colleges and
high schools sponsored dances regularly.
In the later years of his teaching, Ha¨ring was afflicted with a disease
that affected his vocal chords.  He submitted to the use of a box by which
his voice could be transmitted—conveying communication that was always
conscientious, always acute, always kind.
Soldier in Hitler’s army and solider of the Lord, was he carrying, as
the saying goes, water on both shoulders?  I was not called to judge, only
to learn.
Josef Fuchs, at the time I met him, was the leading Jesuit moral theo-
logian—an untitled position but one that carried with it an authority and
influence that marked him as exceptional.  His post was at the Gregoriana,
“the Greg,” the Jesuit university in Rome that educated seminarians and
priests from many different orders and from all parts of the world.
I encountered Fuchs in 1965 when I was invited to serve as a consult-
ant to the papal commission on the regulation of births.  The commission
had been created by Pope John XXIII and enlarged by Pope Paul VI.  The
commission had theologians, demographers, doctors, and three couples
representing the laity.  I was invited to join the sessions of the commission
because my book Contraception had just been published and contained the
only history of the development of doctrine touching this topic.
The commission was housed and met at a monastery on a road lead-
ing into Rome.  Awkwardly, the three wives among its members were
housed separately.  The meeting began early, lasted till a noon meal, then
adjoined for a siesta, and resumed from 4 PM to 7 PM.  The members
spoke thoughtfully and candidly.  When the members of the commission
assembled in 1965 some of them asked, “What do they want us to recom-
mend?”  Only gradually did the conviction come to the members that they
were “they.”  No one was prescribing their recommendations.
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It soon became clear to me that Fuchs was key.  His comments were
clarifying, careful, judicious.  He was not partisan.  He was no advocate.
His mind was open to alternatives.  He did not rush to judgment on issues
that must have been very familiar to him.
In contrast there was another member, also a Jesuit, also a professor
at the Greg.  He was dogmatic in his position that the prohibition of con-
traception was established, binding, and immutable.  When I offered the
analogy of the Church’s prohibition of usury and its development from its
formulation in twelfth century canon law, he was prepared.  At lunch, in
the courtyard, he extracted from his pocket a small-size copy of the Code of
Canon Law and opened it to the canon prohibiting usury.  To a literal
reader the words spoke literally.  For someone conscious of the Church’s
own use of banks the words required interpretation.  No one could have
supposed that the Holy See refused to take interest on its deposits with a
bank.  But the inspired literalist put his trust and his argument in the
words on the page.
When Fuchs joined the majority—the majority in every group, theolo-
gians, demographers, doctors, and laity—to recommend a change in the
rule on contraception, it seemed that the battle was over.
The Second Vatican Council was still in session, in fact nearing the
end of its fourth and final session.  John Ford, a Jesuit moralist teaching at
the Jesuit seminary in Weston, Massachusetts, and not a member of the
commission, went to Paul VI to persuade him to add something definitive
to the Council’s teaching in its proclamation of Gaudium et Spes on the
Church in the modern world.  A footnote then was added referring to
earlier papal condemnation of contraception.  The commission was by-
passed but not trumped.
In fact the work of the commission, again enlarged by the pope, con-
tinued.  Only in 1968 did Paul VI issue Humanae Vitae, the encyclical read
by American bishops as a comprehensive prohibition of contraception but
not so treated by the bishops of Belgium, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands.
Fuchs was a frequent visitor to the United States.  I entertained him
once in Berkeley.  My son, John, aged about six, dragged him upstairs to
see a favorite TV show, Hogan’s Heroes, featuring American prisoners
matching wits with their blundering German guards.  I had thought myself
that Fuchs looked like a U-Boat commander.  Did John make a similar
judgment?  I know only that with the composure characteristic of his bal-
anced mind Fuchs watched the show and rejoined the party.  No situation,
no difficulty was going to disturb his equilibrium.
Czeslaw Milosz—Chester Love in translation—was first the teacher of
my wife, Mary Lee.  A professor of Slavic Languages, Milosz taught a
course on Dostoevsky.  Dostoevsky in his novels showed some disdain for
Poles and Catholics.  Milosz was a Catholic and, although Lithuanian by
birth, a writer of Polish.  “Poles and Russians do not like each other,” he
has written.  Nothing of this sort prevented him from a profound appreci-
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ation of Dostoevsky.  In his course, one great writer explored the heart of
another great writer’s writing.
I didn’t have such an experience of Milosz as a teacher.  I still would
like to think of him as a teacher because eventually I met him as a neigh-
bor in Berkeley and as a fellow parishioner of the Paulist parish of the
Holy Spirit.
The first work of Milosz that I read was The Captive Mind, an analysis of
the thinking of Polish intellectuals who conformed to Communism as it
was imposed by their Soviet masters.  Perhaps self-reflection played a part
in its composition.  Milosz himself conformed enough to be given a diplo-
matic assignment in America by the Communist regime in Warsaw.  In his
analysis I came to see how Communism had conquered by means more
subtle than force.
Milosz had graduated from law school in the early 1930s, but law was
not a profession he cherished.  He was, above all, a poet—that is, a man
for whom the precise words recording his precise thoughts or feelings
were what he sought and found.  Paradoxically, he wrote in Polish so what
I know of his poetry is a translation.  He chose his translators thoughtfully
and, I believe, guided them, so that I hear his voice in what presents itself
in English.
To converse with a poet—a poet of the first rank—was an education
in itself.  What did I learn?  To value the poet as an instrument, a human
instrument through whom the divine spoke, a being in every way no differ-
ent from other humans but selected to transmit visions.
Milosz’s first wife, Janina, I did not know before her death, but his
second wife, Carol, was an American, who had been a graduate student in
English at the University of North Carolina.  With Carol, both Mary Lee
and I were comfortable.  She was a bridge to the poet.  Much younger
than he was, she tragically died before he did.  A survivor, he had survived
many losses, and he survived this loss.
I conclude with lines from one collection of his poetry, not entirely
joyful but joyously entitled Bells in Winter.  The lines come from a short
poem entitled “An Hour”:
Leaves glowing in the sun, zealous hum of bumble bees,
From afar, from somewhere beyond the river, echoes of lingering
voices
And the unhurried sounds of a hammer gave joy not only to me.
Before the five senses were opened, and earlier than any
beginning
They waited, ready, for all those who would call themselves
mortals,
So that they might praise, as I do, life, that is, happiness.
One might read these lines differently, but I read them as identifying
life with happiness, an extraordinary affirmation by a survivor.
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PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT LEGAL AND WHO ARE NOT ALIVE
IN THE EYES OF THE LAW
RICHARD W. PAINTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Persons and Masks of the Law,1 John T. Noonan, Jr. juxtaposes legalrules based upon abstract principles with the persons whose lives are
affected by these legal rules.  Judges and legal commentators articulate
and expound upon legal rules and abstract principles, but often ignore
the persons who are the subjects of the law. Persons and Masks of the Law
addresses this imbalance by introducing the reader to the people in fa-
mous and not so famous cases, ranging from the coincidental plaintiff,
Mrs. Palsgraf in 1928,2 to the slaves subjected to Virginia’s colonial laws.3
This Essay explores the interaction of persons with the law in two con-
texts.  The first is a person who is considered to be “illegal” in a particular
jurisdiction because he or she is not legally present in the jurisdiction.
The second is a factual dispute about whether or not a person is “alive,” an
issue that arises when judges try to define the boundaries of human life,
both the very beginning of human life and the very end.  This Essay raises
questions about personhood and the law in these two contexts.  This Es-
say’s normative conclusions, however, are limited.  Meaningful conclu-
sions about what courts and lawmakers should do with respect to persons
who are present in the jurisdiction but are not legally here, or about per-
sons who may or may not yet/still be alive, requires more thoughtful con-
sideration than space or time allows here.  The question raised here is
whether abstract “masks of the law” imposed by legislatures and/or by
courts avoid difficult questions about persons and their legal rights and
instead take the path of justice down a short cut that treats some people as
if they do not exist.
II. WHEN COURTS RULE THAT PERSONS ARE NOT “LEGAL”
Sometimes the law acknowledges that a person exists, but labels that
person “illegal” because he or she is not lawfully present in the jurisdic-
tion.  “Illegal immigrant” and “illegal alien” are common terms for such a
person, although sometimes the person is simply said to be an “illegal.”
* S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law, University of Minnesota;
Fellow, Harvard Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University (2014–15).  The
author clerked for Judge Noonan from 1987 to 1988.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, & WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (5th ed. 2002).
2. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
3. See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 35–51, 142.
(667)
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This shorthand phrase allows an adjective embodying the mask of illegality
to become a noun describing the person, conveying the fact that our soci-
ety deems other aspects of personhood in this context to be irrelevant.  A
different and more specific noun is ordinarily used to describe an object
illegally imported into the jurisdiction or illegally manufactured in the ju-
risdiction, such as an illegal drug or an illegal rendition of a copyrighted
movie, but an illegal person can simply be referred to as an “illegal.”
This “illegal” label—whether used as an adjective or noun—some-
times attaches to entire families of people but sometimes attaches only to
fathers and/or mothers, but not to their children, or vice versa.  Relation-
ships between parents and their children and other familial ties are impor-
tant for determining legal status only if the law says so, for example, if one
or both of a child’s parents are citizens.  If not, and if the law designates
some family members as legal and others as illegal, separation may be
required.4
What impact does using the word “illegal” to describe a person have
on a person’s legal rights?  Does our practice of deeming people “illegal”
because they are illegally present in the jurisdiction invite courts to deny
to these persons fundamental rights, including the right to due process?
While the Constitution does not define due process differently for
persons legally and illegally present in the United States, our courts in
practice do treat “illegals” differently.  Consider the following account of
the procedures used by federal magistrates in “Operation Streamline,”
which began in 2005 as part of a “zero tolerance” policy toward illegal
immigration:
Most of the new deportees passing by describe having been
shackled hand and foot for the Streamline court in Tucson.
Many have just spent 30 days or more at a facility in Florence,
one run by Corrections Corporation of America, a private prison
behemoth that jails Streamline convicts for the U.S.
government. . . .
Migrants—who once would have been removed from the country
through a civil-administrative process and barred from legal re-
entry—now return home with a criminal record that could ex-
pose them to escalating punishment if they cross the border
again to escape poverty, find work, and/or reunite with loved
ones.
Streamline began as a “zero tolerance” approach to border en-
forcement during President George W. Bush’s administration.
Before its advent in 2005, aliens apprehended by the Border Pa-
4. Laws that compel splitting up families because of a person’s legal status are
not new to our legal system; before the Emancipation Proclamation, slaves were
also subjected to this experience because some were deemed to be the property of
one person and some the property of another person.
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trol generally were not prosecuted under existing criminal
statutes. . . .
[The magistrate judge] dispenses with the men and women in his
court in seven-person bursts.  The defendants before him are
dressed in the dirty, sweaty clothes they were captured in, their
hands shackled to their waists, their ankles in fetters.
They look weary and morose.  They have not had baths or show-
ers after several days in the desert, and the funk from this forced
lack of hygiene pervades the courtroom.  Indeed, the wall nearest
to where the remainder of the defendants are still seated is black-
ened with the dirt from countless bodies.
Beside each defendant in front of [the magistrate] is a lawyer,
often a private attorney hired by the court for $125 an hour
under the provisions of the U.S. Criminal Justice Act, which guar-
antees counsel to the indigent.  Some are represented by salaried
federal public defenders.  Each lawyer has four to six clients in a
day’s Streamline lineup.
[The magistrate] runs through a series of questions relayed to
each migrant with the rapidity of an auctioneer, mumbling as he
goes, head down.
Individually, he asks them compound questions, translated into
Spanish by an interpreter and transmitted to them via head-
phones: Do you understand your rights and waive them to plead
guilty?  Are you a citizen of Mexico (or Guatemala or El Salva-
dor), and on such-and-such a date near such-and such a town,
did you enter the United States illegally?
The answers never vary: “Sı´.”
Then he asks them, as a group, whether anyone has coerced
them into a plea of guilty.  “No,” the chorus replies.
Again, they’re asked, as a group, whether they are pleading guilty
voluntarily because they are in fact guilty.  The chorus cries, “Sı´.”
First-timers receive time served for the petty offense of illegal
entry.
Those charged with illegal reentry, a felony, plead guilty to the
lesser offense of illegal entry and get anywhere from 30 to 180
days. . . .
However, in December 2009, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found in U.S. vs. Roblero-Solis that Streamline hearings vio-
lated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
[requiring] that judges “must address the defendant personally
21
Brennan: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.: An Introduction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-4\VLR404.txt unknown Seq: 4 26-SEP-14 14:16
670 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 667
in open court” and determine whether the defendant’s guilty
plea and waiver of rights is voluntary. . . .
The Ninth Circuit did not tackle constitutional issues, leaving it
up to magistrates as to how they should proceed.  Nevertheless,
the Ninth Circuit made clear that it frowned upon magistrates
taking pleas en masse, which was occurring prior to Roblero-Solis.5
The opinion referenced in this news article, United States v. Roblero-Solis,6
was written by Judge Noonan.  Marginal improvements have resulted in
the due process rights of accused illegal immigrants, but these cases con-
tinue to be dispensed with very quickly and with minimal due process.
John Noonan has addressed this problem in both his scholarship7
and in written opinions on the Ninth Circuit.8  Noonan acknowledges that
the law sometimes requires that a person who is here illegally be deported,
usually to return to the country from which he or she came.  However,
Noonan also recognizes that when a judge makes such a decision about a
person, that person is entitled to the same due process rights as other
persons who are parties to civil or criminal cases in our courts.9
By embracing political principles that deem a person to be “illegal”
because that person is illegally present in the country, our society perhaps
invites such due process abuses.  We fail to recognize that these cases in-
volve parties who are persons—a fact that does not change because these
persons are accused of doing something illegal, usually the act of entering
the country without permission and sometimes other illegal acts as well.
Ironically, we got to this point incrementally; the law has not always
been this way.  Many of our ancestors came to America without permission
from the people who were already here.  The Mayflower passengers in
1620 were among the earliest of these immigrants, but there were tens of
thousands more.  The Mayflower passengers left their home country ille-
gally (they did not get permission to emigrate from England), and went to
another country (Holland), where they obtained a ship and sailed to
America.  They did not know if they would be welcome.  They did not ask
permission to come.  They simply came.
The Americans who were already here could have killed the
Mayflower passengers, or they could have detained them and sent them
5. Stephen Lemons, Grinding Justice: Operation Streamline Costs Millions, Tram-
ples the Constitution, Treats Migrants like Cattle, and Doesn’t Work, PHOENIX NEWTIMES
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2010-10-21/news/grinding-
justice-operation-streamline-costs-millions-tramples-the-constitution-treats-mig
rants-like-cattle-and-doesn-t-work/, cited in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W.
PAINTER, PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 658–60 (3d
ed. 2011).
6. 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
7. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905
(2006).
8. See, e.g., Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692.
9. See generally id.
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back to England.  Or, they could have welcomed them to America and
taught them how to support themselves here.  These Americans—some-
times referred to as “Indians” or “Native Americans”—apparently chose
the latter course of action, a choice we are reminded of each year when we
celebrate Thanksgiving.10  Descendants of the Mayflower passengers now
number in the hundreds of thousands, and some have joined a society that
honors the memory of these pilgrims and the Native Americans who
helped them.11
Many subsequent waves of immigrants came to America, and some
did not fare so well with Americans who were already here.  Altercations
sometimes broke out, with violence on both sides.  King Philip’s War was
one of the most noted early conflicts in Massachusetts.12  The immigration
story in America is a complex one.  Fear, prejudice, and violence some-
times predominate, while at other times, new immigrants make a genuine
effort to integrate themselves into the existing order of society, and that
society makes a genuine effort to accept the immigrants.  For more than a
century, however, all of this took place in the absence of federal laws im-
posing meaningful restrictions on who did and did not have a legal right
to be here.
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States em-
barked on a concerted effort to regulate and limit the flow of new immi-
grants to its shores.13  Although our population is not as dense as those of
other major world powers, including China, India, and the European
Union, these laws presumably assume that we can accommodate only a
10. The comedian and entertainer Will Rogers, himself of Cherokee descent,
once jokingly suggested that the Native Americans in this instance should have
taken a harsher stance against immigration:
ROGERS: Well, I think I am, folks Indian.  Both mother and father had
Cherokee in their blood in them born and raised in the Indian Territory.
Course I’m not one of these Americans whose ancestors come over on
the Mayflower, but eh, we met them at the boat when they landed.  It’s
always been to the everlasting discredit of the Indian race that we ever let
them land.  What, it’s the only thing I blame the Indians for, the biggest
bonehead they ever pulled . . . .
CAL. STATE PARKS, Video Transcript, Will Rogers: American, http://www.parks.ca.gov/
pages/735/files/willrogersorientation.pdf (last visited July 31, 2014) (alteration in
original).
11. See MASS. SOC’Y OF MAYFLOWER DESCENDANTS, Scholarships from the Society,
http://www.massmayflower.org/membership/benefits/scholarships/scholarships
.htm (last visited July 31, 2014) (announcing scholarship applications for Wampa-
noag Nation descendants in honor of that tribes’ assistance to Mayflower passen-
gers and requiring “proof of membership in the Wampanoag Nation by a tribal
official’s certification that the applicant is a bona fide member of a Tribe of the
Wampanoag Nation” for scholarship eligibility purposes).
12. See generally JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF WAR: KING PHILIP’S WAR AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY (2009).
13. See The Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2–9, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); The Immigration Act
of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551–1574
(2012)); The Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed
1943); The Page Act, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1943).
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limited number of new immigrants and that we need to enforce these lim-
its.  We have to varying degrees and in various ways enforced these laws, at
one point sending boatloads of Jewish refugees back to Nazi Germany to
face extermination because America did not choose to make room for
them.14  Immigrants who were allowed to come from, among other places,
Ireland, Italy, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan, often faced prejudice
upon arrival and occasionally violence from those who were already settled
here.  The law sometimes offered relief, but at other times stood idle or
was prejudiced against immigrants, even if that prejudice resulted in the
taking of human life15 or the internment of people without trial, includ-
ing U.S. Citizens, simply because of their ancestry.16
Like the Pilgrims who came before them, millions of people still
come to the United States, some without permission.  However, many new
Americans today are deemed to be here illegally because their act of enter-
ing the country without permission violated a specific provision of the
United States Code.  They are “illegal” persons.
Judges should recognize that these immigrants are persons rather
than nonentities hidden behind the mask of illegality and should allow
these immigrants the same due process rights as other persons in their
courts.  There is, however, little else that judicial officers can do to address
the situation.  A broken immigration system created by federal statutes in-
vites both unauthorized immigration to the United States and mass
processing of cases against persons accused of coming here illegally.  Presi-
dents Bush and Obama have urged Congress to fix our immigration sys-
tem,17 but Congress has so far done nothing.  Giving people hope—
substantial and meaningful hope—of being permitted to come to the
United States legally and to work here legally is a necessary part of any
reform that would reduce the number of people who enter the country
illegally.  Reduced illegal immigration would lighten our courts’ immigra-
tion caseloads and perhaps allow meaningful attention to the concerns
14. See SARAH A. OGILVIE & SCOTT MILLER, REFUGE DENIED: THE ST. LOUIS
PASSENGERS AND THE HOLOCAUST 105–06 (2010).
15. See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369 (1926); see also NOONAN &
PAINTER, supra note 5, at 619–49 (discussing trial transcript).
“I met Judge Thayer once.  This too was some years after the trial.  We
were in his chambers in Boston settling an automobile accident case . . . .
I realized that Judge Thayer was no longer talking about our case, but
strutting up and down and boasting that he had been fortunate enough
to be on the bench when those sons of bitches had been convicted.”
Id. at 564 (quoting Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3
(1951)) (excerpting Charles Curtis’s account of his later meeting with Judge that
presided over Sacco trial).
16. See Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944)
(holding that internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II was
constitutionally valid).
17. President Bush and President Obama have proposed numerous bills dur-
ing their administrations.
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Judge Noonan and others have raised about fundamental due process
rights.
Our present immigration system is a grave threat to the rule of law in
our country, not because people emigrate without permission, as many
have done before them, but because the immigration system has become
so chaotic that our judicial officers cannot enforce the law without violat-
ing constitutional rights.  Our present immigration system is also a threat
to our national identity, which embraces—with conviction, even if sporadi-
cally in practice—substantive and procedural rights of persons in their re-
lationship with the state, individual rights often described by the word
“freedom”.  We also embrace the concept of America being a nation of
many cultures, and the custom of welcoming immigrants goes back to the
days of the Mayflower.  These are the reasons so many people want to live
here.  Making our immigration system conform to the traditional values of
our Country is a critically important task and a task that ultimately can
only be accomplished by the President and Congress.
III. WHEN COURTS SAY PERSONS ARE NOT ALIVE
Judges sometimes must decide if a live person exists in a particular
case.  In the temporal realm as we know it, human life has a beginning and
an end, or at least the law assumes as much (there is no secular legal rec-
ognition of the concept of “eternal life”).  Courts struggle, however, to
discern the beginning of human life as well as to discern the end of
human life.  To make these distinctions, courts sometimes look to abstract
principles and legal rules that higher courts previously articulated for de-
fining the span of human life.  Alternatively, as Judge Noonan’s scholar-
ship suggests would be preferable, at least when possible, courts could
make findings of fact about whether there is a live human being in each
particular case in which a party alleges that the case concerns the interests
of a live human being.
One risk of allowing abstract legal principles to define human life is
that courts can apply the prevailing principles of the day and decide that a
being is not fully “human” or is not fully “alive,” even if faced with over-
whelming evidence of a live human being.  Legal principles are thus al-
lowed to constrict that person’s existence in the eyes of the law.  The
person is deemed not to be a person or only partially a person, having
some legal rights, but not others, presumably because some abstract prin-
ciple requires it.  Judge Noonan wrote about just such a legal regime in his
account of colonial Virginia’s laws with respect to slaves.18  The abstract
principles applied in these instances may be designed to protect another
person’s actual or perceived legal rights (in Judge Noonan’s example, the
rights of the slave holder) and/or to prevent the political crisis that could
result if the other person’s “rights” are threatened.  These abstract legal
principles, however, have little to do with the facts.
18. See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 35–51, 142.
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The Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford19 thus weighed the legal
rights of slaves against the claimed property rights of slave owners.  Be-
cause the Court did not recognize slaves to fully be persons under the law,
it found in the slave holders’ favor.  This result was overturned by a bloody
Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, but the
decision was grounded in the Court allowing abstract legal principles, in-
cluding principles embodied in the Constitution at the time, to be the
basis for factual assumptions about human beings.  The Court knew there
was no such thing as “three-fifths” a person in the real world, but it none-
theless followed an abstract legal principle that a slave was barely half a
person.
Nearly 120 years later, the Court in Roe v. Wade20 faced a situation that
was much more difficult to decide: whether or not a human life worthy of
protection under the law is taken away by an abortion.  Specifically, the
legal question in Roe was whether or not there existed a compelling state
interest in prohibiting abortion that overrides the privacy rights of the
mother.  This legal question turns in large part on a factual question of
whether the aborted fetus is a live human being.  The Court discussed this
question at length, relying on abstract legal principles—some dating back
to Greek and Roman law—and also on then-modern medical facts related
to fetal development during the first six months of gestation.21  In con-
cluding, the Court articulated a legal principle that defined the beginning
of human life, or at least human life worthy of protection by the law, draw-
ing the line at three months.
“End of life” situations are another category of cases in which a court
may decide whether an alive person exists or whether a person is deceased
in-fact (these definition-of-death cases are different from the “right to die”
cases in which it is acknowledged that a person is alive and steps are taken
to end that life at that person’s direction or the direction of another).  In
definition-of-death cases,22 courts decide when a person who once existed
no longer exists, either because they have disappeared or because their
bodily and mental functions have eroded to a point where a person is
deemed to be dead.  Once again, abstract legal principles could determine
the outcome of these cases regardless of the actual facts—saying that a
person is “legally dead” or “legally alive” regardless of whether the person
19. 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1856).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. See id. at 160–61 (“The Aristotelian theory of ‘mediate animation,’ . . .
continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite
opposition to this ‘ensoulment’ theory from those in the Church who would recog-
nize the existence of life from the moment of conception.”); see also id. at 160, 160
nn. 59–60 (discussing medical evidence on viability of fetus).
22. See, e.g., Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 533
(1988) (defining death related to young man’s suicide attempt and doctor’s subse-
quent diagnosis of “brain dead”); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976) (discussing
evolving definition of death regarding “brain dead” child and medical technology
advancement).
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is in fact dead.23  Alternatively, the decision could be less grounded in
abstract principles and based instead upon the facts in each case.
This distinction between abstract principles based jurisprudence and
facts based jurisprudence makes a big difference in both abortion and end
of life cases.  Abstract legal principles defining the human life span may
originate from human perceptions of factual evidence of there being life
or no life in a particular instance, but after one court articulates a legal
principle, others may follow it.  The Roe Court even cited Roman law, al-
though it did not follow it.  Stare decisis requires courts to follow the legal
principles of higher courts in their jurisdictions.  By contrast, factual con-
clusions depend upon facts in a particular case and are not binding prece-
dent.  Indeed, what some other court decided about factual evidence—
even similar factual evidence—in some other case, is usually only margin-
ally relevant or not relevant at all in a new case involving new facts.
In situations where advances in science inform human perception of
factual evidence, human perception of even very similar facts is likely to
change as science changes over time.  To the extent courts decide cases
defining the beginning and end of the human life span based upon scien-
tific analysis of evidence, courts’ conclusions about the existence of
human life in very similar factual scenarios could change.
But changes to factual assumptions and the legal rules that follow
from those assumptions can have a political cost.24  Particularly, if some
people could have their legal rights curtailed, all three branches of gov-
ernment could be threatened with political turmoil when a court attempts
to make what it believes to be an accurate finding of fact that diverges
from what other courts have done before.  Courts may choose instead not
to change their decisions about a controversial fact, even if scientific evi-
dence has changed and even if the question of fact is as important as the
existence or nonexistence of a human life.  A court can avoid the uncer-
tainties of scientific analysis and instead use abstract legal principles to
resolve the factual question.  In countries where the Catholic Church still
has great influence, the abstract principle defining the beginning of
human life might be based upon the factual conclusion that human life
begins at conception because the Church says so.  In more secular coun-
23. These cases turn, to varying degrees, on the factual circumstances that put
certain legal principles into play, but the legal principles sometimes control the
analysis at a very early stage, leading to absurd conclusions. See, e.g., John Schwartz,
Declared Legally Dead, as He Sat Before the Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/us/declared-legally-dead-as-he-sat-before-the-
judge.html?_r=0 (reporting case of Donald Miller, Jr., Ohio man who went missing
for several years, was declared dead, and then later re-emerged, appearing at court
where Hancock County Court still declared Mr. Miller to be dead for Social Secur-
ity purposes).  This man was still legally dead even if he could stand before the
Court and make it obvious to everyone present that he was in fact alive! See Joseph
Vining, Reading John Noonan, 59 VILL. L. REV. 715, 722–23 (2014).
24. This cost may be substantial, even if it is not as dramatic as a civil war that
the Supreme Court apparently tried to avoid with its abstract—and morally offen-
sive—definition of personhood in Dred Scott.
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tries such as the United States, the operative principle might be that
human life—or at least viable human life—begins three months after con-
ception because the United States Supreme Court said so in 1973 and has
not announced that it has changed its mind.
Legal precedent is thus allowed to do something that precedent nor-
mally does not do, which is to control determinations of fact in subsequent
cases for years or perhaps decades.  This continues until the precedent is
revisited by a court that is sufficiently influential, informed, and coura-
geous to do so when and if the scientific evidence suggests that the court
should make a determination of fact anew.  Until then, lower courts that
feel compelled to follow precedent on questions of fact simply fall into
line and follow the precedent, refusing to consider evidence that might
contradict it.  Precedent does not account for subsequent advances in
medicine and other sciences unless it is affirmed by a court that has actu-
ally considered those factors.  Precedent is still precedent, nonetheless.
To what extent is the weight of opinion in the medical community in
1973, about when a human fetus becomes a human being, if there was any
consensus in 1973, relevant for deciding that same question of fact in a
case forty-one years later in 2014?  The answer to this question is that the
view of the medical community in 1973, which influenced the opinion in
Roe v. Wade (it was authored by Justice Blackmun, who was the former
General Counsel of the Mayo Clinic) is very relevant—and indeed far
more relevant than what the medical community believes in 2014—
whether or not those views have changed.25  The earlier opinion is incor-
porated into a legal rule26 that is widely believed to be binding precedent
in 2014 cases.  If, however, the legal rule in Roe is really only a factual
conclusion now forty-one years old about the beginning of human life,
one wonders what a judge should do with that opinion in 2014.
Judge Noonan wrote a lot on this question, mostly in the decade after
Roe was decided27 and before he joined the Court of Appeals.  This author
is not certain he agrees with what Judge Noonan said on that question
(defining the beginning of a human life is then as now a conceptually and
factually difficult task).  This author, however, has serious concerns about
assigning too much weight now to anyone’s conclusions about that ques-
25. This author does not express an opinion here as to whether those views in
the medical community have in fact changed or whether they are likely to change
in the future other than to point out the obvious: perceptions of empirical evi-
dence are different now than they were in 1973 and will likely be yet more differ-
ent in the future.  Consensus about ultimate conclusions may or may not be the
same.
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116–17 (“[W]e have inquired into, and in this opinion
place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that his-
tory reveals about man’s attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the
centuries.”).
27. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE
MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1–60 (John T. Noo-
nan, Jr. ed., 1970).
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tion in the 1970s and 1980s.  Facts are facts, and when human observation
of facts is shaped by quickly evolving medicine and science, courts and
commentators are obligated to reexamine those facts continuously to en-
sure to the best of their ability that these observations are correct.  This is
particularly true when facts concern the existence or nonexistence of a
human life.  No court—not even the Supreme Court—should consider
itself too busy to undertake that inquiry as often as needed to make the
best possible effort to get the facts right.
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THE BIOGRAPHY OF GRATIAN, THE FATHER OF CANON LAW
KENNETH PENNINGTON*
“WHO was Gratian?” asked John T. Noonan, Jr. at the beginning ofhis classic essay on the biography of the Father of Canon Law.
He continued:
That Gratian was the author of the Concordia discordantium ca-
nonum; that he was a teacher at Bologna; that he was a monk; and
that he was a Camaldolese are assertions made by all twentieth-
century historians of canon law.  That he was dead by 1159 is also
often added as a fact, that his school was at the monastery of
Saints Felix and Nabor is sometimes stated as certain or proba-
ble, and that he was born at Ficulle near Carraria or at Chiusi is
occasionally noted as likely.  An authoritative history adds that he
was probably educated as a monk at Classe in Ravenna.  From
these statements, meager as they are, a distinct picture emerges
of a scholar, bound to a particular monastic tradition, and cir-
cumscribed by particular places and dates.1
At the end of his essay and after a vigorous use of Ockham’s razor, Noo-
nan concluded that:
[W]e have reason to believe that Gratian composed and com-
mented upon a substantial portion of the Concordia.  In such
composition and commentary he revealed himself to be a
teacher with theological knowledge and interests and a lawyer’s
point of view.  He worked in Bologna in the 1130s and 1140s.
Beyond these conclusions, we have unverified hearsay, palpable
legend, and the silent figure in the shadows of S. Marco.2
Since John Noonan’s superb historical detective work using the standard
tools of criticism with admirable dexterity, we have added some very im-
portant, undoubted facts to Gratian’s biography.  After Anders Winroth’s
splendid discovery of an earlier recension of Gratian’s Decretum in the
* The Kelly-Quinn Professor of Ecclesiastical and Legal History, The Catholic
University of America, Washington, D.C., at the Columbus School of Law and the
School of Canon Law.
1. John T. Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the Father of
the Systematic Study of Canon Law, 35 TRADITIO 145, 145 (1979) [hereinafter Noo-
nan, Gratian Slept Here].  Noonan also wrote a very insightful essay about Causa 29
in which Gratian introduced the principle “error of person,” a concept that is still
an important norm in canonical marriage law (Codex iuris canonici c.1097 § 1). See
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Law School—A.D.1150, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1189
(1998) [hereinafter Noonan, Catholic Law School].
2. Noonan, Gratian Slept Here, supra note 1, at 172.
(679)
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1990s and the work of other scholars inspired by his discovery, we can also
state with absolute certainty that Gratian compiled and commented on the
Decretum in stages.3  For that reason, in this Essay, I shall abandon the ter-
minology of “Gratian I” and “Gratian II.”  Referring to the stages of the
Decretum as “Gratian I” and “Gratian II” gives a misleading picture of uni-
formity in how the Decretum evolved.  Gratian and later jurists who taught
and used the book never thought of it as a fixed text.  They added canons
to it at all stages of its evolution.  In this Essay, I will use the terms pre-
Vulgate and Vulgate to refer to Gratian’s great law book.  By Vulgate, I
mean the text that became the basic, introductory canon law text some-
time around 1140, without the numerous “paleae” added later in the
twelfth century.4
The research on the pre-Vulgate manuscripts has been enormously
interesting and, not surprisingly, has created areas of disagreement about
aspects of Gratian’s life, work, and teaching.  These scholarly debates have
given birth to a fruitful and vigorous exploration into the teaching and
development of law in the first half of the twelfth century.5  The issues are
many.  Perhaps the most important is the lack of consensus about how
long Gratian worked on the Decretum and how long he taught.  That will be
the focus of this Essay.
To further complicate the story of Gratian, Winroth has argued that
there were two Gratians.  The first Gratian compiled the pre-Vulgate
Decretum that Winroth discovered; a second “Gratian”—persona incog-
3. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 49 (2000); see
also Melodie H. Eichbauer, Gratian’s Decretum and the Changing Historiographical
Landscape, 11 HISTORY COMPASS 1111 (2013) (presenting most recent discussion of
historiographic problems discussed in recent literature with rich bibliography).
Orazio Condorelli has written the most recent biography of Gratian. See Orazio
Condorelli, Graziano, in DIZIONARIO BIOGRAFICO DEI GIURISTI ITALIANI (XII–XX
SECOLO) 1058–61 (Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone & Marco Ni-
cola Miletti eds., 2013).
4. See Peter Landau, Gratian and the Decretum Gratiani, in THE HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD, 1140–1234: FROM GRATIAN TO THE
DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY IX 22, 47–48 (Wilfried Hartmann & Kenneth Pen-
nington eds., 2008).
5. See, e.g., Anders Winroth, The Teaching of Law in the Twelfth Century, in LAW
AND LEARNING IN THE MIDDLE AGES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CARLSBERG ACAD-
EMY CONFERENCE ON MEDIEVAL LEGAL HISTORY 2005 41 (Helle Vogt & Mia Mu¨nster-
Swendsen eds., 2006) (arguing that teaching of Roman and canon law did not
begin until 1130s).  I have presented evidence that Roman law was cited in court
cases and was taught much earlier, probably as early as the traditional dates for the
beginnings of the law school in Bologna, circa 1075–1100. See Kenneth Pen-
nington, The “Big Bang”: Roman Law in the Early Twelfth-Century, 18 RIVISTA INTERNA-
ZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMUNE 43 (2007) [hereinafter Pennington, Big Bang]; see also
Kenneth Pennington, The Beginning of Roman Law Jurisprudence and Teaching in the
Twelfth Century: The Authenticae, 22 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMUNE
35 (2011) [hereinafter Pennington, Roman Law Jurisprudence]; Kenneth Pen-
nington, Roman Law at the Papal Curia in the Early Twelfth Century, in CANON LAW,
RELIGION, AND POLITICS: LIBER AMICORUM ROBERT SOMERVILLE 233 (Uta-Renate
Blumenthal, Anders Winroth & Peter Landau eds., 2012).
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nita—doubled the size of the Vulgate Decretum during the 1140s.  There is
very little evidence for his conjecture.6  He was compelled to create a sec-
ond Gratian because he had shrunk Gratian’s teaching career to only a
few years.  I will examine his reasons for doing so below.  My main argu-
ment for not accepting the theory that there were two Gratians is quite
simple.  It is difficult to imagine that if a Gratian compiled the pre-Vulgate
Decretum, and another person doubled the size from circa 2000 canons to
circa 4000, the first generation of jurists after Gratian would have not no-
ticed or not known about the second Gratian’s work and blithely attrib-
uted what was now a massive work to just “Gratian.”  Further, as we shall
see, the additional canons were not added in one fell swoop, but over
time.  Gratian may have had an atelier of assistants, but it seems unlikely
that another completely unknown person would step in to complete the
Vulgate Decretum with not only many canons but also dicta which all the
later jurists recognized as Gratian’s.
The main reason that Winroth created a second “Gratian” is because
of a text that is found in all the pre-Vulgate manuscripts.  At D.63 d.p.c.34
Gratian cited a papal conciliar canon.  The passage is contained in all pre-
Vulgate manuscripts and also in the Vulgate Decretum:
Nunc autem sicut electio summi pontificis non a cardinalibus
tantum, immo eta ab aliis religiosis clericisb auctoritate Nicolai
papae est facienda, sicc episcoporum electiod non a canonicis tan-
tum, sete ab aliis religiosis clericis, sicut in generalif synodog  In-
nocentii pape Romeh habita constitutum est.i
a et] etiam PFdBcAa BiFsMeMlMzPd b uiris uel clericis BiPd c sic]
ita et PFdBcAa BiFsMeMzPd, ita Ml d lectio Biace set] set etiam
PBcAa BiFsMeMlMzPd set etiamac, immo etiampc Fdf gnalaac,
gnalaspc Fd g studio add. ante synodo Biacg Roma Meh constitutum
6. His main argument is that the Vulgate Decretum is not as well organized as
the pre-Vulgate.  As I have pointed out in other examples of jurists expanding
their texts, their methodology of revising texts inevitably leads to a lack of clear
argumentation. See Kenneth Pennington, An Earlier Recension of Hostiensis’s Lectura
on the Decretals, 17 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 77 (1987); Kenneth Pennington,
Johannes Andreae’s Additiones to the Decretals of Gregory IX, 74 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVI-
GNY-STIFTUNG FU¨R RECHTSGESCHICHTE KANONISTISCHE ABTEILUNG 328 (1988); Ken-
neth Pennington, Panormitanus’s Lectura on the Decretals of Gregory IX, in
FA¨LSCHUNGEN IM MITTELALTER: INTERNATIONALER KONGREß DER MONUMENTA
GERMANIAE HISTORICA MU¨NCHEN, 16–19. SEPTEMBER 1986: GEFA¨LSCHTE RECHT-
STEXTE: DER BESTRAFTE FA¨LSCHER 363 (1988).  Winroth has also argued that Gra-
tian changed his mind in his treatment of the marriage of unfree persons. See
Anders Winroth, Neither Free nor Slave: Theology and Law in Gratian’s Thoughts on the
Definition of Marriage and Unfree Persons, in MEDIEVAL CHURCH LAW AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: A TRIBUTE TO KENNETH PENNINGTON 97 (Wolf-
gang P. Mu¨ller & Mary E. Sommar eds., 2006).  I do not find his argument convinc-
ing.  There are many changes in emphasis and topics as the Decretum evolved.
These changes are not proof that someone else made them, e.g., Gratian’s treat-
ment of Jews. See Kenneth Pennington, The Law’s Violence Against Medieval and
Early Modern Jews, 23 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMUNE 23 (2012).
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est] add. ait enim: Obeuntibus sane episcopis . . . add. Aa in textu,
add. Bc in marg.7
In translation:
Now, however, just as the election of the supreme pontiff is not
made only by the cardinals but by other religious clerics, as was
established by Pope Nicholas II’s authority, so too not only ca-
nons of the cathedral chapter but also other religious clergy par-
ticipate in the election of bishops as was established in the
general synod of Pope Innocent held in Rome.
Gratian’s comment is the last datable text in the pre-Vulgate manuscripts.
Pope Innocent II was the bishop of Rome from 1130 to 1143.  If one is
convinced, as Winroth and others are, that this text can refer only to c.28
of the Second Lateran Council, then one is faced with an almost intracta-
ble problem.8  In the pre-Vulgate manuscripts, this text is the only one
that can be dated after circa 1125.  That fact, if true, would raise the ques-
tion: what was Gratian doing between circa 1125 and 1139; or to put the
question differently, why would Gratian have compiled a collection of ca-
non law in the late 1130s that ignored all the conciliar legislation and
papal decretals after circa 1125; or to add further complexity, why would
Gratian add this reference in 1139 to a recent council and not add the text
of the canon; or even more puzzling, why did he not refer to other canons
of that singularly important council in his pre-Vulgate Decretum(s)?
In a recent article, Atria Larson has attempted to provide a possible
answer to some of those questions by arguing that, since late eleventh and
early twelfth century councils generally—and Innocent II’s councils in par-
ticular—repeated canons of previous councils almost word for word, one
might explore the possibility that Innocent held a council in Rome before
1139 and that is the council to which Gratian referred.9  Larson went on to
present evidence that Innocent might have held a council in Rome in
1133, and that council could be the one that Gratian cited.  Since the ca-
nons of this council are not preserved and since there is no other evidence
7. See GRATIAN, DECRETUM [hereinafter DECRETUM].  I base the translation on
St. Gall, Stiftsbibliothek 673 (Sg), 25–26 which I have collated with Paris, Bib-
liothe`que nationale de France nov. acq. lat. 1761 (P), fol. 65va; Florence, Bib-
lioteca nazionale centrale Conventi soppressi A.1.402 (Fd), fol. 12va.; Barcelona,
Arxiu de la Corona d’Arago´, Santa Maria de Ripoll 78 (Bc), fol. 76rb; and Admont,
Stiftsbibliothek, fol. 72v of the pre-Vulgate manuscripts, and with these very early
Vulgate manuscripts: Biberach, Spitalarchiv B 3515 (Bi), fol. 57vb; Bremen,
Universita¨tsbibliothek a.142 (Br), fol. sine numero; Mainz, Stadtbibliothek II.204
(Mz), fol. 44vb; Munich, Staatsbibliothek Clm 13004 (Me), fol. 78ra; and Clm
28161 (Ml), fol. 53v; Paris, Bibliothe`que nationale de France lat. 3884-1 (Pf), fol.
78ra, 14317, fol. 52va-vb (Pd).  I have not recorded minor scribal errors here and
in the text of Obeuntibus below.
8. See WINROTH, supra note 3, at 137.
9. See Atria A. Larson, Early Stages of Gratian’s Decretum and the Second Lateran
Council: A Reconsideration, 27 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 21, 37–39 (2007).
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for it, her conjecture cannot be considered conclusive.  Nonetheless, if
correct, it would explain what Gratian was doing in the 1120s and early
1130s: teaching canon law in Bologna and working on his textbook.  He
did not finish the pre-Vulgate Decretum circa 1140 but rather circa 1133.
Three of the pre-Vulgate manuscripts added the text and a rubric to
c.28.  The Florence and Barcelona manuscripts placed the canon in the
margins of their main texts.  Florence also had it in the supplementary
appendix at the back of the manuscript.  It is striking and important that
the marginal and supplemental texts of the canon in Florence are clearly
from two different textual traditions and must have been added at differ-
ent times.  The Admont manuscript incorporated it into the body of Gra-
tian’s text:
Sicut in generali sinodo Innocentii papae Romae  habita con-
stitutum est.Ait enim: Absque religiosorum uirorum consilio ca-
nonici maioris ecclesie episcopum non eligant.a  Obeuntibusb
sane episcopis quoniamc ultra tresd menses uacare ecclesiame
sanctorum patrum prohibent sanctionesf sub anathemateg in-
terdicimus, nech canonici de sede episcopalii ab electione episco-
porum excludant religiosos uiros, set eorum consilio honesta et
idonea personaj in episcopum eligatur.k  Quod sil exclusism religi-
osis electio facta fueritn, quod absque eorum consensuo et
coniuentiap factum fuerit, irritum habeaturq et uacuum.
Collated: Fdin marg. Fdin suppl. AaBcin marg.BiCdFsMeMzPdPfSa
a Absque—non eligant Fdin suppl.BcCdBiMeMzPdPfSa, om. Fdin marg.
Aab Abeuntibus Fdac, in suppl.BcMzpcPf cquo Aa d tres om. Aaac, add.
super lin. iii. Aapce ecclesias COGD2f prohibent patrum sanc-
tiones tr. COGD2 anathematis uinculo CdFsMzPd hne Aapc, ne
Fdin suppl.BiCdFsMeMzPdPfSa COGD2i episcoporum Fdin suppl.
jhonestam et idoneam personam Fdin suppl.CdMeMlMz k eligant
Fdin suppl.BcCdMeMlMzl si om. Aaacm exclusis] eisdem add. COGD2
nfacta fuerit] fuerit celebrata COGD2, legi non potest Fdin marg.,
fuerit Fs, fuerit facta tr. Pfoconsensu eorum tr. Mz p coniuentia
Aa: continentia Fd in marg., covenienti Saac, conuenientia Fdin
suppl.BcBiCdFsMeMlMzPfSapc COGD2, conniuentia Pd, var. in ap-
paratu COGD2 q habeant Fs10
10. Fd is the base text that is collated with AaBc, the manuscripts listed above
in note 7, and with the text in 2.1 CONCILIORUM OECUMENICORUM GENERALIUMQUE R
DECRETA (Antonio Garcı´a et al.eds., 2013).  113=COGD2 omits “Ait enim” of Gra-
tian’s dictum.  The new edition of COD3 did not introduce any changes into the
text.  The COGD2’s reading of “conuenientia,” which generally means a meeting,
seems less likely than the reading in Aa, which means “consent.”  “Coniuentia” can
be found in many twelfth century sources in contexts in which it means “consent.”
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In translation:
Indeed he [Innocent] says: Without the counsel of religious men the
canons of the major church may not elect a bishop.  Since the decrees
of the holy fathers prohibit a church to be left vacant for more
than three months, we forbid that under anathema and also that
the canons of the episcopal see may not exclude religious men
from the election of bishops.  Rather with their counsel may an
honest and worthy person be elected bishop.  But if an election is
carried out that excludes those religious men, because it was
made without their consent and agreement, the election shall be
held to be invalid and vacated.11
Although the manuscript tradition of the Second Lateran Council is rich,
there has not yet been a critical edition of the canons.  The text in Aa, Bc,
and Fd, in other words, cannot provide a proof of its origin by comparing
it to any current printed edition.  Nonetheless, one significant variant in
this canon gives pause.  Gratian’s text has “facta fuerit,” whereas all twenty
manuscripts containing this canon from Lateran II that Martin Brett has
collated have the reading “fuerit celebrata.”  “Celebrare” is the verb that
one would expect in a papal conciliar decree.  The other textual evidence
is the word “consensus” in the pre-Vulgate manuscripts instead of “assen-
sus,” in the manuscripts of Lateran II that Brett has collated.  “Consensus”
is juridicially more precise.  These two pieces of textual evidence are not,
however, a conclusive proof that Gratian’s source for this text was not the
Lateran II decrees, but it does introduce a modicum of doubt.12
What one may more confidently say is that the text in the three pre-
Vulgate manuscripts provides further evidence that Gratian “tweaked” his
pre-Vulgate Decretum after it began to circulate.  Of the three pre-Vulgate
manuscripts, Florence, Barcelona, and Admont, in which the text of Obeu-
ntibus is present, in Florence and Barcelona it is a marginal addition.  In
Admont, however, it is inserted into the body of the Decretum.  That does
not prove that the inserted text is from Lateran II or from an earlier coun-
cil, but it does lead one to the conclusion that the canons added later to
the Vulgate Decretum circulated in stages and were not received at other
law schools at one time.  The evidence for that last statement is contained
in the texts, margins, and appendices of pre-Vulgate manuscripts.  They
11. Translation based on Norman Tanner’s with minor changes. See 1 Decrees
of the Ecumenical Councils, NICAEA I-LATERAN V, at *203 (Norman Tanner ed., 1990);
2 TRENT-VATICAN II (Norman Tanner ed., 1990).
12. My thanks to Professor Martin Brett for providing me with his preliminary
edition of c.28.  I am currently working on an “edition” of the canons attributed to
Pope Innocent II in all the early manuscripts which will be published this year.
The results to date have provided evidence that none of the canons may be attrib-
uted to Lateran II.  The differences between the canons of Lateran II that Brett
has edited and those that Gratian incorporated into his Decretum are many and
significant.  I will publish an edition of the canons attributed to Innocent II in the
Decretum in the near future.
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provide textual evidence that the Vulgate canons were not copied into pre-
Vulgate manuscripts from complete Vulgate texts.13
There is further evidence in the pre-Vulgate manuscripts that Gratian
probably never conceived of his work as a definitively finished product.  In
the Paris (P), Florence (Fd), and Barcelona (Bc) manuscripts, Distinctions
100 and 101 and the canons of D.99 after c.1 are missing.14  In Fd, addi-
tional texts are inserted by a later hand.  However, the scribe of Fd’s main
text may have known more Distinctions were coming because he ended
D.99 c.1 with the notation “§ d.c. (Distinction 100).”  The scribe of Ad-
mont (Aa) included pre-Vulgate Distinctions 100–101 in the main text.
Barcelona added them on an inserted folia.  The only conclusion that can
be drawn from this textual evidence is that these manuscripts reflect
slightly different stages of a pre-Vulgate text that circulated over a wide
geographical area.  There was a pre-Vulgate Decretum circulating with 99
Distinctions and 36 Causae.  This version reached Northern France (P)
and the Iberian Peninsula (Bc).  Scribes in Italy learned of two new Dis-
tinctions (Fd), left space for them with a notation, and added them later.
In Bc, the revisions of the text were handled differently.  Originally, the
text omitted D.100–101 completely.  A folio was inserted into the manu-
script at a later time, and D.100–101 of the Vulgate text were included in
their entirety.15  The Admont scribe had an expanded pre-Vulgate
Decretum at hand and incorporated parts of D.100–101 into the text.16
The scribe, however, excluded most of the Vulgate text.17
How much time would have elapsed for these different stages of the
text to have circulated to Northern and Western Europe?  Again, the evi-
13. Contra WINROTH, supra note 3, at 130–33 (“The first recension of the
Decretum was not a living text.  It was a finished product which its author consid-
ered ready to be circulated. . . . I know of no manuscript (beyond Aa) which con-
tains a version of the Decretum that is longer than the first recension but shorter
than the second and that could be an intermediate stage . . . .”).  However, as
Melodie Harris Eichbauer has demonstrated, if the canons added to Fd, Bc, and
Aa were entered into the body of a new Decretum, it would not equal a Vulgate text.
See Melodie H. Eichbauer, From the First to the Second Recension: The Progressive Evolu-
tion of the Decretum, 29 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 119, 150–53 (2012).
14. See DECRETUM, supra note 7 (Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale de France nov.
acq. lat. 1761 (P), fol. 83v; Florence, Biblioteca nazionale centrale Conventi sop-
pressi A.1.402 (Fd), fol. 18vb-19ra).  Fd added the omitted texts in a hand that is
similar to the other marginalia and textual corrections in the manuscript.  The
hand of the main text ended on fol. 18vb with the notation: “§ d.c.”, i.e. “distinctio
centum”, which may indicate that the scribe knew that additional text would be
made available.  The scribe left room for the additional text.  In P, the scribe left
room after the last words of D.99 c.1., but the space would not have been sufficient
for D.100 and 101.  Winroth overlooked those omissions in his analysis. See
WINROTH, supra note 3, at 204.  In Bc, the missing texts are added on a new folio.
15. There was not enough room on folio 98r–98v for the entire text.  The
scribe squeezed D.100 d.p.c.8 to D.101 c.1 into the left hand margin of 98v.  For a
discussion on the inserted leaves in Bc, see Eichbauer, supra note 13, at 126–27.
16. See DECRETUM, supra note 7 (Aa fol. 92v-93r).
17. Admont also added D.99 c.4, 5, and D.101 c.1 to the main text of the
Decretum.
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dence does not provide us with any clues beyond the text itself.  One may
say, however, that the geographical spread of the manuscripts alone would
dictate that the time for these texts to circulate could not have been less
than a few years before they reached Northern France and the Iberian
Peninsula.  What was Gratian doing during those years?  I would say: teach-
ing and expanding his text in Bologna.
More can be said about the stages evident in pre-Vulgate texts.
Melodie Harris Eichbauer has done a careful study of the canons that were
added to the margins and to appendices in the Florence and Admont
manuscripts and to the margins of Barcelona.18  Winroth had concluded
that these canons must have been taken from Vulgate exemplars of Gra-
tian’s text.19  I was puzzled from the beginning why a jurist, institution, or
scribe would go to the trouble of creating an updated text that would have
been so difficult to use.  Eichbauer’s study revealed that the appendices
could not have been drawn from a Vulgate text.  The proof is in the num-
bers and in the fact that they were added by different scribes at different
times.  As it is, neither Admont nor Florence has all of the canons that
Gratian added when he compiled his Vulgate text.20  The numbers are not
small: Admont omits eighty-seven canons and Florence sixty-two from the
Vulgate.21  Significantly, the omitted canons are different in each manu-
script.  If one puts the numbers a little differently, between the two manu-
scripts, circa 117 canons are missing from the Vulgate text.  In percentage,
circa 8% of the Vulgate’s canons are not included in the margins or the
appendices of these two manuscripts.  These numerous omissions could
not be attributed to sloppy, careless scribes.  There are just too many miss-
ing canons.  These numbers are the evidence for Eichbauer’s conclusion
that the canons added to the pre-Vulgate texts in Paris, Florence, Barce-
lona, and Admont must have been done in stages and over a period of
time.  Her evidence also points to Gratian having circulated a large bulk of
the additions in one fell swoop but then having updated these additions
afterwards.
There is one last powerful piece of evidence that militates against
pushing the date of the Vulgate Decretum too far in the 1140s: the Second
Lateran canons.  Eichbauer’s research has convinced me that Gratian did
not add the canons of the Second Lateran Council in a flurry of last min-
ute additions as scholars have previously believed.  Ge´rard Fransen, more
than fifty years ago, had argued that the Second Lateran’s canons were
hasty and last minute additions to the Decretum.  At first glance, some of
them, but not all, seem as if they were added without carefully integrating
them into the flow of Gratian’s arguments.  In his study of the rubrics or
18. See generally Eichbauer, supra note 13 (especially her conclusions on pages
150–52).
19. See id. at 123 n.12.
20. Not taking the evidence of the Barcelona manuscript into account, which
would not alter the picture substantially.
21. See Eichbauer, supra note 13, at 145.
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summaries of the canons, Titus Lenherr found textual evidence that sup-
ported Fransen’s conjecture.22  He charted the textual variants in the sum-
maries and saw that they varied more frequently than was usual in Decretum
manuscripts.
The pre-Vulgate manuscripts have confirmed that the canons were
added only to the later stages of Gratian’s text.  However, they were not
added at the last minute.  Almost all of the canons attributed to Lateran II
are in the margins or the appendices of the Florence and Admont manu-
scripts.  The Florence manuscript, which is the earliest of the four pre-
Vulgate manuscripts discovered by Winroth, omitted two canons attrib-
uted to Pope Innocent II completely.23  One of those canons is also not to
be found in Admont.  The remaining canons were added to the appendi-
ces or to the margins of the pre-Vulgate manuscripts.  One canon that was
added to the appendix and the margin of Florence came from two differ-
ent textual traditions, i.e., the text in the margin is different from the text
in the supplement.24  This is good evidence that the canons attributed to
Lateran II were not added to the pre-Vulgate manuscripts at one time.
Consequently, they cannot be texts that Gratian added in a final, rushed
effort to complete the Vulgate as Lenherr has argued.
An even larger question looms over Innocent II’s canons.  Are they
all, in fact, canons from Lateran II?  In the Vulgate Decretum, modern
scholars, but not Gratian, have attributed fifteen canons to it (out of thirty
promulgated by Lateran II).  Their attributions are problematic for several
reasons.  Canon 28 (D.63 c.35) was from the beginning identified as a
canon promulgated by Innocent II in Rome but not as having been
promulgated in the Lateran.  Without an explicit attribution, as Atria Lar-
son has argued, one cannot be absolutely sure it belonged to the council
of 1139.  I have already demonstrated above that the text of Gratian’s Ca-
non 28 has significant variants not in the manuscripts of the Lateran II’s
Canon 28 outside the tradition of Gratian’s Decretum.
Another canon in the Vulgate Decretum combined Canons 18, 19, and
20 of the Second Lateran Council (C.23 q.8 c.32) and is identified only as
having been taken from “a universal council under Innocent II,” which
cannot be attributed to Lateran II with any certainty.25  As Larson has
22. See Ge´rard Fransen, La date du Decret de Gratien, 51 REVUE D’HISTOIRE E´C-
CLE´SIASTIQUE 521 (1956); Titus Lenherr, Die Summarien zu den Texten des 2. Later-
ankonzils von 1139 in Gratians Dekret, 150 ARCHIV FU¨R KATHOLISCHES KIRCHENRECHT
528 (1981).
23. See DECRETUM, supra note 7 (referring to D.90 c.11 and C.21 q.2 c.5 of
Florence manuscript, which is also omitted by Admont).
24. See id. (referring to D.63 c.35, Fd fol. 12va and fol. 113va.).  I am complet-
ing an edition of the texts attributed to Lateran II in the pre-Vulgate and early
Vulgate manuscripts.
25. Canons 18, 19, and 20 combined into one: C.23 q.8 c.32: “De incendariis
quoque Innocentius secundus in uniuersali concilio generaliter constituit dicens.”
DECRETUM, supra note 7.  Clm 13004, fol. 228rb and 28161, fol. 195ra have the
same reading.  In the Biberach manuscript and Salzberg, Stiftsbibliothek a.xi.9, the
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demonstrated in detail, the adjective “universalis,” when attached to synod
or council, did not automatically mean what we mean today by an ecumen-
ical council.  A “concilium” called by the pope and having participants of
different nationalities could be termed “universale.”26  All the other ca-
nons that scholars have attributed to the Second Lateran Council have the
inscription of “Innocentius II” and nothing more.  Their inscriptions bear
no indication that they are conciliar canons promulgated at the Lateran II
or at any other council.  To be sure, their texts are very close to the canons
that we have accepted as products of the Second Lateran.  But many of
them differ significantly from the texts of Lateran II.  The common repeti-
tion of wording that is characteristic of conciliar canons in this era and the
lack of an explicit inscription to Lateran II in all the canons make an attri-
bution to the council of 1139 problematic.  As Martin Brett has explained
to me, “there can be no argument about the extremely close resemblance
between most of the canons attributed to Innocent’s councils at Clermont,
Reims, Pisa and the Lateran,” which can make attributions to a particular
council difficult.27  At the very least, we should be cautious, therefore,
about attributing some or all of these canons to the Second Lateran Coun-
cil.  If they are not Lateran II canons but drawn from other councils over
which Innocent II presided during his pontificate, it would resolve a num-
ber of dating issues that have plagued the study of Gratian’s teaching ca-
reer and his life.  However, much more work has to be done on this
problem before we could come to a firmer conclusion—if a firm conclu-
sion will be possible.  A preliminary edition of the canons attributed to
Innocent II in the early Gratian manuscripts must be constructed from the
best Vulgate manuscripts and then the results compared to Martin Brett’s
edition.  This task is already well underway.
There is an intriguing rubric in a very early Italian Vulgate manu-
script—Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana Plut. 1 sin. 1—that casts doubt
on one text’s having been taken directly from a text of Lateran II.  The
rubric to C.17 q.4 c.29, that might be an edited version of Lateran II’s c.15,
reads: “Item ex lib’ Innocentii pape ii.”28  I have not found another early
Vulgate manuscript with that rubric.  Without a stronger textual tradition,
I would be reluctant to conjecture what it means.  Literally, the text asserts
that this canon can be found in a book of Innocent II’s legislation.  It does
not attribute the canon to Lateran II.  As I have already made clear, how-
ever, no other rubric to the canons identifies the canons as being from
Lateran II.  Did Gratian know a manuscript with a collection of Innocent’s
legislation and take all his Innocentian canons from it?  It is a tempting
hypothesis but for now goes beyond the evidence.
canon is part of Gratian’s dictum and is not separated from it.  My edition of the
canons has provided more evidence for the conclusion that Gratian took these
canons of Pope Innocent II from non-Lateran II sources. See supra note 12.
26. See Larson, supra note 9, at 27–34.
27. Email from Martin Brett, to Author (Jan. 14, 2014) (on file with author).
28. DECRETUM, supra note 7 (Fs fol. 205rb).
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I have postponed a discussion of the St. Gall Stiftsbibliothek 673 until
now.  I wanted to present the evidence for Gratian’s long teaching career
in Bologna from the pre-Vulgate manuscripts of which Gratian’s author-
ship is not questioned.  Scholarly opinion is unanimous that Gratian com-
piled the collections preserved in the pre-Vulgate manuscripts that we
have discussed to this point.29
If the St. Gall text could be proven to be a version of a stage that
preceded the text of the Admont, Barcelona, Florence, and Paris manu-
scripts, there could be little question that Gratian taught in Bologna for a
long time.  No scholar questions the fact that if St. Gall was an abbrevia-
tion, it is an abbreviation of pre-Vulgate Decretum, not the Vulgate text.  I
have written previously that if an abbreviator shortened Gratian’s text
from those manuscripts he was almost impossibly clever.  He left no undis-
putable fingerprints.  The very few places where one may argue about
whether he nodded off while doing his cutting are debatable.
John Noonan and many other scholars have recognized for a very
long time that Gratian’s causae (cases) are wonderful teaching tools and
were Gratian’s stroke of genius.30  If it were a version of an UrGratian, the
St. Gall manuscript would be proof that Gratian began to teach using cases
and developed a Socratic case law teaching methodology.  He was the
Christopher Columbus Langdell of the twelfth century.  There is no ques-
tion that his Decretum became a very popular text because of the causae.  Its
immediate acceptance as a “liber legalis” (textbook) that took its place
alongside Justinian’s Roman law codification in the schools all over Eu-
rope was not because the first part of the Decretum, the distinctions, offered
exciting and compellingly teachable material.  It was his causae that won
Gratian his unique place in the history of canon law.  Before the discovery
of the St. Gall manuscript, one could have conjectured that he had begun
teaching with the causae.  In this context, one cannot be too surprised that
St. Gall exists.
The St. Gall manuscript is not, however, a pristine UrGratian.  From
Causa 27–36, the text of the manuscript received significant interpolations
and editing by unknown hands, probably not by Gratian’s.  Nonetheless,
Causa prima to Causa 23 (causae 24–26 are missing) must have corre-
sponded fairly closely to an UrGratian (remembering, however, that there
is some evidence that stages preceded the St. Gall text as well).31  The
29. See WINROTH, supra note 3, at 175–96.
30. See, e.g., Noonan, Catholic Law School, supra note 1, at 1201 (“[Gratian
showed that t]he study of law was, at least in part, the study of hypotheticals, with
the power of hypotheticals to select and isolate significant legal issues and the
weakness of hypotheticals that they lack the rich concreteness, the true mindbind-
ing complexity, of real cases.  The hypotheticals were the basis for questions that
opened up substantial areas of law in a penetrating way.  The questions also turned
out to be convenient pegs on which to hang a variety of authorities.”).
31. Melodie Harris Eichbauer’s careful study of the rubrics in the St. Gall
manuscript demonstrates that they were not the work of an abbreviator and that
additional causae were probably added over time to the book. See generally Melodie
41
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additions of Roman law authenticae in the margins and glosses indicate that
the manuscript was used in the classroom at a significant law school
(Bologna?) and not one on the periphery.32  The authenticae would not
have been known to teachers of canon law outside Italy in the 1130s.  Just
as Rolandus—a commentator on the Decretum in the 1150s—had, it seems,
only used the causae to teach his students, so too did the early Gratian.33
Where was the St. Gall manuscript produced and used?  Scholars who
have examined the illuminated initials have concluded that they were
done in Central or Northeastern Italy in the second half of the twelfth
century.  The script is certainly older than that.  I would date it to the
middle of the twelfth century at the latest.  Its provenance is Italian.  The
combination of its carefully prepared script and its elaborate—and quite
beautiful—illuminations is proof that it was the product of a sophisticated
scriptorium in Northern Italy.34
Only one piece of evidence seriously calls into doubt St. Gall’s being
derived from an UrGratian.35 Causa 2 in St. Gall and Causa 1 in all the
other recensions of Gratian’s text dealt with the issue of simony.  The case
he presented was complicated to say the least.  I will give it in each of the
versions beginning with St. Gall:
A certain man gave his son to a monastery and, as demanded by
the abbot, rendered a payment of ten pounds.  The son was igno-
rant of this because of his age.  The boy matured.  He quickly
became a priest.  The suffragan bishops selected him to become
a fellow bishop on his merits.  Finally, his father interceded with
his consent and prayers to his election and also gave money to a
Harris Eichbauer, St. Gall Stiftsbibliothek 673 and the Early Redactions of Gratian’s
Decretum, 27 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 105 (2007).
32. See Pennington, Big Bang, supra note 5, at 63–66; see also Jose´ Miguel Viejo-
Xime´nez, Las Novellae de la Tradicio´n Cano´nica Occidential y del Decreto de Graciano,
in NOVELLAE CONSTITUTIONES: L’ULTIMA LEGISLAZIONE DI GIUSTINIANO TRA ORIENTE
E OCCIDENTE, DA TRIBONIANO A SAVIGNY: ATTI DEL CONVEGNO INTERNAZIONALE, TER-
AMO, 30–31 OTTOBRE 2009 207 (Luca Loschiavo, Giovanna Mancini & Cristina
Vano eds., 2011).
33. See Rolandus [de Bologna] (Papst Alexander III. [Magister Rolandus, Ror-
lando Bandinelli male]), DIE SUMMA MAGISTRI ROLANDI, NACHMALS PAPSTES ALEXAN-
DER III., NEBST EINEM ANHANGE; INCERTI AUCTORIS QUAESTIONES (1874), reprinted in
SUMMA MAGISTRI ROLANDI, MIT ANHANG INCERTI AUCTORIS QUAESTIONES (Friedrich
Thaner ed., 1962) (1874 edition is flawed); see also Kenneth Pennington & Wolf-
gang P. Mu¨ller, The Decretists: The Italian School, in THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CA-
NON LAW IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD, 1140–1234: FROM GRATIAN TO THE DECRETALS
OF POPE GREGORY IX 131–35 (Wilfried Hartmann & Kenneth Pennington eds.,
2008).
34. See Marina Bernasconi Reusser, Considerazioni Sulla Datazione e Attribuzione
del Decretum Gratiani Cod. Sang. 673: Un Manoscritto di Origine Italiana in Terra
Nordalpina, in SCHAUKASTEN STIFTSBIBLIOTHEK ST. GALLER: ABSCHIEDSGABE FU¨R
STIFTSBIBLIOTHEKAR ERNST TREMP 142–47 (Franziska Schnoor, Karl Schmuki &
Silvia Frigg eds., 2013).
35. See Eichbauer, supra note 3, at 1113–14 (summarizing various arguments
on both sides of issue very well with detailed bibliographical references).
42
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member of the archbishop’s household; he was consecrated
bishop without knowing of his father’s consent and of his gifts of
money.  As time passed he ordained some clerics for free and
others for money.  Consequently, he was accused and convicted
[of simony].  He suffered the judgment that condemned him.36
The other pre-Vulgate and Vulgate versions presented a more nuanced
and detailed story:
A certain man had a son whom he gave to a very wealthy monas-
tery.  The abbot and the brothers demanded ten pounds to take
his son.  His son, because of his age, did not know about the
money.  The boy grew and with the passing of time and with a
succession of offices, he came of age and was ordained a priest.
Finally, he was elected bishop by the suffragan bishops because of
his talents.  His father gave his consent and prayers to his elec-
tion and also gave money to a member of the archbishop’s
household; he was consecrated bishop without knowing of his fa-
ther’s consent and of his gifts of money.  In the passing of time,
he ordained several priests for money and to others he gave the
sacerdotal benediction for free.  Finally, he was accused and con-
victed [of simony] at the archiepiscopal court.  He accepted his
judgment of damnation.37
A comparison of the two texts makes it difficult to imagine that the pre-
Vulgate text in St. Gall is an abbreviation of the pre-Vulgate text in the
other manuscripts.  The pre-Vulgate hypothetical incorporated specific
36. DECRETUM, St. Gall, Stiftsbibliothek 673, 28–29 [hereinafter DECRETUM,
St. Gall] (“Obtulit quidam filium suum cenobio qui exactione abbatis motus x.
libras monasterio soluit.  Ipso tamen filio propter etatem hoc ignorante.  Creuit
puer.  De hinc ad sacerdotium conuolauit.  Suffragantibus meritis in episcopum
est assumptus.  Tandem obsequio ac precibus paternis intercedentibus pecuniam
quoque ex consiliariis archiepiscopi cuidam data consecratur electus, oblate
pecunie paterni obsequi penitus ignarus.  Ac per hoc tempore procedente quos-
dam gratis, non nullos etiam per pecuniam ordinauit; qui tandem accusatus et
conuictus, contrariam sibi sententiam reportauit.”).
37. See DECRETUM, supra note 7 (Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale de France nov.
acq. lat. 1761, fol. 83vb–84ra and Paris, Munich, Staatsbibliothek Clm 13004, fol.
97ra: “Quidam habens filium obtulit eum ditissimo cenobio exactus (ab add. Me)
abbate et fratribus x. libras soluit ut filius susciperetur (reciperetur Me), ipso
tamen beneficio etatis hoc ignorante.  Creuit puer et per incrementa temporum et
officiorum ad virilem etatem et sacerdotii gradum peruenit.  Exinde suffragantibus
meritis in episcopum eligitur, interveniente obsequio et paternis precibus data
quoque pecunia cuidam ex consiliariis archiepiscopi consecratur iste in antistitem
nescius paterni obsequii et oblate pecunie.  Procedente vero tempore nonnullos
per pecuniam ordinauit, quibusdam uero gratis benedictionem sacerdotalem
dedit, tandem apud metropolitanum suum accusatus et conuictus sententiam in se
damnationis accepit.”)  An edition of this version of Gratian’s Decretum is being
prepared under the leadership of Anders Winroth.  For its progress, see Decretum
Gratiani: First Recension, https://sites.google.com/a/yale.edu/decretumgratiani/
home (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
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facts into the case that are left out or remain ambiguous in St. Gall.  The
pre-Vulgate’s monastery was wealthy.  It practiced simony in spite of its
wealth.  After his ordination, the boy received other clerical offices on his
merits, one presumes, and not simoniacally.  In contrast, the St. Gall case
suggests that the boy became a priest inappropriately quickly (convolare =
to fly).  The description of the court’s decision in St. Gall (contraria senten-
tia) could be interpreted to imply that the bishop lived with a decision that
was not in accord with his own views of his actions.  In the other pre-Vul-
gate hypothetical, the bishop accepts his fate.  These differences do not
suggest an abbreviator to me.  They suggest a reworking by Gratian.
Gratian then listed seven questions that he wished to consider, which
are almost the same in all the versions of the text.  Number six was the
question whose text created a problem of interpretation: “Sixth [question]
Whether those who were ordained by him in the past without knowledge
of his simony must be deposed?”38  There was only one text in the entire
corpus of canon law that could answer that question: two canons that Pope
Urban II had promulgated at the Council of Piacenza in 1095.  To answer
Question Six, Gratian presented the two Piacenza canons as one canon in
the St. Gall manuscript.39  The logical place for the canon was in Question
Six.  That is exactly where it is in the St. Gall manuscript:
If those, he said, who were ordained by simoniacs but not simoni-
acally can be proven that when they were ordained to have not
known the [bishops] were simoniacs, then they will be consid-
ered as Catholics in the Church, and we will sustain those ordina-
tions mercifully, if their laudable lives endorse them.  Who,
however, knowingly is consecrated by simoniacs, rather one
would say execrated, we declare that their consecration is com-
pletely invalid.40
38. DECRETUM, St. Gall, supra note 36, at p.29 (“Sexta: An illi qui ab eo iam
symoniaco igoranter sunt ordinati abici debeant.”).  The later versions add “aut
non” to the end of the question.
39. See ROBERT SOMERVILLE, POPE URBAN II’S COUNCIL OF PIACENZA: MARCH
1–7, 1095 91–92, 104–11 (2011) (printing edition of canons and discussing canons
with information about canonical collections that included these texts).
40. DECRETUM, St. Gall, supra note 36, at p.41b.  The text is slightly different
from the pre-Vulgate and Vulgate, which are closer to the conciliar canons (C.1
q.1 c.108): “Si qui, inquit, a symoniacis non symoniace ordinantur, siquidem
probari potuerint se, cum ordinaretur, nescisse eos symoniacos esse, et tunc pro
catholicis habebantur in ecclesia, talium ordinationes misericorditer sustinemus, si
tamen eos laudabilis uita commendat.  [Qui uero scienter se a symoniacis con-
secrari immo execrari permiserint, eorum consecrationem omnino irritam esse
decernimus.]”  Urban II, Council of Piacenza, c.3 and [c.4]: Collectio X partium, fol.
76r, where the chapters are separated. Collectio 3 librorum 2.8.11 in medio.  9L
3.5.1.  The additional “inquit” is found in other Urban texts.  It is one other small
bit of textual evidence that Sg cannot be an abbreviation.  For a discussion of refer-
ences to the pope in the third person, see ROBERT SOMERVILLE, POPE URBAN II, THE
COLLECTIO BRITANNICA, AND THE COUNCIL OF MELFI (1089) CB 8, 11, 17, 28, 44
(1996).  Most importantly, Gratian included another canon attributed to Urban,
Duae sunt, that also uses “inquit” in its incipit, which I have discussed. See Kenneth
44
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In the transition from the St. Gall Decretum to the manuscripts in Florence,
Paris, Barcelona, and Admont, Gratian added fifteen canons to Question
One between c.90 and c.113.  One of those canons was a decretal of Pope
Nicholas II, in which the pope distinguished between several types of simo-
niacal ordinations: simoniacs ordained simoniacally by simoniacs, simoni-
acs ordained by non-simoniacs, and simoniacs ordained by simoniacs but
not simoniacally.  Nicholas did not, however, cover all the possible permu-
tations, the most important being the legal issue of ignorance.  Gratian
had already applied the principle of ignorance to marriage law in St. Gall
Causa 26 (=29).
As he considered Nicholas’s decretal, Gratian must have thought,
“what about the cleric, as in my hypothetical, who was ignorant that the
prelate was simoniacal?  Or a cleric, as in my hypothetical, who did not
know that someone was paying for his ordination?”  He must have also
considered the issue that his raising the question of ignorance in Question
One, and not leaving it for Question Six, disturbed the organization that
he had created for Causa One.  In Question One, his question had been:
“Is it a sin to buy spiritual things?”41  In spite of whatever reservations he
may have had, Gratian moved Urban’s conciliar canon from Question Six
to Question One and placed it after Nicholas’s decretal.  As Gratian re-
marked in the dictum he wrote before the canon:
But these clerics [i.e. Nicholas’s last category] must be under-
stood as being those who are ordained by simoniacal prelates,
whom they did not know were simoniacal.  The decretal makes
these simoniacs, but not guilty of a crime, yet [having] an ordina-
tion of a simoniac.  Concerning these clerics Pope Urban stated
[in his canon].42
Moving a canon is unique in the textual tradition of the Decretum. Causa
One Question One is the only place in the Decretum in any of its versions
where Gratian moved a text significantly.  We may think with some justifi-
cation that he could have placed Nicholas’s decretal in Question Six.
Question One was already ungainly long.  His moving Urban’s canons did
not improve his argument or the organization of Causa One.  Neverthe-
less, he moved Urban’s text.  Gratian then reworked his introductory dic-
tum to Question Six in his later versions of the Decretum to read: “What
indeed ought to be done concerning those who unknowing are ordained
by simoniacs, which is asked in the sixth question, is found above in the
Pennington, Gratian, Causa 19, and the Birth of Canonical Jurisprudence, in 4 “PANTA
REI”: STUDI DEDICATI A MANLIO BELLOMO 344 (Orazio Condorelli ed., 2004).
41. See DECRETUM, supra note 7, at C.1 d.a.c.1 (“Hic primum queritur an sit
peccatum emere spiritualia?”).
42. See id. C.1 q.1 d.a.c.108 (“Sed hoc intelligendum est de his qui ordinantur
a simoniacis, quos ignorabant esse symoniacos.  Hos facit simoniacos non reatus
criminis, sed ordinatio symoniaci.  De quibus Urbanus papa ait.”).
45
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chapter of Urban that begins: ‘Si qui a simoniacis non simoniace ordinati
sunt.’”43
Previously in the St. Gall manuscript, Gratian had introduced the Pia-
cenza canons with a dictum, and it is this dictum that has created
problems of interpretation and the conviction of some that St. Gall is an
abbreviation:
Quid autem de his fieri debeat qui ignoranter a symoniacis
ordinati sunt, quod quidem sexto loco quesitum est supra in
capitulo Urbani dictum est quod, quia forte ibi quantum ad
negotium pertinebat integre poni non fuit necessarium, in
presenti ad evidentiam in medium adducamus.44
In translation:
What moreover ought to be done with those clerics who unknow-
ingly are ordained by simoniacs, which is asked in the sixth ques-
tion, [can be found] in the chapter of Urban that has been cited
above, but indeed, because it was not necessary to place the en-
tire text there as far as it pertained to the issue, I bring it forward
here.
Winroth and others have interpreted Gratian’s dictum at the beginning of
Question Six as being proof of St. Gall’s being an abbreviation.45  They
assume that the abbreviator fell asleep and forgot that he had omitted
Pope Nicholas’s canon and also that he had eliminated Urban’s canons
immediately after Nicholas’s.  With that assumption, Winroth is quite right
that the reference is puzzling and, if he had interpreted the passage cor-
rectly, could be a solid proof that St. Gall is an abbreviation.  However, the
compiler of the St. Gall text was quite wide awake.  What Winroth over-
looked was that Gratian had, in fact, cited Urban’s canon “supra” in Ques-
tion Four of St. Gall and in all the subsequent versions of the Decretum.
That is the place Gratian referred to in his dictum before Question Six in
St. Gall.  He was not citing a now non-existent text in the first question.
He alerted his readers that he could have put Urban’s canon in Question
Four but did not.  In his dictum in Question Four, he had written: “Again,
if someone is excused from having been ordained unknowingly by a simo-
niac, just as he can be excused who is ordained simoniacally but unknow-
43. See id. C.1 q.6 d.a.c.1 (Paris BNF nov. acq. lat. 1761, fol. 102va; Florence,
B.N. Con. Sopp. A.1.402, fol. 25rb) (“Quida uerob de his fieri debeat qui
ignoranter a simoniacis ordinati suntc, quod sexto loco quesitum est suprad in
capitulo uidelicet Vrbani quod sic incipit, Si quie a simoniacis non simoniace
ordinati sunt requiratur. a Quodac Fd b igiturac, autempc Fd c nunc autem add. Fdac d
quod—supra om. Fdac e quispc Fd”).
44. DECRETUM, St. Gall, supra note 36, at p.41 C.1 q.6 d.a.c.1.
45. See Anders Winroth, Recent Work on the Making of Gratian’s Decretum, 26
BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 1, 20–21 (2006).
46
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ingly.”46  In the later versions of the Decretum, Gratian clarified that the
dictum referred to Urban’s canon that was now placed in Question One
with an inserted added phrase: “Again, if someone is excused from having
been ordained unknowingly by a simoniac, as seen above in Urban’s ca-
non [in q.1 c.108], he can also be excused who is ordained simoniacally
but unknowingly.”47  Once Gratian’s dictum before Question Six in the St.
Gall manuscript is understood to refer to his dictum in Question Four, the
use of this passage as being a proof that St. Gall is an abbreviation cannot
be sustained.  An abbreviator did not nod; Gratian was practicing a meth-
odology he used in all the versions of his Decretum: referring to canons in
other parts of his work with their first few words or, as here, with a short
reference to a canon’s content.
The other arguments for and against St. Gall’s being an abbreviation
rest upon small textual variants that cannot come close to being a full
proof.  A number of scholars, including me, have made textual arguments
taken from Gratian’s dicta in St. Gall.  Some are more persuasive than
others.  None of them makes a full proof for either opinion.48  As I have
stated above, I believe that the textual anomalies in St. Gall in Causae
27–36 of Gratian’s text cannot be used as evidence of an abbreviation be-
cause I believe the text is a redaction with interpolations.49  A significant
piece of evidence for my conviction about St. Gall’s being an early pre-
Vulgate version of Gratian’s Decretum and not an abbreviation are the four
authenticae that are added to the margins of the manuscript.  Two of them
Gratian included into the text of the Decretum in later recensions.  Two of
them he did not.  Gratian did not add them to the margins of St. Gall;
someone else did.  Whoever added these authenticae to St. Gall knew Ro-
man law very well and was using the manuscript to teach canon law in a
center where others must have been teaching Roman law.  Such a person,
I have argued, would not have been teaching with an abbreviation.50
46. DECRETUM, St. Gall, supra note 36, at p.38 C.1 q.4 d.p.c.10 (“Item si ex-
cusatur qui a symoniaco ordinatur ignoranter et utique iste excusari potest qui per
ignorantiam symoniace ordinatur.”).
47. DECRETUM, supra note 7, C.1 q.4 d.p.c.10 (P fol. 100va, Fd fol. 24v) (“Item
si excusatur qui ignoranter a simoniaco ordinatur, ut supra in capitulo Urbani
legitur, et iste excusandus est qui per ignorantiam symoniace ordinatur.”).
48. Causa 29 (Sg 26) has a particularly interesting set of textual variants that
suggest that St. Gall is not an abbreviation. See Jose´ Miguel Viejo-Xime´nez, Non
omnis error consensum euacuat: La C. 26 de los Exserpta de Sankt Gallen (Sg), in IUSTITIA
ET IUDICIUM: STUDI DI DIRITTO MATRIMONIALE E PROCESSUALE CANONICO IN ONORE DI
ANTONI STANKIEWICZ 617, 630–31 (Janusz Kowal & Joaquı´n Llobell eds., 2010) (es-
pecially his conclusion at 630–31).
49. One of the texts is a canon of Pope Innocent II, commonly attributed to
Lateran II.  It is the only Innocent II text in the Decretum that is attributed to a
council held in Rome.  If it is not a Lateran II canon, then it would be possible that
St. Gall is Gratian’s work.
50. See Pennington, Big Bang, supra note 5, at 64; Pennington, Roman Law R
Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 35–53. R
47
Brennan: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.: An Introduction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 18 23-SEP-14 13:05
696 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 679
There are other arguments for St. Gall’s being an abbreviation.  An-
ders Winroth noticed, as many other scholars have, that Gratian cited the
Bible frequently in his dicta.  He chose canons with many biblical citations
as well.  Winroth drew attention to the fact that Gratian cited the Pseudo-
Paul Pastoral Epistles to Timothy and Titus when he analyzed clerical dis-
cipline in Distinctions 25–49.  That Gratian would have turned to these
epistles was inevitable.  Any medieval author who discussed clerical behav-
ior and norms of rectitude would have thought immediately of the Pas-
toral Epistles.  The canons Gratian compiled for those distinctions cited
them many times more than Gratian did.  Winroth concludes his discus-
sion about Gratian’s use of the Pastoral Epistles with the statement:
Gratian’s use of St. Paul for his organization is, incidentally, a
well-nigh irrefutable argument against the idea that the text of
the Decretum known from the infamous manuscript St. Gall,
Stiftsbibliothek 673 would be the earliest version of Gratian’s
work.  This manuscript makes a hash of that organization, cutting
most references to the Epistle to Timothy, while allowing a few to
stand, orphaned and barely intelligible.51
Like black truffles, irrefutable arguments are hard to find in scholarly de-
bates.  There are two very good reasons for thinking that Winroth’s con-
clusions can be questioned.  The first objection is that the Pseudo-Pauline
Epistles do not provide an “organization” or an “organizing principle” for
Gratian’s distinctions in the ordinary sense of those terms.  He does not
follow the Epistles exactly as they discussed clerical discipline line by line
or chapter by chapter.  He skips around in the Epistles, quoting them and
taking whichever ideas he found useful for the issues he was discussing.
He also cited other texts in the Pauline Epistles in his analysis of clerical
rectitude.  If there is no organization or organizing principle in his use of
the Pastoral Epistles, it cannot be violated.
The second objection, and much more weighty, is that comparing the
Distinctions to Causa prima in St. Gall is to compare two different literary
genres.  In Causa prima, Gratian created a hypothetical, asked a series of
questions, and presented texts that pertained to his case.  He presented a
hypothetical in which a student had a concubine, a subdeacon had a wife,
and after this sorry amorous history became a priest and then a bishop.  In
St. Gall, Gratian did not focus on “what are the virtues a cleric should
have?”  In the Distinctions, he did.  When he refashioned that material,
the wingspan of his subject matter was much wider.  In Causa prima of St.
Gall, Gratian explored clerical sexual norms and how they might affect a
prelate’s status; in the later distinctions that grew out of Causa prima, he
dealt with a much broader set of issues touching on clerical discipline and
51. Anders Winroth, Where Gratian Slept: The Life and Death of the Father of Ca-
non Law, 99 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FU¨R RECHTSGESCHICHTE, KANONIS-
TISCHE ABTEILUNG 105, 110 (2013) (footnote omitted).
48
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what characteristics a good cleric should possess.  The difference is not
trivial.  It is an entirely different project.  To compare the two is to com-
pare tuber melanosporum (black truffles) to agaricus bisporus (button mush-
rooms).  To combine the two is not good gastronomy or scholarly
methodology.  Timothy and Titus have not much to say about clerical sex-
ual behavior covered in Causa prima of St. Gall; they have a lot to say about
the topics covered in the Distinctions.
Finally, Winroth’s conclusion sidesteps another question about St.
Gall that I raised ten years ago: if St. Gall is an abbreviation, why did the
abbreviator ignore the Tractatus de legibus D.1–20 and Distinctions 80–101?
Or why did the abbreviator cut out Causae 24–26 and 28?  If the abbrevia-
tor went to the trouble of transforming the Distinctions 27–79 into Causa
prima, and if he was using the text to teach, chopping out the Tractatus de
legibus is strange.  A good reason for deleting certain causae is also difficult
to find.  It is an old principle of humanistic scholarship that the easiest
and simplest explanation for textual changes is usually the most compel-
ling.  To my mind, when Gratian decided that the issue of clerical mar-
riage and sexual behavior had been resolved by conciliar legislation of
Lateran I and Innocent II’s councils, especially Pisa in 1135, he set to work
dismantling Causa prima.52  He quite logically put together his distinctions
on clerical discipline before his first Causa.53  To imagine an abbreviator
taking the Distinctions between 27 and 79, omitting half the canons, and
creating a coherent causa is to my mind not only a much difficilior task, but
also raises the question: why did he do it?  If one argues that the abbrevia-
tor created Causa prima, one ought to give reasons why he thought there
was a need for that Causa.  Was there any longer a need for a causa with
the issues of Causa prima?  Gratian certainly did not think so when he fin-
ished the Vulgate Decretum.  No causa of the Vulgate focuses on the
problems Gratian broached in Causa prima.
In the end, what can we conclude from the manuscript evidence that
remains from the early versions of Gratian’s Decretum?  He taught many
years in Bologna and had many students.  Some of them began to gloss
and comment on his magnum opus.54  The glossators began their work very
early.  The primitive set of glosses contained in all the early manuscripts of
the Decretum, pre-Vulgate and Vulgate, with its citations to Burchard of
Worms’ Decretum and to the Lombarda, is undoubtedly of Italian origin.55
52. Lateran II c.7 has been cited as the definitive statement on clerical mar-
riage, but it repeats the prohibition that Innocent II promulgated at Pisa in 1135,
c.4 or c.1. See Robert Somerville, The Council of Pisa, 1135: A Re-Examination of the
Evidence for the Canons, 45 SPECULUM 98, 103–06 (1970) (showing canon as it ap-
pears in different manuscripts).
53. See Pennington, supra note 40, at 351–53.
54. Winroth’s latest conjecture is that Gratian may have taught for only one
or two years. See Winroth, supra note 51, at 125–26.
55. This is not to say that this earliest set of glosses was a coherent and uni-
form text.  The manuscripts prove that without a doubt.
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Nonetheless, they circulated in the margins of Gratian’s text following it
wherever it went.
John T. Noonan wrote his conclusion without the benefit of what we
know today about Master Gratian.  It is still a pretty good biographical
summary: Gratian “revealed himself to be a teacher with theological
knowledge and interests and a lawyer’s point of view.  He worked in
Bologna in the 1130s and 1140s.”56  I would tweak his conclusion only with
“also the 1120s.”  In my reading of the causae and thinking about the
changes he made in the different versions of his book, I have been im-
pressed by how Gratian developed and expanded his analysis of the
problems posed by the hypotheticals he created.  One could conclude, as I
have, that he could not have done that work and thought through so many
different legal issues in a few years of teaching.
“Horror vacui” is a metaphor that applies to almost any field of study.
If we do not know what we wish we could know, we search for evidence to
fill in the void of our ignorance.  Noonan proved quite persuasively that
the “horror vacui” created a rich tapestry of illusory knowledge about Gra-
tian during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Twenty-first century
scholars have taken up the search to know more about Gratian.  It is a
worthy quest.  Anders Winroth has endorsed two medieval conjectures
that have been recently put forward by other scholars: that Gratian was a
bishop of Chiusi and that he participated in a Venetian court case in 1143.
Both of these conjectures would mean that Gratian lived until circa 1145.
Winroth has done more to revive and invigorate the study of Gratian’s
Decretum than anyone else in the last 200 years.  Not surprisingly, he cares
about Gratian and thinks often about this man who did so much to launch
European jurisprudence.  Although I may not agree with all of his conclu-
sions or conjectures about Gratian, I must emphasize that Winroth’s work
has opened new vistas and perspectives for thinking about Gratian the
teacher, the jurist, and the man.  A few disagreements do not undermine
or diminish his achievement.
Winroth has been convinced by an argument, first advanced by Fran-
cesco Reali, that Gratian became the bishop of Chiusi at the end of his life.
Medieval authors also thought Gratian had been the bishop of Chiusi.57
Reali noticed that a necrology of the Cathedral Chapter of Siena con-
tained a notice that a Gratian from Chiusi, who was also a bishop, had died
sometime in the middle of the twelfth century.58  Reali made the assump-
tion that this Gratian was not only from Chiusi but also had been bishop of
Chiusi.  Winroth has embraced Reali’s discovery and used it as evidence of
Gratian’s fate in the 1140s.  There is, in fact, as Noonan had already noted,
very early evidence for Gratian’s having been a bishop.  Rudolf Weigand
56. Noonan, Gratian Slept Here, supra note 1, at 172. R
57. See Larson, supra note 9, at 54–55.
58. See Francesco Reali, Magister Gratianus e le origini del diritto civile Europeo, in
GRAZIANO DA CHIUSI E LA SUA OPERA: ALLE ORIGINI DEL DIRITTO COMUNE EUROPEO
98–101 (F. Reali ed., 2009).
50
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss4/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 21 23-SEP-14 13:05
2014] JOHN F. SCARPA CONFERENCE 699
printed an introductory gloss or prologue that precedes eight Decretum
manuscripts.59  In three of them, the text states that Gratian divided the
Decretum into two parts, i.e., that the last part on sacraments, De consecra-
tione, was not yet part of the Decretum; the other five manuscripts change
the two parts to three.60  All five manuscripts that contain “three parts” are
later copies of the Decretum.  The reading of the three manuscript wit-
nesses for this passage is certain evidence that the gloss was written very
shortly after the Vulgate version of the Decretum left Gratian’s desk in
Bologna without the third part, De consecratione.61
The scribe of possibly the oldest of these three manuscripts, Paris,
Bibliothe`que nationale de France lat. 3884-I, entered the text on the folio
preceding the beginning of the Decretum.62  We cannot know with cer-
tainty whether this short prologue was an attempt to introduce the
Decretum to readers or an introduction to the primitive set of glosses in the
margins of the manuscript or both:
In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.
The first part of the Decretum begins with a discussion of written
and non-written law.  It treats the authority of law, the election of
clerics and their dispensation.
The Concord of discordant canons.  In the beginning a treatment of the
ius of constitutions and of nature.63
The Concord of Discordant Canons which Bishop Gratian organ-
ized into two parts.  The first part contains 101 Distinctions, al-
though Distinction 49 (48) seems incomplete.
59. See Rudolf Weigand, Fru¨he Kanonisten und ihre Karriere in der Kirche, 76 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FU¨R RECHTSGESCHICHTE, KANONISTISCHE ABTEILUNG
135, 152–53 (1990).
60. See Winroth, supra note 51, at 115–16 (“Perhaps this means that this glos-
sator wrote before the second recension with its three parts circulated, in which
case it would be very early testimony, say from the 1140s, more or less contempo-
rary with Gratian.”).  He did not, however, take the passage as solid evidence be-
cause he mistakenly thought only one manuscript had the “duas” reading.
Further, because he believes that Pf is the only witness, he states that “[o]ne Pari-
sian law teacher told his students that Gratian was a bishop.” Id. at 115.  From our
discussion, it should be clear that the text is not the product of one French
canonist.
61. See Eichbauer, supra note 3, at 1112–13. R
62. The other two manuscripts containing the earliest version of this gloss,
according to Weigand, are Gent, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit 55, and Trier,
Stadtbibliothek 906 (1141). See Rudolf Weigand, The Development of the Glossa
ordinara to Gratian’s Decretum, in THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW IN THE
CLASSICAL PERIOD, 1140–1234: FROM GRATIAN TO THE DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY
IX 59 (Wilfried Hartmann & Kenneth Pennington eds., 2008).
63. The Italicized text is in a rubricated style of capital letters and is a com-
mon rubric at the beginning of the early Decretum with small variations, e.g., Biber-
ach, Spitalarchiv B.3515, fol. 10r; Ko¨ln, Dombibliothek 127, fol. 9r; Mainz,
Stadtbibliothek II.204, fol. 2r; Salzburg, Stiftsbibliothek a.xi.9, fol. 11r.
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The second part contains 36 causae and you must note that sev-
eral canons are edited64 and are arranged in various causae so
that if indeed you wish to see the entire canon, [you can find it]
in another place; you may not presume to fill them in or to con-
tinue as if this was the result of scribal error.  Similarly even when
you find other translations of Greek councils, you should con-
sider those reliable which are inserted into this work.  You should
not presume to mix similar chapters or change a series of
translations.65
The text is not without its intriguing ambiguities.  The first line is a stan-
dard introduction to a medieval work, but not, as far as I know, to Gratian.
Weigand did not include this line of text in his edition.  If it does occur in
the other manuscripts, that would be a stronger piece of evidence that it is
part of a prologue introducing the glosses, not to Gratian’s text.  The sec-
ond sentence is a summary of the subject matter of Distinctions 1–101.
That too might be part of the prologue to the glosses.  The italicized text is
taken from a different tradition that one finds at the beginning of quite a
few twelfth century Gratian manuscripts.  The scribe must have had two
different texts in front of him and combined them.  The remainder, that I
have taken from the Paris manuscript and which Weigand calls the early
version, called the readers’ attention to three textual matters.  The first is
that Distinction 49 (or 48) is not complete.  The second is a warning that
the reader should not be concerned if other texts, presumably in other
collections, were different.  Gratian had edited them to suit his purpose.
Finally, the Greek councils that Gratian inserted into the Decretum should
be respected.  Gratian, he implied, made good choices.
64. Shortening and editing canons and decretals, the omitted parts they
called “intercisiones” became standard editorial practices of the canonists from
Gratian to Raymond de Pen˜afort. See Kenneth Pennington, The French Recension of
Compilatio tertia, 5 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 53, 60–63 (1975) (giving examples).
65. fol. 15v: Written in red ink, rubric style:
In nomine domini nostri Ihesu Christi.  Prima pars incipit de iure scripto
et non scripto et quod cui preponatur et legum auctoritatibus et cler-
icorum electione siue dispensatione.
Concordia discordantium canonum.  Ac primum de iure constitutionis et
nature.
Concordantia discordantium canonum iuxta determinationem Gratiani
episcopi que in duas partes divisa.  Prima pars constat centum et una dis-
tinctione, licet xl.maix.na (Trier has 48) incompetens uideatur. Secunda
uero causis xxx.vi. ubi notandum est nonnulla esse intercisa capitula at-
que ita digesta prout diuersis causis uisum est expidiri (sic) que quidem
cum alibi repperiris integra supplere his seu continuare tanquam id
scriptoris uicio contigisset.  Similiter etiam cum alias grecorum con-
ciliorum translationes inueneris, eas sufficere tibi credens de qua huic
operi sunt sumpta congruentia capitula miscere uel uariare transla-
tionum seriem non presumas.
Another early manuscript, Heiligenkreuz, Stiftsbibliothek 44, fol. 8v, began with
the text “In nomine—siue dispensatione [in a slightly garbled form]” but omits
the rest.
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I lean towards thinking the text is a prologue to the primitive and
sparse but significant glosses in Paris, BNF 3884-I and II.  Weigand had
studied manuscripts with these glosses for years and called them part of
the “First Composition” of glosses when he worked out his categorization
of early glosses to Gratian.66  He did not mention in his work that this
layer of glosses, which is found in almost all the early glossed Gratian man-
uscripts, including the pre-Vulgate Barcelona and Admont manuscripts,
included many references to canons in Burchard of Worms’s Decretum and
to texts in the Lombarda.67  No other pre-Gratian canonical collection re-
ceived as much attention from the early canonists in the margins of
Decretum manuscripts as Burchard of Worms’s Decretum.  Their function
has not yet been studied.  Were they to supplement, support, or contradict
Gratian’s choices of sources?  Some were later incorporated into the Vul-
gate Decretum as “paleae.”  The citations to Burchard disappear from the
margins after circa 1200.  The citations to Lombard law are not as fre-
quent.68  Citations to the Lombarda are not common in Italian Roman law
manuscripts and have not been noticed before in canonistic texts.69  Wei-
gand had already concluded that the “First Composition” was very early,
not later than 1150, perhaps earlier.  Its presence is a good test for the
date of a manuscript.  No canonist would have needed or wanted these
glosses after circa 1150.  This layer of glosses also can provide evidence of
its origins: Italy.  Although Paris, BNF 3884-I and II are written and illumi-
nated in Northern France, it is difficult to think of many reasons why a
Northern French jurist would be interested in Lombard law.  These allega-
tions to the Lombarda would have been of interest and use to canonists in
Northern and Southern Italy and make it likely that the First Composition
66. See RUDOLF WEIGAND, DIE GLOSSEN ZUM ‘DEKRET’ Gratians: Studien zu den
fru¨hen Glossen und Glossenkompositionem 26–27 (1991); Weigand, supra note
62, at 55–97 (providing compact version of his magnum opus in English).
67. All the early manuscripts of the Vulgate with glosses, listed in supra note 7,
contain Burchard and Lombarda citations.  The form of citation is, e.g., Pf, fol. 45v:
B. xix. Si quis [clericus] uexatus (Burchard 19.93) in the margin opposite D.33 c.3.
In this case, the canon in Burchard dictated ten years penance for clerics who were
possessed by demons.  If they were freed from demons, they could resume their
clerical duties.  Gratian’s text stipulated one year of freedom from demons.  Some-
times the scribes confused the B with D.  D.33 c.3 occurs only in the Vulgate
Decretum.
68. Cited as Lombar. or Lom. de decimis, l.iii. (Lombarda 3.3.3) in Pf fol.
195r in the margin opposite C.12 q.2 c.26, which is only in the Vulgate Decretum.
The text in the Decretum instructs bishops how they should divide tithes; the c.3 in
the Lombarda is a general admonition to do so, which is followed by c.4 with more
detailed instructions.  The Lombarda citations are primarily found in the causae.
69. See Glosse preaccursiane alle Istituzioni: Strato Azzoniano Libro primo and Libro
secondo (Severino Caprioli, Victor Crescenzi, Giovanni Diurni, Paolo Mari & Piergi-
orgio Peruzzi eds., Fonti per la Storia d’Italia 107 and Antiquitates 14; Roma: Nella
Sede dell’Istutito, 1984–2004) (where not a single gloss to the Lombarda is re-
corded); see also Pennington, Roman Law Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 35–53; Ken-
neth Pennington, The Constitutiones of King Roger II of Sicily in Vat. lat. 8782, in 21
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMUNE 35 (2010).
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had its origins in the Italian schools.70  The presence of the First Composi-
tion gloss that graces the margins of the Barcelona and Admont manu-
scripts is good evidence that the pre-Vulgate Decretum circulated long
enough for someone to have composed a gloss for it.  If the pre-Vulgate
manuscripts had had a very short shelf life, no one would have bothered.
There is one more puzzle in Paris, BNF lat. 3884-I.  Carlos Larrainzar
discovered that the front flyleaf was a folio from a pre-Vulgate version of
Gratian’s Decretum.71  Jacqueline Rambaud had long been convinced of
the manuscript’s significance, and Larrainzar’s discovery raises intriguing
if unanswerable questions.  The manuscript was produced in an important
center.  No expense was spared on its production.  The text was divided
into two volumes and provided with magnificent illuminations.  One
might presume that when the Vulgate text arrived, the owners of the pre-
Vulgate text decided to trash their old text and use the manuscript(s) for
more mundane purposes, like flyleaves.  If one could localize this manu-
script and trace other manuscripts produced at the center, one might find
more flyleaves of pre-Vulgate Gratians.  One might guess that Paris, BNF
3884-I was produced in a major center in Northern Europe for the study
of canon law and that the center had close ties to Bologna.  Art historians
have connected its illuminations to Paris or perhaps Sens.  An important
center in Paris would make sense.
What does this information mean for Gratian’s biography?  First, the
glosses in Barcelona, Admont, Paris, BNF 3884-I and II, and other manu-
scripts were not written in Northern Europe but in Italy.  This very early
Italian glossator(s) of Gratian’s text who was writing close to 1140 thought
that Gratian was a bishop.  For obvious reasons, he would have been in a
position to know.  The Decretum in its earlier forms was an immediate suc-
cess all over Christian Europe.  The oldest three manuscripts of the eight
that contained the “prologue” discussed above identify Gratian as the com-
piler.  Other manuscripts do as well.72  It is not accurate to say that Gratian
70. Weigand did not venture an opinion on the origins of these glosses. See
Weigand, supra note 62.
71. See WINROTH, supra note 3, at 32.
72. See, e.g., DECTRETUM, supra note 7, Clm 13004, fol. 30r (“Hoc opus inscrib-
itur de Concordia discordantium canonum quod a quodam Gratiano compositum
in libros xxxvii. est distinctum.”)  This particular manuscript has long been recog-
nized as an early witness.  The author of this introduction did not know “De con-
secratione”: “Primus liber continet divisiones, diffinitiones, necnon et differentias
legum tam secularium quam ecclesticarum et quomodo uel a quibus uel quando
sint institute de electione quoque seu ordinatione clericorum.  Secundus continet
de scienter seu ignoranter a symoniacis ordinatis et de ordinationibus que per
pecuniam fiunt.”  Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, fol. 8r has the same text.  Carlos Lar-
rainzar has discussed and edited the complete text. See Carlos Larrainzar, Notas
sobre las introducciones In prima parte agitur y Hoc opus inscribitur, in MEDIEVAL
CHURCH LAW AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: A TRIBUTE TO
KENNETH PENNINGTON 134–53 (Wolfgang P. Mu¨ller & Mary E. Sommar eds., 2006).
These two manuscripts cannot be dated later than 1145–1150.  If Gratian were
unknown, it is puzzling how he might have been discovered to be the compiler of
the Decretum.
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was unknown or that the glossators did not mention his name.  As Noonan
illustrated in great detail, twelfth century authors thought they knew many
details about him.73  But was he bishop of Chiusi, as Reali and now
Winroth would like to believe?74
The passage about Gratian in the Siena necrology was written after an
entry, but on the same line as a notice of a certain Anselm.  Anselm’s
death is not dated.  It reads: “Obit Anselmus subdiaconus et canonicus
Sancti Martini Lucensis.”  At the end of Anselm’s entry a later scribe ad-
ded: “et Gratianus Clusinus episcopus.”  Reali and Winroth date both
hands to the twelfth century, and I think they are right.75  Nonetheless,
there are problems with their attribution.  If one adheres to the rules of
Latin syntax, the text reads: “Gratian of Chiusi, bishop.”  “Clusinus” can-
not normally be applied to “Gratianus” and “episcopus” at the same time.
If one can assume the scribe knew his Latin well, one can interpret the
text as stating that Gratian from Chiusi was a bishop.76  Winroth asserts
that it is Magister Gratian because the name is not common.77  That is not
the case.  He overlooked the fact that in the same necrology that has a
modest number of names, there is another Gratian who is memorialized.78
The final problem with this entry in the Sienese necrology is that if
this is the Gratian who compiled one of the most famous textbooks of the
twelfth century and who taught canon law at Bologna for a long time, can
73. See, e.g., Johannes Faventinus’s rubric to Summa, circa 1171, Klos-
terneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek fol. 1ra (“Incipit prefatio in Decreta magistri
G[ratiani] a, a magistri Jo[hannes] Faventino canonice ac dilucide edita ex duabus
summis Ruffini et Stephani utili artificiosoque excepta”); id. fol. 1vb (“Circa liber
autem quem pre manibus gestamus hec attendenda sunt, scilicet que sit materia
Gratiani in hoc opera, que ipsius intentio, que utilitas que causa operis, que dis-
tinctio libri, quis modus tractandi, quis titulus.”)
74. See Reali, supra note 58, at 96–97; Winroth, supra note 51, at 115–24.
75. See RACCOLTA DEGLI STORICI ITALIANI DAL CINQUECENTO AL MILLECIN-
QUECENTO ORDINATA DA L.A. MURATORI 22 (Giosue´ Carducci, Vittorio Fiorini &
Pietro Fedele eds., 1931) [hereinafter RACCOLTA DEGLI STORICI ITALIANI].
76. I do not completely exclude the possibility that the scribe did intend to
write that Gratianus was from Chiusi and was bishop of Chiusi.  Professor Anne
Duggan has pointed out to me that Pope Gregory VII referred to another bishop
of Chiusi, Lanfrancus, with the same syntactical phrase “confrater noster Lan-
francus Clusinus episcopus.” DAS REGISTER GREGORS VII, in MONUMENTA
GERMANIAE HISTORICA, EPISTOLAE SELECTAE 2.1 187, lines 13–14 (Erich Caspar ed.,
1990); see also Noonan, Gratian Slept Here, supra note 1, at 153–54 (noting that circa R
1162–1184 Robert de Torigny named Gratian a bishop of Chiusi).  Professor Dug-
gan told me that the information was in a later correction to Avranches, Bib-
liothe´que municipale 159, though possibly made during Robert’s lifetime.  In any
case, Robert’s evidence is distant in time.  Robert also thought Gratian was active
circa 1130.  Noonan thought that chronology was wrong.  In this Essay I argue
Robert’s date is correct.
77. See Winroth, supra note 51, at 124 (“The name is unusual enough, how-
ever, that we may conclude that it is likely . . . .”).
78. See RACCOLTA DEGLI STORICI ITALIANI, supra note 75, at 17 (“Obit presbyter
Gratianus prius plebanus de Folliano et post canonicus Senensis honestus clericus
et bene litteratus, anno Domini MCC.”).  We will meet two more Gratians in the
Venetian sources below.
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we believe that he would have been given such a modest entry?  It is much
more modest than Anselm’s and many others in the necrology.  Would the
Sienese scribe have given him no title, no descriptive adjectives, and no
clues that he was a person of European wide fame?  In the end, after re-
viewing the evidence, I think John T. Noonan would have concluded that,
yes, Gratian was probably a bishop.  When was he bishop?  Difficult to say.
Was he the bishop of Chiusi?  The evidence, I think he would say, is
inconclusive.
Another Gratian appears in a Venetian court case that was held in
1143.  The case concerned tithes, a subject on which Master Gratian had
more than a little expertise.  The case has been in print for several centu-
ries.  Noonan thought it possible that this Gratian could be Master Gra-
tian, but he thought it was only possible, “even plausible,” but not certain.
Recently, Gundula Grebner uncovered more evidence that would confirm
Gratian’s presence in a Venetian courtroom and change Noonan’s plausi-
ble to certain.79  Winroth accepts Grebner’s argument.  The issues of the
case are only sparsely given, except that it concerned monks holding the
rights to tithes.  Grebner points out that Gratian dealt with that issue in his
Decretum at C.16 q.7.  The judicial sentence was rendered with the concur-
rence of “consilio Patriarce Aquilejensis et episcopi Ferrariensis et magistri
Walfredi et Graciani et Moysis et aliorum prudentum” (with the counsel of
the Patriarch of Aquilea, the bishop of Ferrara, Master Walfredus, Gratian,
Moses, and other prudent men).80  Again, the question: can this be Master
Gratian, the Father of Canon Law, the compiler, by this time, of a famous
book?  The hesitations are some of the same as they were for the necrology
in Siena.  Walfredus, the Roman lawyer, is given the title “magister.”  Gra-
tian is not.  Gratian would have been, in 1143, at the end of his life, having
taught canon law at Bologna for almost twenty-five years.  Would he not
have received at least some recognition of his contributions to Bolognese
legal culture?  I think so.  Furthermore, there is another Gratian whom
Noonan, Grebner, and Winroth did not know in the Venetian court
records who participated in a case in 1150.81  In spite of having a cogno-
men in 1150, he may be the same Gratian who heard the 1143 proceed-
ings—or another Gratian.  In any case, as in 1143, he heard the case with a
master but is not given that title.  It is also another piece of evidence that
every Gratian is not Gratian.
79. See Gundula Grebner, Lay Patronate in Bologna in the First Half of the 12th
Century: Regular Canons, Notaries, and the Decretum, in EUROPA UND SEINE RE-
GIONEN: 2000 JAHRE RECHTGESCHICHTE 107–22 (Andreas Bauer & Karl H.L. Welker
eds., 2007).
80. See FLAMINIO CORNARO, 1 ECCLESIAE VENETAE ANTIQUIS MONUMENTIS NUMC
ETIAM PRIMUM EDITIS ILLUSTRATAE AC IN DECADES DISRIBUTAE 378 (1749) (entry
dated Aug. 31, 1143).
81. See Gratianus Contarenus et Magister Lanfrancus de Brissia, in CODICE DIPLO-
MATICO PADOVANO DALL’ANNO 1101 ALLA PACE DI COSTANZA (25 GIUGNO 1183) (An-
drea Gloria ed., 1879).  Gloria prints the 1143 case on page 313, number 419.
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The man in Venice is someone who has, perhaps, training in canon
law, but he is very likely not the Father of Canon Law.  Noonan is right:
after you strip away the myth and dubious evidence, Gratian is a shadowy
figure.  I think that Noonan would agree that Gratian was probably a
bishop—but where, and more importantly, when?  Was he a bishop-elect
at the end of his life?  He could not have been a bishop and teaching and
compiling his textbook while he was in Bologna.
As we have seen, speculation without any or much evidence has domi-
nated the debate about Gratian for the past ten years.  I would like to
exercise my right to speculate about Gratian too.  If all my guesses and
uncertainties in this Essay about Gratian’s work and life were to be con-
firmed as fact, this is the story we might have (remembering that I label
these remarks a conjectural novella): Gratian began teaching circa
1125–1130 using a text that looked something like the St. Gall manuscript.
He expanded his text circa 1133–1135.  He added circa 1500 canons, in-
cluding some canons from Innocent II’s conciliar legislation prior to Lat-
eran II.  They derived from Innocent’s other councils or letters.  He
became bishop of (pick a city, maybe Chiusi).  Around 1135, Italian can-
onists (maybe even Gratian himself?) provided a primitive set of glosses to
his text that circulated in the earliest manuscripts.  He composed a final
part of the Decretum on sacraments, De consecratione, circa 1140.  This addi-
tional text is very unsophisticated in comparison to the rest of his work
and very old-fashioned: it contains just one dictum and 405 texts.  If Gra-
tian compiled it, he could have done it quickly and without much thought
or effort.  Does this story fit the possible facts?  Yes.  Is it true?  As I hope
this Essay suggests, some of these conjectures are more plausible than
others.  Let’s wait and see whether the scholarly world of Gratian’s follow-
ers reaches a consensus.  It may take time.
Gratian would move from the shadows to the brilliant and shadowless
light of day only in the fourteenth century when Dante put him in Paradiso
Canto 10, 97–103:
Questi che m’e` a destra piu` vicino, frate e maestro fummi, ed
esso Alberto e` di Cologna, e io Thomas d’Aquino.
Quell’altro fiammeggiare esce del riso di Grazian, che l’uno e
l’altro foro aiuto` sı` che piace in paradiso.
Those who are to my right were my brother and master, Albert
from Cologne and I Thomas Aquinas.
That other person with the light shining from his smile, is Gra-
tian, whose contributions to the secular and the ecclesiastical
courts has pleased Paradise.82
82. DANTE ALIGHIERI, PARADISO, Canto 10: 97–103.  Francesco Calasso fol-
lowed Ruffini and Brandelione in their conviction that Dante meant the internal
and external forum in this passage. See FRANCESCO CALASSO, MEDIO EVO DEL DIR-
ITTO VOL. 1: LE FONTI 396 (Giuffre` ed., 1954).  Dante’s son, Pietro Alighieri,
thought his father meant the secular and ecclesiastical courts.  Gratian did not just
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Dante knew nothing about Gratian’s life.  He did know that Gratian com-
posed a book known to every educated person in Europe.  He knew it was
a book that every student of law studied and that it influenced the develop-
ment of ecclesiastical and secular jurisprudence.  Dante imagined that
Gratian sat in heaven with Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas at his
side.  He may have also known that Albertus and Thomas both used Gra-
tian’s Decretum in their great summae.  Do we have to know more about
Gratian than Dante knew?  Maybe not.
deal with ecclesiastical courts in his Decretum.  I follow Pietro and thank Orazio
Condorelli for this bibliographical information.
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“TO ERASMIANS, EVERYWHERE”: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE
AND WORK OF JUDGE JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.
REVEREND MICHAEL SWEENEY, O.P.*
I regard it as a singular honor and privilege to have been invited to speakin celebration and in honor of the contribution to the Church and soci-
ety of John Noonan.
I begin by noting that Judge Noonan dedicated his very important
work on the development of moral teaching in the Church “[t]o Erasmi-
ans, Everywhere.”  When I first read his text I wondered of whom he was
thinking: was it of Erasmus who was reluctantly consecrated as a religious
and who, for the rest of his life, attempted to be a layman instead?  Or was
it of Erasmus the scholar who disdained scholastic conventions that over-
looked the pure rendering of Scripture and the tradition that a deeper
scholarship might afford?  Or, perhaps, was it of Erasmus who, remaining
aloof from the violence of his age, managed to disappoint everybody?  Of
course, John himself satisfied my wonder: “Erasmus must stand as one of
those ‘great minds,’ recognized by John Paul II, as ‘truly free and full of
God,’ who were in some way able to withdraw from the climate of intoler-
ance [that characterized his age]. . . .  Erasmus’ lone voice was lost in the
storm.”1
Judge Noonan’s is not a voice to be “lost in the storm.”  At the same
time, I suspect that we would do him insufficient honor were we to over-
look the fact that he is very much as capable of being provocative as was
Erasmus.  I wish to call out two remarks of Judge Noonan that, in my view,
open a horizon through which we can appreciate one aspect, at least, of
the significance of his work on behalf of the Church.  In his A Church That
Can and Cannot Change, John remarks that, with the determination of Bl.
John Paul II that slavery is intrinsically evil, the hierarchy had finally
caught up with the moral consensus of the lay faithful.  His remark invites
us to wonder how it is that this recognition was so long in coming.  Then,
in the same work, he notes that the insistence upon the inviolability of
human freedom articulated in Dignitatis Humanae was not accompanied by
any sort of acknowledgment of the fact that such a freedom had been
violated for centuries when the Church, both in theory and in practice,
condoned capital punishment for heretics.  Whence, he invites us to won-
der, is the reluctance to admit that, in centuries past, the Church appears
to have got it wrong?  We might further wonder how it is that, after centu-
* President, Dominican School of Philosophy & Theology.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 153 (2005).
(707)
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ries of having gotten it wrong, at Vatican Council II the Church finally got
it right.
I propose that these rather troubling questions can be addressed by
contemplating a realization on the part of the Council fathers that, most
especially in their moral teaching, those who speak for the Church are
only partially attentive to the ferment of the Spirit in the affairs of human-
ity when they neglect to consult the lay faithful.  We can say, without a
trace of hyperbole, that at Vatican II the hierarchy finally saw the necessity
of consulting men like Judge Noonan and others who are preeminently
competent to speak of secular things, because it is possible to speak of
secular things with the authority of Christ.  What, exactly, does this entail?
More than a decade prior to the Council, Fr. Yves Congar, O.P. had
remarked that, in order for the contribution of the laity to be acknowl-
edged, the Church had to come to a double realization: first, there is a
world out there; and second, it is not the Church.  I would propose a co-
rollary realization: that the world out there will remain the world and
should not be the Church; that the invitation Christ extends to all human-
ity to be gathered into his Body the Church does not mean that the world
must cease to be the world.  The world, according to the Council, is the
dwelling place of the Church and, in some measure, defines her mission:
the Church dwells in the world for the sake of the world.  In other words,
the worldliness of the world—the properly secular—is itself to be trans-
formed in Christ and the Church and therefore has, according to the insis-
tence of the Council and the subsequent papal magisterium, a properly
secular dimension.
How are we to think of this properly secular dimension of the church?
To borrow again from Fr. Congar: “The Church is one, but with a unity of
fullness,”2 and the fullness of the Church includes a properly secular di-
mension.  As such, some elements of the body of the Church exist outside
it: “[T]here exists a field . . . which is, by the essential condition of crea-
tion, a field of Christ, of the Church, a possession of Catholicism; but it is
also, by its intrinsic nature, a field common to all . . . .”3  So we read in St.
Paul to the Romans: “For creation was made subject to futility, not of its
own accord but because of the one who subjected it, in hope that creation
itself would be set free from slavery to corruption and share in the glorious
freedom of the children of God.”4  If this is so, then the moral teaching
cannot have as its sole concern the unity of the Church that is the first
concern of its pastors, whether expressed in: the comportment of Chris-
tians toward participation in the sacramental life of the Church; or the
creation of a secular society that conduces toward the sacramental life of
the Church; or even participation in a secular society that is not inimical
to the sacramental life of the Church.  Rather, the vindication of the
2. YVES CONGAR, O.P., CHRISTIANS ACTIVE IN THE WORLD 148 (1968).
3. Id. at 151.
4. Romans 8:20–21.
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destiny of the human family and with it the field of things that are com-
mon to all must remain a concern in its own right.
It is this field of things that are common to all that Judge Noonan
both explicitly and implicitly addresses.  He rightly points out that it is
impossible to address these things apart from intimate participation in
them.  He notes:
The ordinary moral theologian makes available to his readers lit-
tle of his life.  The typical theologian, prior to 1960, was male,
celibate, and ordained.  He probably had not had the sexual od-
yssey of an Augustine or the military odyssey of a Ha¨ring, and he
would not likely have had the intellect of an Aquinas.  He would
have in adolescence entered on study for the priesthood, and
more likely than not would have been the member of a religious
order, which had chosen him to study moral theology.  As a
priest he would, until recent times, have been subject to ecclesias-
tical censorship of what he wrote. . . . Limited by their training
and by censorship, often with limited experience of the world,
the moral theologians generally entered on the exposition of
moral theology by following in the steps of their predecessors.  In
this way a tradition was constructed.5
I might add that the tradition constructed in this way does not sound terri-
bly promising.
What is clearly lacking is an engagement with secular life.  This mat-
ters.  If I may, I will reflect for a moment from my own experience.
Several years ago I was invited by one of our students to visit with him
at his family ranch in Arizona.  While there, he took part in the various
chores around the ranch and I offered my help.  The “help” that I was able
to afford him was, to put it in the very best light, well intentioned.  Prior to
my visit my idea of a cow was of a docile and rather stupid unhorned crea-
ture, languidly chewing its cud.  These cattle were frisky, horned, and skit-
tish toward dangerous.  My friend, making a prudential judgment of my
yet untested abilities, determined that a truck was a likelier, if more limit-
ing, choice than horseback as a means of transportation.  He suggested
one afternoon that we go skeet shooting.  I had never shot a rifle in my life
and discovered, during that adventure, that I am left eye dominant; as I
tried and failed to line up the site on the rifle, he informed me, with hu-
miliating patience, that I had the wrong eye opened.  I did shoot one
skeet—on the ground as a target, not flying—by accident.  Having entan-
gled myself in rope fence closures, having been cautioned lest, moving too
suddenly, I should cause a stampede—that, thankfully, was averted—and
in myriad other ways demonstrating a complete lack, not only of compe-
tence but of aptitude for conducting myself on a ranch, I found myself
more and more desirous of gathering my hosts and beseeching them to
5. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 205.
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believe that there is an area of my life in which I am considered to have
attained a modest degree of accomplishment.  I am not at this or any mo-
ment contemplating a treatise on the moral requirements of life on the
ranch.
While my example is admittedly trivial, the incapacity to which it
speaks is not.  What is the basis of this incapacity?  As Judge Noonan has
articulated, it consists in a failure of love.  Immediately following his dedi-
cation “[t]o Erasmians, Everywhere,” he cites St. Paul to the Philippians,
“And this I pray: That your love abound more and more [i]n knowledge
and in insight of every kind [s]o that you test what is vital.”6  I am capable
of esteeming, albeit from a great distance, the competence required to
run a ranch.  I am not capable of loving the ranch or, for that matter, the
ranch hands in so far as they are ranchers.  (I speak as a celibate male,
ordained, a member of a religious order, lacking the intellect of Thomas
Aquinas, exactly as Judge Noonan described me).  Moreover, I am pre-
cluded by my very office of even the opportunity to come to know a ranch
and the ranch hands insofar as they are ranchers—my office concerns
teaching, sanctifying, and governing within the Christian community as a
coworker of the Bishop—and as St. Thomas Aquinas insists, what I do not
know I cannot love.  Nor, I would add, am I capable of prudential moral
judgment if love is lacking.  Love concerns always what is particular, what
is concrete, what is actual and never what is merely general, abstract, or
notional.  The moral order itself concerns human action and the term of
every act is something particular, concrete, and actual.  The love of Christ
is a love that designates, elects, chooses, calls forth, names.  If I am to have
knowledge of what it is to ranch and what it is to love a ranch, then I am
fully dependent upon the testimony of those whose knowledge is born of
love, in this instance, the ranchers themselves.  And it is to them that I
must refer in any moral judgment I might make concerning the responsi-
bility of ranchers.
But there is more.  The Church dwells in the world for the sake of the
world; the world and creation itself have a destiny that only Christ fully
reveals, and he has entrusted that revelation to the Church; only knowl-
edge of the world born of love can therefore satisfy the Church’s mission.
For this reason, following the Council fathers, John Paul II did not hesitate
to designate the lay function in the Church as a participation in the priest-
hood of Christ:
The lay faithful are sharers in the priestly mission, for which Jesus
offered himself on the cross and continues to be offered in the
celebration of the Eucharist for the glory of God and the salva-
tion of humanity.  Incorporated in Jesus Christ, the baptized are
united to him and to his sacrifice in the offering they make of
themselves and their daily activities. . . . “Thus as worshipers
6. Id. at vii (quoting Philippians 1:9–10).
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whose every deed is holy, the lay faithful consecrate the world
itself to God.”7
This, it seems to me, is the crux of the matter: the popes and even the
Saints who condoned slavery were, in one sense, incapable of seeing it.  As
Judge Noonan shows, the first interventions on behalf of slaves had to do,
not with the fact itself of their condition as slaves, but with their participa-
tion in the sacramental life of the Church.  Could a slave be fully a Chris-
tian?  Certainly yes, on the authority of St. Paul.  Many of the first
Christians were, in fact, slaves.  Should the sacrament of marriage be
honored between Catholic slaves?  A qualified yes.  Should Catholic slaves
be the property of non-Catholics?  No, they should not.  Concern was cer-
tainly expressed for the spiritual life of the slave.  Yet, as Judge Noonan
relentlessly points out, something essential was overlooked, not seen: iron-
ically, the very fact of slavery itself.  For Pope Gregory the Great, Judge
Noonan writes: “In actual practice [slavery] is not an intrinsically evil but a
usefully available institution. . . . Gregory is not upset by the enslavement
of human beings.”8  What is clearly missing in Gregory’s view is an appreci-
ation, born of love and therefore of knowledge, of life in the world for its
own sake.  True, Christ himself became a slave for our sake, but he did so
freely.  True, Pope and bishops are slaves of the Master, but their slavery is,
as Judge Noonan insists, metaphoric.  There is a difference between the
office of standing in persona Christi capitis to govern, teach, and sanctify the
Christian faithful and the exercise of the priesthood of Christ that consists
in consecrating the world itself to God, the royal priesthood.  That differ-
ence controls what is loved and therefore what is seen.  It also suggests a
difference in moral judgment.
That this is the case is, I believe, manifested in the fact that the differ-
ence persists.  Just as there is a difference in function between the priest-
hood of the ordained and the priesthood that is common to the baptized,
so there is a difference between religious and lay sensitivities.  St. Teresa of
Calcutta, possibly to a greater degree than anyone else in our generation,
manifested a solicitude for the poor.  Yet she refused participation in any
program on their behalf.  Her concern was not the alleviation of poverty as
such but the dignity of each human person in whom she saw reflected the
image of her Lord.  Her sisters serve the Lord Jesus in the poorest of the
poor.  Yet the alleviation of poverty as such by means of a preferential
option for the poor that necessitates change in economic and social poli-
cies is a requirement of government and a work that the pastors of the
Church commend particularly to the lay faithful.
7. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI ¶ 14 (1988) [hereinafter CHRIS-
TIFIDELES LAICI] (citations omitted), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_fath
er/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_30121988_christi
fideles-laici_en.html.
8. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 40.
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Judge Noonan has wonderfully manifested the exercise of the royal
priesthood.  It has required of him a double fidelity: to Christ revealing
himself through the Church in her Scriptures and liturgy and to Christ
offering himself for the sake of the world in order that the world might be
redeemed in Him.  Through the prism of participation in the common
priesthood of Christ the world takes on an entirely different meaning and
significance:
The “world” . . . becomes the place and the means for the lay faithful to
fulfill their Christian vocation, because the world itself is destined to
glorify God the Father in Christ.  The Council is able then to
indicate the proper and special sense of the divine vocation
which is directed to the lay faithful. . . . [T]o be present and
active in the world is not only an anthropological and sociologi-
cal reality, but in a specific way, a theological and ecclesiological
reality as well.  In fact, in their situation in the world God
manifests his plan and communicates to them their particular vo-
cation of “seeking the Kingdom of God by engaging in temporal
affairs and by ordering them according to the plan of God.”9
Accordingly, for one possessed of the priestly character of Christ, life in
the world is not a circumstance, but a divine vocation: each one is “called
there by God.”10  We should note, in passing, that Bl. John Paul proposes
that every Christian vocation is, in its naissance, secular in character.
To offer oneself for the sake of the world requires that one love the
world for its own sake, to see it with Christ in whom the world came to be
and in whom it will reach its fulfillment.  This, in turn, requires the exer-
cise of moral judgment and, as Judge Noonan has said, an appreciation of
what can and cannot change.
In this regard, I would like to invite us to reflect upon what it is that
unifies our moral judgment.  The realm of morality is the realm of human
action and the term of every act is an end that is particular.  As St. Thomas
taught, one cannot have a science of particulars.  For this reason, what
unifies our moral vision is the exercise of virtue—the virtue of prudence
and then the virtue of justice—and therefore the exercise of habits.  The
just man or woman is one who habitually judges well concerning what is
due to another.  This is very precisely why justice must be born of love,
that is, of an attentiveness to the particular, concrete, and actual circum-
stance of another who is appreciated for his or her own sake.  The moral
teaching is not the elaboration of an idea but a reflection upon the lived
experience of the Church in time.  It is an attempt to articulate principles
of action.  As such, and as Judge Noonan has insisted, the moral teaching
9. CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI, supra note 7, ¶ 15 (citation omitted).
10. POPE PAUL VI, LUMEN GENTIUM ¶ 31 (1964), available at http://www.vati
can.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_196411
21_lumen-gentium_en.html.
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not only admits of the possibility of development over time, but insists
upon it.
Perhaps, ironically, what has most changed in the wake of Vatican
Council II is a much deeper appreciation of what cannot change.  In situ-
ating the role of the laity as a participation in the priesthood of Christ, the
Council insisted upon the urgency to see and judge with him.  For that
reason, engagement with the world, which is preeminently the responsibil-
ity of the lay faithful, has as its measure the love of Christ.  This is precisely
where Judge Noonan directs us: “Development proceeds directly by this
rule.  The love of God generates, reinforces, and seals the love of neigh-
bor.  What is required is found in the community’s experience as it tests
what is vital.  On the surface, contradictions appear.  At the deepest level,
the course is clear.”11
To stay the course requires both courage and competence.  And, as a
matter strict justice, courage, and competence invite, or rather require,
our gratitude.  We well know that there can be no fidelity without courage,
for to be faithful requires that we look and not look away, that we remain,
that we stay in relationship and we give witness to what we see, regardless
of the cost.  We would be lacking in our appreciation and our gratitude to
Judge Noonan were we to fail to see his insistence upon engaging the
world as a fully ecclesial act.  Just as the ordained priest stands in persona
Christi in his sacramental ministry, so the lay faithful stand in persona Christi
as they embrace the world in all of its fallenness and thereby “work to
renew the world from within, as a leaven.”  Precisely because each of the
baptized participates in the one priesthood of Christ, in the exercise of the
common priesthood, each is united with the whole Church.
The reality of the Church as Communion is . . . the integrating aspect,
indeed the central content of the “mystery[,”] or rather, the divine
plan for the salvation of humanity. . . . The Church as Communion
is the “new” People, the “messianic” People, the People that “has,
for its head, Christ[;] as its heritage, the dignity and freedom of
God’s Children[;] for its law, the new commandment to love as
Christ loved us[;] for its goal, the kingdom of God . . . established
by Christ as a communion of life, love and truth.”12
The integrity that Judge Noonan has shown in the conduct of his office
must be acknowledged as an act on behalf of the whole Church; he has
acted for us and in our name.
Similarly, faithfulness to the world demands competence; the world
must be engaged on its own terms.  Like Erasmus, Judge Noonan stands
among the most accomplished scholars of our generation.  The gratitude
that competence requires is best expressed in trust; we are invited or, bet-
ter, required to seek his counsel.
11. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 222.
12. CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI, supra note 7, ¶ 19.
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One who loves the world in the manner of Christ is one who is wed-
ded to the truth—not merely the truth of propositions, but the truth
about creation and the truth about the supernatural destiny of the human
person.  Yves Congar once remarked: “There are persons in whose pres-
ence it is not possible to lie.”  Because he has committed himself to life in
the world; because he has looked upon the world with Christ; because he
has clearly seen the dignity of secular pursuits, how they are ordered to the
human person, and has offered them through Christ to the Father; be-
cause he has been faithful to men and to women—that he has remained
with them, that he has looked and has not looked away; precisely for these
reasons, Judge Noonan has become one in whose presence the truth
about the person is made known, one in whose presence it is not possible
to lie.  I can think of no greater tribute to John than to pray that when we
are called to stand before the Father this might be said of each of us.
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READING JOHN NOONAN
JOSEPH VINING*
JOHN Noonan has done more than any in our time to save law and therule of law for those who more and more are looking to it around the
world, more to brace those who in reading him sense that they are reading
themselves as they would wish to be, and more to speak the truth to those
who cannot bring themselves to speak it.  I want in this tribute to touch on
the ways Noonan has been bold and true, and do so in the course of a
brief look at two of his books—Persons and Masks of the Law from 1976,1
and A Church That Can and Cannot Change from 2005.2
I
Noonan takes readers of Persons and Masks to the basis of thought:
“[S]ome vision of the construction of the universe will be found to under-
lie anyone’s account of law.”3  People did not reach so far in 1976.4  It
would have been shocking to most if they heard themselves saying any-
thing like this.  But it is true.  I think we all know it is true, which leaves us
individually to ask what our vision is of the construction of the universe.
Each of us has a sense of it, however deep down in us it is.  What do we
think we think, and what do we actually think?
* Joseph Vining is Hutchins Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of
Michigan.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (2002) [hereinafter PERSONS].
2. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING (2005) [hereinafter CHURCH].
3. PERSONS, supra note 1, at 71–72.
4. Unless, that is, they were trying to grasp the life and thought of Oliver
Wendell Holmes.  In 1977, Holmes’s third official biographer, Grant Gilmore, de-
scribed the world as imagined by Holmes as “bleak and terrifying” and Holmes
himself as “savage, harsh, and cruel.” GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
49 (1977).  But cruelty was meaningless in the world in which Holmes tried to live
or thought he lived, since it was without persons, or indeed individuals.  Law, for
Holmes, was “like everything else” in the universe and “[t]he postulate on which
we think about the universe is that there is a fixed quantitative relation between
every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents.”  Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897); see also JOSEPH
VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP 274, 372 n.28 (1994) (discussing The Path of the
Law); Joseph Vining, The Cosmological Question, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2024, 2025 (1996)
(discussing Holmes’s definition of “Law” in The Path of the Law).
Gilmore died leaving the biography he had worked on for fifteen years unfin-
ished and unpublished.  The half-century effort to commission an official biogra-
phy of Holmes was abandoned. See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES:
THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 31–33 (2000).
The lectures John Noonan began in 1971, that ultimately became Persons,
were the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures of 1972.
(715)
67
Brennan: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.: An Introduction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-4\VLR407.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-SEP-14 13:20
716 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 715
Many will be surprised at the difference between what they think they
think as they make their way through life today, and what they actually
think.  They may find even foreign what they actually think, while they say
and do what others who claim authority over them demand.  Noonan
knows that moving toward their actual vision will change the articulation
of their thought, and with it their account of law and its authority.
Then Noonan points to love in the structure of the universe and to
love’s role in all moral feeling, thought, and development.  “The central
problem, I think, of the legal enterprise is the relation of love to power.”5
“[M]oral education,” he adds, is “essential to the professional preparation
of lawyers, who are to be formed less as social engineers than as the chari-
table creators of values.”6
Again, use of the very word “love” in a professional setting would have
been shocking thirty-eight years ago.  If it is less so today, that is Noonan’s
achievement.  He felt able to end his prominent response in 1998 to con-
temporary attempts to reduce law to economics, “[l]ove is not simply an
emotion, a sentiment . . . . It is the Love ‘that moves the sun and the other
stars’ that also moves Dante . . . .”7
II
The universe.  The love built into its very structure.  Then the univer-
sality of fundamental human values:
So many of us struggle with how far what we take to be important and
moral can be allowed to reach in our understanding of humanity as a
whole.  We wonder, even when we wish we did not, how grounded value is,
how much discovered rather than created solely by us, how much it comes
to us from beyond the conventions of our culture as well as from inside us.
We cannot imagine warming to an abstract rule, and without our warmth
it has no real authority for us.  Our wondering extends back in time to the
morality and meaning of our predecessors, as much as it extends to the
other side of globe right now.
Noonan explores this common doubleness of mind throughout what
he has given us.  He especially takes up the first way the question of univer-
sality lives with us, and looks to the fact of change in moral and legal val-
ues over the course of history—change over time rather than over
distance.  “Development” is his word for it.  Development in understand-
ing what our predecessors have said and done affects the hold that old
papers and old decisions have over us in our own thought and practice.
The challenge to their hold on us pulls in legislation that seeks to initiate
or confirm change too, for any document emerging from a legislature is
dropped into an existing web of past understandings and decisions and
5. PERSONS, supra note 1, at xx.
6. Id. at xix.
7. John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner’s Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1768, 1775
(1998) [hereinafter Problematics].
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must find its place there, categorized, colored, and channeled by them.
How is it, Noonan asks, that the fact of change over time can be faced and
accepted, without emptying the very notion and sense of authority in law
and religious belief today?
Here I turn to Noonan’s book a generation later, A Church That Can
and Cannot Change.  His principal subject is slavery and its movement from
acceptance and maintenance by law and church, as “natural” even, to its
recognition as “intrinsic evil” today, as without justification in any context,
like torture.8  He chooses the pervasive moral and legal issue that presents
the phenomenon of change in its strongest form.9  We believe enough in
our own goodness and rightness to be able to do or be in on the doing of
the terrible things we often do in law—kill, imprison with “civil death” in a
known kind of hell, impoverish and bankrupt, rip children from the arms
of a parent, torture animals, on and on.  If those who gave us our Constitu-
tion and built the tradition of the Church, and who made decisions we
follow today, did engage in intrinsic evil, and thought themselves good
and right too, how can we allow even our own values to comfort and guide
us?
8. See CHURCH, supra note 2, at 5.
9. Chapter 2 of Persons, “Virginian Liberators,” focused attention on Found-
ing Fathers in Virginia, identified with the ideal of liberty and justice for all, ac-
tively engaging in maintaining and tightening Virginia’s law of slavery. See
PERSONS, supra note 1, at 29–64.  “The Virginia paradox is the legal paradox, gen-
erally.” Id. at 58.  A year later, Noonan supplemented his historical treatment of
the problem in The Antelope. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE
ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE
AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977).  Chief Justice Taney responded to the paradox,
or problem, in one way before the Civil War in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856).  With seven justices joining his opinion, Taney quoted the Declaration of
Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . .” Id. at 410 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  He continued,
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole
human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day
would be so understood.  But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the
people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as
understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distin-
guished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have
been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted;
and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently
appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and
reprobation.
Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men—high in liter-
ary acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and incapable of assert-
ing principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.  They
perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it
would be understood by others . . . .
Id.
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I was raised in the South in the forties and fifties.  The experience in
our country of slavery maintained by law and lawyers did not end with the
Thirteenth Amendment.  The evidence was all around me, and there was
no challenge from the churches also all around me.
I dealt with slavery in the reading I did on my own.  I had Faulkner
and Tolstoy to help me.  I dealt with it in some intellectual way throughout
my schooling.  But I can say here, in confession and admiration, that I
think I had never felt so connected personally with what slavery really
meant until I read this book.  I read absorbed.  The book is beautiful in its
form and in its sentences despite its chilling substance, as if Noonan were
continually reminding the reader how human life can be lived.  Its chap-
ters and sections are like verses.
Noonan is generous to all at its end.  Nonetheless, I have found my-
self since troubled too by the brutality of slavery in ancient Greece and
Rome, those high civilizations, as we call them, on which so much of my
education and taste were built.  I wonder how I would have read Cicero’s
orations as a boy in school if I had been fully aware of the treatment of
human beings that made them possible.  I do not know how far the art,
architecture, and literature of Greece and Rome can be separated from it,
though I separate the Gospel and the early church from it and can work
with Noonan’s help to separate the tradition of the Church from it.10  I do
10. Among other contemporaries responding to this personal question of sep-
aration, the theologian and historian David Bentley Hart is especially helpful in
setting it in its larger context. See, e.g., DAVID BENTLEY HART, ATHEIST DELUSIONS:
THE CHRISTIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS FASHIONABLE ENEMIES (2009).  In the intro-
duction Hart remarks:
This book chiefly—or at least centrally—concerns the history of the early
church, of roughly the first four or five centuries, and the story of how
Christendom was born out of the culture of late antiquity.  My chief ambi-
tion in writing it is to call attention to the peculiar and radical nature of
the new faith in that setting: how enormous a transformation of thought,
sensibility, culture, morality, and spiritual imagination Christianity consti-
tuted in the age of pagan Rome; the liberation it offered from fatalism,
cosmic despair, and the terror of occult agencies; the immense dignity it
conferred upon the human person; its subversion of the cruelest aspects
of pagan society; its (alas, only partial) demystification of political power;
its ability to create moral community where none had existed before; and
its elevation of active charity above all other virtues.  Stated in its most
elementary and most buoyantly positive form, my argument is, first of all,
that among all the many great transitions that have marked the evolution
of Western civilization, whether convulsive or gradual, political or philo-
sophical, social or scientific, material or spiritual, there has been only
one—the triumph of Christianity—that can be called in the fullest sense
a “revolution”: a truly massive and epochal revision of humanity’s prevail-
ing vision of reality, so pervasive in its influence and so vast in its conse-
quences as actually to have created a new conception of the world, of
history, of human nature, of time, and of the moral good.  To my mind, I
should add, it was an event immeasurably more impressive in its cultural
creativity and more ennobling in its moral power than any other move-
ment of spirit, will, imagination, aspiration, or accomplishment in the
history of the West.  And I am convinced that, given how radically at vari-
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believe it was as evil then as it is today, as he believes.  I know, as does he,
that necessary to this belief is belief in the universality of fundamental
human values, on which any sense of melioration and progress depends.
Of course, there are doubts about the universal in anything human
and about progress in moving toward a humane world.  However hard we
work for betterment in the particular ways we do, I think most of us carry
the burden of these doubts when we reflect on what we have achieved or
failed to achieve for others than ourselves.  But this is the beauty of Noo-
nan’s addressing our conflict by focusing on change:
It is by reflection on the promptings of love that morality begins,
that the requisite human response to the human stranger . . .
becomes clearer. . . . By experience, by analogy, by more inclu-
sive seeing, and also by argument, reasoning, and moral theo-
rizing, morality is developed . . . .11
The course of moral doctrine, like that of [a] great river, appears
to follow no rule.  Plunging over heights, striking boulders,
creeping in almost motionless channels, it defies prediction, can
scarcely be the subject of science. . . . [It is t]he testing of what is
vital . . . . What is required is found in the community’s experi-
ence as it tests what is vital.  On the surface, contradictions ap-
pear.  At the deepest level, the course is clear.12
Hearing Noonan’s eloquent voice as I read A Church That Can and
Cannot Change, I recalled the effect on me of discovering Va´clav Havel’s
address to the Canadian Senate and House of Commons in 1999.  Noonan
was giving me that experience again.  “I have often asked myself,” Havel
said at the end,
why human beings have any rights at all.  I always come to the
conclusion that human rights, human freedoms, and human dig-
nity have their deepest roots somewhere outside the perceptible
world.  These values are as powerful as they are because, under
certain circumstances, people accept them without compulsion
and are willing to die for them, and they make sense only in the
perspective of the infinite and the eternal.  I am deeply con-
vinced that what we do, whether it be in harmony with our con-
science, the ambassador of eternity, or in conflict with it, can
only finally be assessed in a dimension that lies beyond that world
ance Christianity was with the culture it slowly and relentlessly displaced,
its eventual victory was an event of such improbability as to strain the very
limits of our understanding of historical causality.
Id. at x–xi.
11. Problematics, supra note 7, at 1775.
12. CHURCH, supra note 2, at 221–22.
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we can see around us.  If we did not sense this, or subconsciously
assume it, there are some things that we could never do.13
III
The universe.  The human universal.  Love.  The last of the large sub-
jects of Noonan’s work I want to notice here is the person in legal thought.
Let us turn back to Persons and Masks of the Law.  The more general
subject of A Church That Can and Cannot Change is the place of authority in
a world of change and development.  In Persons and Masks of the Law, Noo-
nan focuses directly on the question of the person and the personal.
The reception of the 1976 edition of the book had been such that it
was republished in 2002, with Noonan adding a new Preface to his 1976
Foreword.  His Foreword describes his principal subject as “the place of
the person in the understanding of law . . . with the purpose of bringing at
least some ‘professionals’ into the camp of the ‘humanists.’”14  His new
Preface to the 2002 edition describes the book’s “central question” as “the
place of rules in the legal system if the process takes persons into ac-
count.”15  He adds, “[t]he book, as will be seen, defends rules as
indispensable.”16
Were it not for his subsequent reference in the new Preface to the
rarity of his dissents (3.4%) in judging the cases he had heard since join-
ing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985, and the examples he gives
of situations where more attention might be paid to persons in a case, one
might think that the 1976 Foreword and the 2002 Preface are offering two
ways of stating the same question.
His 2002 examples include forms of address and reference in speak-
ing and writing.  He calls them “modest ways” of paying attention to per-
sons.17  Beyond those, there are the examples of close cases, cases where
“the precedents are varied or unclear,” and particular areas of law where
this is done—sentencing in criminal law, asylum petitions, cases involving
13. Va´clav Havel, Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(June 10, 1999), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1999/jun/10/ko-
sovo-and-the-end-of-the-nation-state/?pagination=false.  The extraordinary work of
the well-known internationalist, Philip Allott, builds a legal world in which the uni-
versal is recognized and realized. See, e.g., PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER
FOR A NEW WORLD (2d ed. 2001); PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY
AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE (2002); see also Philip Allott, Law and the Challenge of the
Transcendental: Rethinking the Order of All Order, HARVARD LAW SCH., INST. FOR
GLOBAL LAW & POL’Y WORKSHOP, (Jan. 4–14, 2013), available at http.//
www.trin.cam.uk/show.php?dowid=1614.
14. PERSONS, supra note 1, at xvi.
15. Id. at x.
16. Id.
17. Id. at xi.
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religious freedom, and cases involving sovereign immunity.18  Against the
panoply of the whole of law these would seem rather modest also.
Indeed, there is something of an impression left by the 2002 Preface
of modulation and pulling back from the passion that drove the ending of
the 1976 Foreword that he wrote when he wrote the book:
[Law is] a human activity affecting both those acting and those
enduring their action.  The analytic bent of most of those now so
engaged leads them to reduce “person” to a congeries of “rights,”
with the highest ideal, if any is expressed, to do “justice” by en-
forcing the rights. . . . But it is necessary to insist that the person
precedes analysis, and to seek to do justice in the narrow sense is
no more a full human aspiration than such justice is the sum of
human virtues.19
But we have beside us A Church That Can and Cannot Change, if we wonder
what to do with such an impression.  It appeared shortly after the new
2002 Preface, in 2005, and there is certainly no pulling back in it. Persons
and Masks of the Law remains a radical book, as radical read today as it was
in 1976.
“The person precedes analysis,” at the end of the 1976 Foreword just
quoted, is, I think, the critical perception.  The mere enforcement of ab-
stract rights connected to abstract entities on either side of a case fails to
do justice, except in a sense that bleeds justice of its meaning.  The object
of a legal system with true authority is law and justice both.
In fact, “law and justice” is a phrase heard often today.  The object of
“the law” is commonly described in this way.  Behind the combination of
law with justice is a long institutional history, the present outcome of
which is part of the context of Noonan’s radical call to look and to see.
There was at one time a court called a court of law, in which rules
were enforced by sanctions, and another court called a court of equity or
the Court of Chancery, to which those injured by the way rules of law
worked could turn and be heard with arguments that a particular outcome
was unjust given the full circumstances of the case and its participants.
Both courts were august, sitting in their own palaces.  The Law Lords had
such remedies as were spelled out in the rules.  The Lord Chancellor rep-
resenting the sovereign had his own remedies, “equitable remedies”—in-
junctions, “constructive” trusts, restitution.  The rules, which were called
“law,” were applied.  The court of equity was at hand to do “justice.”
Then, over time, the two courts were merged into one court.  The
Law Lord and the Lord Chancellor became one judge with two roles.
Then “law” and “equity” themselves, two mentalities each with their sup-
porting body of precedents, were merged in jurisdiction after jurisdiction.
The two roles of the judge were merged into one with now both sets of
18. Id. at x–xiii.
19. Id. at xix–xx.
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remedies available.  In the federal system this happened in 1938,20 the
year I was born and therefore by definition recently.  In Virginia the
merger took effect in 2006, very recently.21
This is not Noonan’s account.  He is too good a historian to link what
he sees to this legal development, which may have been meant to be one
of nomenclature only.  I mention it as a device to help us grasp Noonan’s
purpose and vision.  In this merger of “law and equity,” a law of rules and
abstractions might have swallowed a law of justice without digesting it.
What Noonan presents is an “understanding of law”22 in which a law of
justice swallowed a law of rules and did digest it.  Justice became part of
what was sought and what was argued and what was taught in every case.
In every case: this is what makes Noonan’s perception remarkable, radical,
and true.  Decision makers seeking guidance in the body of legal texts and
hoping they may be able to say they find a rule in them, must also take
into account the actual persons involved in the case and their circum-
stances, “invoking,” as he says, “a tradition of equity jurisprudence with
which so much that I have written here has affinity.”23  Who the defendant
is, who the plaintiff is, how they came to their places in court, who is
presenting the arguments, are among all the particulars of the case that
may be relevant.  Though “it would be a travesty of what I believe,” he says,
“to suppose that law could exist without rules.  At the intersection of rules
and persons, the process to be understood occurs.”24  Again, Noonan
writes in 1976, “my principal subject [is] the place of the person in the
understanding of law”25 and in 2002 “[t]he central question . . . is the
place of rules in the legal system if the process takes persons into ac-
count.”26  “[T]he person precedes analysis” still.27
I might freshen the examples Noonan gives of cases in which the ac-
tual persons before the court are not seen, as a slave is not seen, with a
recent case in Ohio.  In 1994, Judge Allan Davis in the Hancock County
Probate Court declared Donald Miller dead several years after he mysteri-
ously disappeared, so that his ex-wife, Robin Miller, could apply for Social
Security benefits for their two daughters.  Nineteen years later, Mr. Miller
showed up, wanting to apply for a driver’s license and reactivate his Social
Security number, and petitioned Judge Davis to reverse his declaration of
20. See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938–1958: Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 436 n.8 (1958).  For a
stimulating and engaged account of equity in English law and history, and of the
treatment of equity in disciplines other than law, see GARY WATT, EQUITY STIRRING:
THE STORY OF JUSTICE BEYOND LAW (2012).
21. See W. Hamilton Bryson, The Merger of Common-Law and Equity Pleading in
Virginia, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 77, 77 (2006).
22. PERSONS, supra note 1, at xvi.
23. Id. at 98.
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. at xvi.
26. Id. at x.
27. Id. at xx.
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death.  A lawyer for Mrs. Miller, James Hammer, opposed the petition on
the ground that she might have to return the benefit payments received
from Social Security and did not have the money to do so.  Judge Davis
ruled that Ohio law does not allow a declaration of death to be reversed
after three years or more have passed.  “[Y]ou’re still deceased as far as the
law is concerned,” he said to Mr. Miller sitting in the courtroom.28  “I
don’t know where that leaves you.”29  The case, he said later, was decided
“in strict conformity with Ohio law.”30  Mr. Miller’s lawyer, Francis Marley,
said Mr. Miller could not afford to appeal.  He added, “[w]e hoped the
judge would see the equity of giving his life back.”31
It remains to ask what or who the persons are that must be taken into
account in decision-making in a legal system that does justice.  Thinking
and speaking of “persons” already extends quite far in our daily experi-
ence and may be spreading further.
Noonan uses the word “individual” from time to time.  He speaks of
“developing a sense of justice—a sense of what was due to particular indi-
viduals in a concrete situation.”32  “By masks,” he says, “I mean ways of
classifying individual human beings so that their humanity is hidden and
disavowed. . . . [I]n any sociological analysis, the masks may be seen as
devices reflecting the structure of society and the degrees of its acknowl-
edgment of humanity in different groups.”33  Contrasting masks and roles,
he says:
Roles are as necessary for the display of human love as clothes for
the display of human beauty.  The naked individual rises to the
communal expectations invested in the role . . . . No more than
clothes does a role obscure the human visage.  But as a hat can
be pulled down to cover a face, so a role, misused, becomes a
mask obliterating the countenance of humanity.34
The masks of the law are “[n]either individual projections nor objective
artifacts, neither social roles nor literary disguises.”35
In speaking of the limitations of any quantitative understanding of
law, he remarks, “It is difficult to persuade any individual human being
that such abstractions are commensurate with himself or herself.  The
complex rationality of individuals escapes reduction.”36
28. John Schwartz, Declared Legally Dead, as He Sat Before the Judge, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 11, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/us/declared-legally-dead-
as-he-sat-before-the-judge.html?_r=0.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. PERSONS, supra note 1, at xviii–xix.
33. Id. at 19, 23.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 164.
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“Person” is used by Noonan almost as a synonym of “individual.”  By
“persons,” he says,
I mean particular flesh and blood and consciousness.  I take as a
starting point that we are such beings, that we encounter such
beings, and that encountering them we recognize those who are
in shape and structure, in origin and destiny, like ourselves.  I
assume that we have the experience of responding to persons.37
He asks, for his reader,
[A]re persons merely a collection of roles—husband, father, law-
yer, etc.?  I take persons to be ontological realities, perceptible
through the roles, distinguishable from both roles and masks. . . .
If a lawyer could not distinguish between real persons and fic-
tional persons such as corporations or trees, he would not be ca-
pable of communication.38
As for “the law,” Noonan comments that “Holmes gave it a fictitious life.
No person itself, the law lives in persons.”39
Readers will understand what Noonan has in mind in referring to per-
sons as well as to individuals.  “Person,” rather than “individual,” is the
term of reference to human beings in the Constitution: there are “free
persons, including those bound for service for a term of years,” “citizens,”
“Indians not taxed,” and “all other persons.”  “Other persons” is the Con-
stitutional euphemism for “slave,” a word that does not appear in the Con-
stitution until the Thirteenth Amendment, and slaves were to be counted
in determining the population of a state for purposes of setting its number
of Congressional representatives as three-fifths of a person.  “Person” is
also the primary term of reference in the Church, and it inhabits ordinary
speech in many ways.  It is a standard term in many areas of law.
But there are ambiguities in its general use, indicated by Noonan’s
confidence that we are always able to see the difference “between real per-
sons and fictional persons such as corporations or trees.”40  A slave might
be a person but not a “legal person.”  In the awful words of Chief Justice
Taney, speaking for the Supreme Court in 1856, a descendant of an Amer-
ican slave “had no rights which the white man was bound to re-
spect . . . .”41  By contrast, corporations were never “flesh and blood,” but
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 4.  Does human experience teach that real persons must be flesh
and blood, or human?  The law as Holmes describes it can have only a fictitious
life.  But in legal method and practice we cannot do without the presupposition of
a caring and living mind beyond the individual.  For some discussion on my part,
see Joseph Vining, DILEMMA: Faith and Failure, in THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE
AUTHORITARIAN 45–60 (1988).
40. See PERSONS, supra note 1, at 27.
41. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).  Justice McLean replied
in his dissent, “A slave is not a mere chattel.  He bears the impress of his Maker,
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they are legal persons.  So are the great administrative agencies.  Neither
corporation nor agency can be reduced to the human individuals associ-
ated with them or speaking for them and constantly being replaced.  Law-
yers sue on their behalf, and they can be sued without individuals
associated with them being drawn in.
In the case of corporations, including the Church, they have property
of their own and not as in a form of trust.  Human individuals often have
quite limited claims on them or claims on them linked to fiduciary duties
to them.  Corporations claim, and are granted as persons today, some con-
stitutional rights of their own.  Beyond this, developments in criminal law
have made them chargeable with serious crimes, the mens rea elements of
which are corporate and apart from any individual’s mens rea.  When con-
victed, a corporation’s sentence, which can include mandated change
within and a period of oversight from without, can be set by its score on a
“corporate culpability scale” and can be mitigated by “corporate remorse.”
The question of their “ontological reality” has become harder and harder
to answer.42
The general difficulty is that persons are regularly made and unmade
in the legal system.  Noonan makes the point himself: “Legal education,”
he says, “has often been education in the making and unmaking of per-
sons.”43  The subtitle of Colin Dayan’s fine 2013 book, on law’s collabora-
tion in the perpetuation of slavery even today, is How Legal Rituals Make
and Unmake Persons, which I judge from the book to be a reference and a
tribute to Noonan.44  In fact, the person in everyday life is made and
sometimes unmade.  The friend who is present to us, as a person we know,
is half-constructed by us.  Consciously, semi-consciously, or unconsciously,
we are always sifting through what an individual says and does as an indi-
vidual, and either identifying it with him or her as a person who exists over
time, or putting it aside as mistake or inauthentic.  We do the same with
ourselves.  You sit in judgment on what you say and do, wondering
whether that was really you who said or did it.
Human individuality is not made and unmade.  It is the first thing we
know, and the last.  It is not our uniqueness, though each of us is unique.
That would not distinguish us from any river stone we might pick up.  It is
rather that about us that interferes, blunts, or stops others’ quantitative
and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to an endless
existence.” Id. at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting).
42. For discussion of the question, see, what I think is still the finest piece in
English on corporate purpose and the nature of a corporate entity, W.M. Geldart,
Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REV. 90 (1911); see also Joseph Vining, Corporate Crime and
the Religious Sensibility, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 313 (2003). But see Tracy Fessenden,
Response to Joseph Vining’s ‘Corporate Crime and the Religious Sensibility’, 6 PUNISHMENT
& SOC’Y 105 (2004). See generally ERIC ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF
THE FIRM (2013).
43. PERSONS, supra note 1, at 58.
44. See COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG: HOW LEGAL RITUALS MAKE
AND UNMAKE PERSONS 2, 23, 264 n.37 (2011).
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and utilitarian calculation in their treatment of us.  The individual is not
known to the natural sciences or the social sciences.  It has no place in
them.  But the individual is known to theology, to psychiatry, literature
and art, and to law.45
Readers who come to this wonderful book may assume references to
the individual are references to the person.  But the terms are not synony-
mous.  I suggest that Noonan’s meaning is served when “individual” comes
to supplement “person” in the reader’s mind.  Thought of the person
would be kept centered on our human condition as Noonan intends it to
be.  There are nonhuman persons all around us.  There is also nonhuman
flesh and blood and perhaps consciousness all around us—those animals
who are being seen more and more as individuals in scientific work as well
as in law, and who in law are therefore being protected more and more by
statute and constitutional recognition.46  Indeed, there is expressed fear
today within the Institute of Medicine and the National Academies of Sci-
ence that this rapid development of law governing human relationships
with animals will end with some sentient animals being viewed as legal
persons, with unquestioned ontological reality.47  Noonan’s powerful call
to look and see is also a call addressed to the humane in us.
There is always the question of the place of roles in understanding
the person’s relation to the individual.  Noonan observes, as we have
noted, that a person is not a collection of roles, is perceptible through the
roles, and is distinguishable from both roles and masks.  He compares a
role to clothes for the naked individual that help in active service to
others.  In distinguishing role from mask, he says, “The lawmaker and the
judge and the litigant are all carrying out positions assigned them by soci-
ety, all are the players of roles.  They have not been identified with those
parts.”48
But a person does have an identity in his or her own eyes and in the
eyes of others.  It emerges from an individual’s life and does not have the
fictive quality that attends playing a part.  Becoming a person is bringing
purposes and values into one’s world that connect one with other individ-
uals in their worlds.  One’s purposes and values are not all one’s own, and
45. For further discussion, see Joseph Vining, Dignity as Perception: Recognition
of the Human Individual and the Individual Animal in Legal Thought, in UNDERSTAND-
ING HUMAN DIGNITY 573–90 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) [hereinafter Dig-
nity]; Joseph Vining, The Consequence of Human Differences, 5 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE
21 (2010).
46. Noonan may indeed be referring to them as “beings” of
particular flesh and blood, and consciousness.  I take as a starting point
that we are such beings, that we encounter such beings, and that encountering
them we recognize those who are in shape and structure, in origin and destiny,
like ourselves.  I assume that we have the experience of responding to
persons.
PERSONS, supra note 1, at 26 (emphasis added).
47. See Dignity, supra note 45; Joseph Vining, Human Identity: The Question
Presented by Human-Animal Hybridization, 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 50 (2008).
48. PERSONS, supra note 1, at 20.
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they are not realized alone.  They are in Noonan’s words vital, fundamen-
tal, and can sometimes be worth devoting an entire life to, or dying for, as
clothes and playing a part could never be.  They call to us.  They excite
our imagination and creativity.  They speak to us in a real way.  Noonan
ends the book with this speaking:
[Good purposes] exist now in living human persons recapturing
the thought of past living persons.  These purposes, and with it
their vitality, their toughness, arise out of the lives of past per-
sons; they speak to us out of those lives.  Whether they are moral
ideals or judicial opinions, they must be understood in the multi-
ple contexts which enfold each individual’s experience.  The act
of understanding enhances our power to discriminate between
what was fundamental . . . and what was, even within their own
framework, weakness or misapprehension or contingent solu-
tion. . . . Persons speak to persons, heart unmasked to heart.49
Thus, on the one hand, we have ourselves as individuals, each of us
necessarily at the center of the world as he or she sees it and believes it to
be, each with power to say “no” or “yes” to life, “no” or “yes” to the way the
world is, “no” or “yes” to others’ propositions about the world and to their
actions in the world.  On the other hand, we have ourselves as persons
identifying with moral realities and aspirations that make us human in
small ways and large.  Each of us is a miraculous fusion of the two without
the loss of either.
Might it not be this fusion that readies us for what Christ offers us?  I
hesitate, as a lawyer who is not a theologian, to speak so directly about
divinity itself, to speak as I think John Noonan can.  But let me just suggest
that Christ’s offer might be expressed as an offer to bring us, with a
human identity by virtue of fusion of this kind, then into the divine pres-
ence in Him.  In fusing our ineradicable individuality with a humanity that
cannot be thought about or spoken of except by acknowledging the actual
presence of other individuals, in being penultimately taken into values
that exist beyond any of us individually and animate us in life, we move
toward participation in the Divine.  A double negative may for once actu-
ally help: the Divine a person, a person not utterly and completely unlike
us.
Personal reflection on who or what a person is may lead some to such
a thought as this.  But Noonan does not assume or try to lead his readers
toward the visualization of divinity on which the Catholic Church and
Catholic imagination and practice are built.  The works we have consid-
ered here are not works of theology and they are certainly not evangeliz-
ing.  He is reaching to everyone.  The experience of reading John Noonan
is of opening more and more to the human in us and all around us, the
possibility of a humane world growing with each perception.
49. Id. at 167.
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Martin Luther King, Jr. Lecture
“SKIN IN THE TAX GAME”: INVISIBLE TAXPAYERS?
INVISIBLE CITIZENS?
MILDRED WIGFALL ROBINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR Mullane, in extending this invitation to deliver the 2014Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial lecture here at the Villanova
University School of Law, noted that she was seeking someone who could
speak from an economic justice perspective informed by work done in the
area of taxation.
As I seek to respond to her invitation, let me first establish a context.
You will recall that at the time of his assassination in 1968, Dr. King was
campaigning in Memphis, Tennessee on behalf of the city’s striking,
predominantly black sanitation workers.1  In Memphis at that time, more
than one half of all black residents lived below the poverty line.2  Compar-
atively, one in seven white Memphians lived below the poverty line.3  “Four
out of [ten] sanitation workers qualified for welfare, and they received no
medical insurance, workers’ compensation, or overtime pay.”4  The work-
ers wanted improved working conditions, and they wanted to unionize.5
Dr. King had long viewed racial injustice and economic injustice as inextri-
cably intertwined.6  But his proposals for redressing the conditions in
which the sanitation workers lived and worked were, in terms of race,
broadly cast.  They included an economic and social bill of rights promis-
* Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation Professor of Law,
University of Virginia.  I thank Taunya L. Banks for her helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this essay and Alex Nordholm, Class of 2014, for his enthusiastic
and very helpful research assistance.  As always, I thank our librarians for general
research support.  An earlier version of this essay was delivered as the Rev. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Lecture at the Villanova University School of
Law on January 27, 2014.  I thank Professor Joy Mullane for extending to me the
invitation to deliver the address.
1. See Memphis 1968: Sanitation Workers’ Strike Spurs Cause of Economic Justice,
APWU MAGAZINE (2005), http://apwumembers.apwu.org/laborhistory/05-1_
memphissanitationworkers/05-1_memphissanitationworkers.htm.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.  Even during his formative years, he viewed economic injustice as the
inseparable twin of racial injustice. See generally Martin Luther King, Jr., “My Pil-
grimage to Nonviolence,” FELLOWSHIP (Sept. 1, 1958), available at http://mlk-kpp01.
stanford.edu/primarydocuments/Vol4/1-Sept-1958_MyPilgrimageToNon-
violence.pdf.
(729)
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ing all citizens the right to a job, adequate education, decent housing, and
a minimum income.7
II. ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND TAX BURDENS: WHY IT MATTERS . . .
There is no hint of direct concern for tax matters in any of this.  In-
deed, Dr. King may have been initially taken aback at the notion that con-
cern for economic justice could extend to the ways in which we in this
country raise revenue in addition to concerns regarding the ways in which
we use those resources.  But the importance of our taxing systems, writ
large, cannot be overstated.  Oliver Wendell Holmes quite likely said it
best: “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .”8  Given the central-
ity of raising revenues to financing our way of life, I submit that the ways in
which we talk about and implement the tax laws allocating the burdens of
this civilized society are just as important as the ways in which we use those
resources to accord the benefits of living in this civilized society.
In fact, Holmes’s observation is quite powerful.  Let’s think about his
words a bit more. TAXES . . . are what WE pay . . . for CIVILIZED SOCIETY.
These words are carved over the doors of the building housing the Inter-
nal Revenue Service in the nation’s capital.9  During the process of em-
blazoning those words upon that building, for a time the words were
“taxes are what we pay.”  Had only those words remained, we would likely
be having quite a different conversation here today.  But as completed,
Mr. Justice Holmes did not say tax is the price that we pay.  Nor did he say
that taxes are paid only by a few.  “Taxes”—the word is plural.  And we pay.
So let’s think more deeply about this quote.  Just who is “we”; what are
these taxes; and what does this civilized society look like?
III. “SKIN IN THE GAME”
Let me digress for just a moment.  How many of you have heard or
used the phrase “skin in the game?”  To my surprise, while watching the
Golden Globe awards on January 12th (for all of ten minutes), I heard
Matthew McConaughey use the phrase in his acceptance speech upon re-
7. See Letter from SCLC, to the President, Congress, and Supreme Court of
the United States (Feb. 6, 1968), available at http://www.thekingcenter.org/
archive/document/economic-and-social-bill-rights.  Dr. King had earlier shared
this vision on the world stage during his 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech. See
Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1964), available
at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-accept-
ance_en.html (“I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have
three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and
dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits.”).
8. Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. See Jay Netherton, A “Higher” Calling for the IRS?, WETHEPEOPLE.ORG (June
19, 2013), http://wethepeoplehq.org/2013/06/19/a-higher-calling-for-the-irs/.
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ceiving the award for his starring role in Dallas Buyers Club.10  Mc-
Conaughey said, “This film . . . was an underdog . . . turned down 86
times. . . . We got the right people together five years ago, stuck to it, put
some skin in the game, and here it is.”11  I assume that as used here, he was
referring to investing capital in the project, deemed to be an important
signal to possible investors.  The message to potential investors: We have
put our money on the line . . . we are committed to this project . . . you
should be too.
“Skin in the game”—I was instantly more attentive.  Not because of
his receipt of the award (well deserved in my view), but because of his use
of the phrase.  In non-political settings, it has been the currency de-
manded of those seeking to influence an outcome in a variety of circum-
stances including business, finance, betting, and war: “Skin in the game”—
some thing that the interested party has at risk.  Though he denies it, War-
ren Buffett was thought to have coined the phrase in the business world.12
No doubt he, like many others, has demanded that ante when it appeared
strategically useful to do so.  Indeed, William Safire, writing in 2006, cited
a 1912 news report in which the phrase was used and suggested that the
concept of, at the very least a skin game, predated that 1912 report by
almost 100 years!13
I had encountered that phrase on a recurring basis in recent political
discourse.  The phrase with its unmistakable message has become a part of
everyday American politics.  It may have first been introduced into politi-
cal jargon by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) in 2006 as the United States
Senate considered health savings accounts (H.S.A.).  During the Senate
debate on a bill that its sponsors claimed would reduce health insurance
premiums, Senator Coburn argued that “H.S.A.’s [would] give consumers
some ‘skin in the game’ by putting them in charge of health-care dollars.”14
The phrase has been used in both the executive and legislative branches
of government and across party lines.  It has been deployed by then Presi-
dent-elect Barack Obama,15 Representative David Camp (R-MI),16 and
10. Mr. McConaughey has since received the 2014 Oscar award for the Best
Performance by an Actor in a Leading Role for Dallas Buyers Club.
11. 71st Golden Globe Awards (NBC television broadcast Jan. 12, 2014) (empha-
sis added).
12. See William Safire, Skin in the Game, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/magazine/17wwln_safire.html.
13. See id.
14. Id. (quoting Sen. Tom Coburn).
15. See Jennifer Parker, Obama Calls for ‘Grand Bargain’ on Economy: ‘Everybody’s
Going to Have to Give’, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2009, 2:25 PM), http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/politics/2009/01/obama-calls-for-2/ (noting that President-elect
Obama explained that long-term fix for economy would demand sacrifices from all
Americans, “Everybody’s going to have to give.  Everybody’s going to have some
skin in the game”).
16. See George F. Will, Dave Camp’s Plan: Taxes Made Simple, WASH. POST (Dec.
23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/
22/AR2010122203771.html (“‘I believe . . . you’ve got to have some responsibility
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Senator Mark Warner (D-VA).17  In short, it seems that “skin in the game”
is becoming the price for participation in the political process.  Personal
financial risk—some personal stake—is demanded of all “players.”  The im-
plications are clear: no skin, no play.  If you want to participate in the
conversation, you must bring something to the table.
That these are very high stakes indeed should go without saying.
Broad participation in political debate has long been the aspiration for
American governance.  Limiting political participation on the basis of eco-
nomic participation would certainly undermine that goal and would also
arguably compromise the concept of what it means to be a citizen.  A re-
quired economic ante (or the absence thereof), with its vast potential for
constitutional mischief, should not be the litmus test for political partici-
pation.  In fact, this tactic has actually been previously deployed.  The poll
taxes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, primarily insti-
tuted as part of the Jim Crow laws,18 imposed a tax as a precondition to
exercising the right to vote—precisely the kind of economic ante that
“skin in the game” implicitly requires.  Poll taxes were finally deemed un-
constitutional in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections19 in 1966.  Any
conceptual descendants having a similar effect should meet the same con-
stitutional fate.
Furthermore, the suggestion that a significant percentage of Ameri-
cans do not have “skin in the game” is specious.  The fact of the matter is
that most Americans—indeed, the vast majority of Americans—do have
“skin in the game.”
The requirement for “skin in the game,” in the context of the recent
deficit debate,20 along with the “concern” so widely discussed in the 2012
campaign—that almost 50% of Americans pay no federal income tax21—is
for the government you have.’  People have co-payments under Medicare, and eve-
ryone should have some ‘skin in the game’ under the income tax system.”).
17. See Naftali Bendavid & Damian Paletta, Senate ‘Gang’ Hashes out Deficit Plan,
WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10
001424052748704569404576297221814287188 (“[T]here’s no option but to push
ahead.  A way forward won’t be found ‘unless there’s a grand enough bargain that
everybody feels they’ve got some skin [in] the game’ . . . .”).
18. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 84 (2001)
(noting that poll tax was “esteemed . . . as the most reliable means of curtailing the
franchise . . . .”).
19. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20. See, e.g., Travis Waldron, Taxing the Poor: The Only Tax Increase Republicans
Support, THINKPROGRESS (July 25, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/econ-
omy/2011/07/25/278175/taxing-the-poor-republicans-support/ (providing
quotes from Sen. Orrin Hatch, Sen. John Cornyn, Sen. Dan Coats, and Rep. Eric
Cantor that working poor need to contribute more to tax revenues).
21. The surreptitiously recorded comment made by then presidential candi-
date Mitt Romney during a 2012 private reception for wealthy donors remains il-
lustrative.  Romney was recorded as he described almost half of Americans as
“people who pay no income tax,” are “dependent upon government,” and “believe
the government has a responsibility to care for them.”  Michael D. Shear &
Michael Barbaro, In Video Clip, Romney Calls 47% ‘Dependent’ and Feeling Entitled,
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but the latest version of the ongoing political “cut-taxes/reduce govern-
mental size” wrangling.  Paul Krugman noted in a New York Times op-ed
that the downsizing argument has at its heart an “effort to . . . bully the
nation into slashing social programs—especially programs that help the
poor.”22  The deficit debate is yet another play on the high political visibil-
ity of the federal income tax as an institution.  Though a year apart, the defi-
cit and 47% comments share a common thread: all are driven by the view
that those Americans who are federal income tax “freeloaders” are not enti-
tled to a political voice.  Rather, these Americans can be shut out of the
conversation regarding governmental imperatives.  Both sets of com-
ments, however, share a fatal flaw: neither look beyond the federal level—
and the federal income tax at that—in assessing the extent to which Amer-
icans across the income spectrum bear the burden of costs of governance
writ large.
An editorial published in the New York Times in the summer of 2011
addressed this myopia.23  The editorial conceded, as it must, that in the
context of that debate, the group from whom skin was demanded was the
47% of Americans who did not pay federal income tax.24  Of critical im-
portance, however, as the New York Times editorial also pointed out, the
absence of liability on the lower end of the socio-economic scale results
from deliberate tax policy.25  A combination of deductions, exemptions,
and credits—along with the progressive structure of the internal revenue
code—ensures that the poorest Americans are shielded entirely from in-
come tax liability.26  Many (though not all) of those earning more than
this minimal amount are advantaged by tax expenditures designed to ac-
cord tax relief to Americans hardest pressed economically.  An important
element of this deliberate policy has been the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), implemented with bipartisan support during the Nixon adminis-
tration and substantially reformed during the Reagan administration.27
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
09/17/romney-faults-those-dependent-on-government/?_php=true&_type=blogs&
_r=0.
22. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Populist Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/opinion/krugman-the-populist-
imperative.html.
23. See Editorial, The New Resentment of the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/the-new-resentment-of-the-poor.
html.
24. Id.
25. See id.  The editorial defines the poor as those families making less than
$40,000 annually, noting that nearly ninety percent of those families paying no
income tax make less than this figure. Id.  The average income for an American
household is, presently, approximately $50,000 annually.
26. See id.  Taxpayers will not be subject to liability until taxable income ex-
ceeds an amount greater than the combination of the standard deduction and the
appropriate number of personal exemptions.
27. See Thomas L. Hungerford & Rebecca Thiess, The Earned Income Tax Credit
and the Child Tax Credit: History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness, ECON. POLICY INST.
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The editorial also correctly notes that the federal income tax is not the
only source of governmental tax liability.28  Exemption of liability for fed-
eral income tax purposes does not necessarily carry with it similar exemp-
tion from other levies either on the federal level or on the state and local
levels.29  In the words of the editorial, “[e]ven if [Americans] earn too
little to qualify for the [federal] income tax, they pay payroll taxes . . .
gasoline excise taxes and state and local taxes.”30
The editorial’s key point bears repeating: Americans who do not pay
federal income taxes pay state and local taxes in addition to any levies to
which they remain subject on the federal level.  A close examination of the
effect of this cumulative liability makes even more powerful the editorial’s
assertion that “a vast majority of Americans have skin in the tax game.”31
The simple fact is that the American system of governance is not uni-
tary but deliberately federalist.  Further, fiscal federalism is inextricably a
feature of this stratified American governance.  As such, government on
each level must identify sources of revenue adequate to defray services pro-
vided and—with the exception of the federal government—must do so
within the confines of a balanced budget.32
In reality, the state and local taxes upon which subnational govern-
ments rely inevitably impose an additional economic burden on less afflu-
ent taxpayers.  Because of either the inherently regressive nature of many
of the levies upon which subnational governments rely or the manner in
which they have been implemented (and sometimes both), less affluent
Americans may well carry more than their “fair share” of the aggregate tax
burden.  That is, they pay more than they may reasonably be expected to
pay in light of their more limited disposable income.  Further, the taxes
paid may have little political salience, thus gaining little traction for af-
fected taxpayers.  In short, these taxpayers may have little or no political
visibility.  Finally, because of the long-term economic effects of decades of
racial discrimination, marked racially demarcated differences in wealth ex-
ist.  Black and brown Americans are demonstrably less affluent (and have
(Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-
and-the-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/.
28. See Editorial, supra note 23.
29. For an explanation of the impact this can have on taxes paid, see CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES,
2008 AND 2009 14 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43373-06-11-HouseholdIncomeandFedTaxes.pdf (“For most
income groups, the 2009 average federal tax rate was the lowest observed in the
1979–2009 period . . . . Payroll tax rates rose steadily for the lowest income group,
offsetting some of the decline in their individual income tax rates.”).
30. Editorial, supra note 23.
31. Id.
32. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL
BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (October 2010), available at http://
www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-balanced-budget-requirements-provi-
sions-and.aspx (discussing various state balanced budget requirements).
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less disposable income) than their white counterparts.33  As a result, the
burden of regressive taxes is quite likely borne disproportionately by
Americans of color.
IV. REVENUE SOURCES: AN OVERVIEW
A cursory review of the kinds of levies to which taxpayers are likely to
be subject on each level of government is helpful here.  Recall that govern-
ment on each level must identify sources of revenue adequate to defray
services provided.  Without exception, on each level, in recent years and as
a matter of fiscal necessity, income items for such budgets have been of
mixed source; that is, both major and minor sources of revenue have been
tapped.34  Relatively speaking, income, retail sales, federal government
transfers, and property taxes are major sources of revenue and “everything
else”—including user charges, license fees, and excise taxes—are minor
but increasingly important sources of revenue.35
A. The Federal Government
On the federal level, the individual income tax has been the major
income source and currently accounts for approximately 46% of federal
revenue.36  As has been widely reported, this burden is not borne by all
Americans; approximately 47% of American taxpayers paid no federal in-
come tax at all in 2011.37  A point lost in the heated rhetoric of the deficit
debates and the 2012 presidential campaigns is that the percentage had
not always been that high.  The 2011 percentage reached what was then a
historic high as a result of the great recession of 2008; the historical aver-
age is about 40%.38  More recently, in 2013, approximately 43% of Ameri-
33. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 695.  MONEY INCOME OF FAMILIES—NUM-
BER AND DISTRIBUTION BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2009, http://www.census.
gov/compendia/statab/cats/income_expenditures_poverty_wealth.html (provid-
ing data on family incomes grouped by race and national origin).
34. See CHERYL H. LEE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT FI-
NANCES SUMMARY REPORT 2–4 (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://www2.census.gov/
govs/state/12statesummaryreport.pdf (discussing various sources of state
revenues).
35. See TAX POLICY CTR., State and Local Tax Policy: How Have the Sources of
Revenue for State and Local Governments Changed over Time, fig. 1 (May 8, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/state-local/revenues/overtime.
cfm.
36. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, TBL. 2.1,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals.
37. See Editorial, supra note 23; see also Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huang,
Misconceptions and Realities About Who Pays Taxes, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORI-
TIES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3505.
38. See Marr & Huang, supra note 37.
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can taxpayers had no liability.39  New estimates project a continually
declining percentage until, by 2024, only about one-third will pay no tax.40
It remains significant that a sizeable minority of Americans will con-
tinue to have no federal income tax liability.  This assumption rests on the
expectation that the present deliberate tax policy will remain in place.
Given that assumption, as is presently the case, quite likely a substantial
percentage of this exempt group will remain the working poor.41  For
these Americans, the combination of the standard deduction and the per-
sonal exemption will lop off the bottom of the income curve.42  Further,
many of the taxpayers who exceed those minimal incomes but remain at
quite low income levels will continue to receive disbursements as appropri-
ate from the federal treasury through the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), making the system a negative income tax to this extent.43  Impor-
tantly, despite its shortcomings, many economists and policy makers re-
gard the EITC as having been highly effective in lifting substantial
numbers of the American working poor out of poverty.44  Additional relief
for earners on the lower end of the income spectrum is provided through
the Child and Dependent Care Credit and the Child Tax Credit (CTC),
which in combination, effectively exempt an additional segment from lia-
bility.45  When these numbers—those advantaged by the EITC and those
advantaged by the Childcare Credits—are increased by the number of
39. See Roberton Williams, And Now for the Movie: Fewer Americans Pay No Federal
Income Tax, TAX POLICY CTR. (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://taxvox.taxpoli-
cycenter.org/2013/08/29/and-now-for-the-movie.
40. Id.  This projection is predicated upon the expectation that the economy
will continue to improve and, possibly, the expiration of tax cuts.
41. See Marr & Huang, supra note 37 (“Most of the people who pay neither
federal income tax nor payroll taxes are low-income people who are elderly, una-
ble to work due to a serious disability, or students . . . .”).
42. See IRS, Publication 501 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/publica-
tions/p501/ar02.html#en_US_2013_publink1000289305 (showing that standard
deduction is $12,200 for married couple filing jointly and personal exemption is
$3,900, for total non-taxable amount of $20,000 for married couple filing jointly).
43. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, Policy Basics: The Earned Income
Tax Credit (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=2505.  The
EITC subsidizes low-income working families.  It provides a refundable credit
equal to a fixed percentage of earning from the first dollar of earning until the
credit reaches its maximum.  After that point, it is phased out until it disappears
entirely. See I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
44. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 43.  The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, using Census Bureau data, estimates that in 2012, the
credit “lifted about 6.5 million people out of poverty, including about 3.3 million
children.” Id.
45. See IRS, Ten Things to Know About the Child and Dependent Care Credit (March
7, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Ten-Things-to-Know-About-the-Child-and-De-
pendent-Care-Credit (illustrating tax relief and requirements for Child and De-
pendent Care Credit); see also I.R.C. § 21 (providing tax credit for expenses for
household and dependent care services necessary for gainful employment); I.R.C.
§ 24 (providing for child tax credit).  The CTC is the largest tax code provision
benefiting families with children.
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(most likely elderly) taxpayers, who are in receipt of modest pensions and
Social Security benefits,46 a substantial minority exists.  Finally and inevita-
bly, some segment of potential taxpayers may have no liability in spite of
substantially higher incomes because of the confluence of other tax pref-
erences or because of strategic tax planning.  Included in this final cate-
gory are taxpayers who are advantaged by deductions for mortgage
interest, state and local taxes, charitable contributions, and exclusion for
contributions to pensions, 401(k) plans, and employer-sponsored health
insurance.
In any case, all of those who fall into this group will remain subject to
other federal taxes and levies.  Payroll taxes constitute the next major
source of revenue, generating approximately 35% of federal revenues.47
This category includes social security and Medicare taxes as well as unem-
ployment insurance and federal workers’ pension contributions.48  In
2011, a New York Times editorial noted that “[o]nly 14 percent of house-
holds pay neither income nor payroll taxes . . . .”49  This remains the
case.50  Bringing up the rear insofar as individual taxpayers are concerned
are excise or transactional taxes—proceeds of which comprise approxi-
mately 3% of federal revenues.51  Included here are levies on alcohol, to-
bacco, telephone, ozone-depleting chemicals/products, and
transportation fuels.52
B. State Governments
States’ major income items have been either the retail sales tax,53 or
individual income tax,54 or some combination thereof for a significant
share—about two-thirds—of revenue generated.55  Both of these systems
46. See IRS, Topic 410—Pensions and Annuities (Feb. 27, 2014), http://
www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc410.html.
47. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax
Revenues Come From? (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=
3822.
48. See IRS, Understanding Employment Taxes, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Understanding-Employment-Taxes (last up-
dated June 13, 2014) (providing information on employment taxes).
49. Editorial, supra note 23.
50. See Williams, supra note 39.
51. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 47.
52. See id.
53. See State Sales Taxes, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://
www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/tax_stru.html (providing data on retail sales tax and
states’ income).
54. See State Income Taxes, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://
www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/tax_stru.html [hereinafter State Income Taxes] (provid-
ing data relating to individual income tax and states’ income).
55. See SHEILA O’SULLIVAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT
TAX COLLECTIONS SUMMARY REPORT: 2012 2 (Apr. 11 2013), available at http://
www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2012stcreport.pdf (noting that general sales and
individual income taxes generated 30.5% and 35.3% of state income respectively,
for total of 65.8% of revenue).
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have been subject to intensive review and fiscal tweaking recently as states
have struggled in the wake of the latest economic downturn to accommo-
date falling revenues, sometimes in the face of increasing demand for ser-
vices.56  Retail sales taxes have been particularly volatile as state legislative
bodies seek continuously to offset budget deficits by increasing collections
through this mechanism.57
C. Local Governments
Local governments58 have since the 1930s relied principally upon the
ad valorem property tax for financial support.59  The property tax is, in its
purest form, levied against all real property, residential and business,
within the geographic confines of the taxing district.  This tax has almost
from its inception been unpopular with taxpayers and commentators
alike.60  Its most salient feature is the factor that likely has contributed
most to its lack of popularity; again, in its purest form, it is an annual tax
on wealth as measured by the value of property imposed without regard to
taxpayer liquidity.
D. General Observations
In addition, on both the state and local levels, a variety of transaction-
based targeted taxes, fees, and user charges are in place.61  This hodge-
podge of additional revenue sources has steadily become more diverse and
of greater fiscal importance over the last several decades.  Prominently in-
cluded in this last group of levies are the so-called sin taxes: taxes on alco-
hol, tobacco, and gaming.62
56. See, e.g., Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=
view&id=711.
57. See Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, State Tax Revenue Growth and Volatility,
6 REG’L ECON. DEV. 23, 32 (2010), available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/publica-
tions/red/2010/01/Cornia.pdf (discussing volatility with regard to retail sales tax).
58. Included here are county commissions, city councils, town councils,
school districts, and special government districts having financial independence.
59. See WERNER Z. HIRSCH, THE ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
96 (Seymour E. Harris ed., 1970); JAMES A. MAXWELL & J. RICHARD ARONSON, FI-
NANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 135–37 (3d ed. 1977).
60. For example, in 1994, 28% of Americans chose the local property tax as
the worst tax, over the federal income tax, social security tax, state income tax, and
state sales tax. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHANG-
ING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES 1 (1994), available at http://
www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ACIR/Reports/survey/S-23.pdf (highlighting survey in
which 28% of Americans chose local property tax as worst tax); see also HIRSCH,
supra note 59, at 95.
61. See LEE ET AL., supra note 34.
62. The legalization of marijuana may present the next big opportunity for
significant increases in sin tax collections.  Legalization is being viewed by officials
in Colorado as a potential tax bonanza.  Colorado’s most recent budget proposal
estimated that sales of marijuana for recreational use could reach $610 billion in
the next fiscal year.  The proposal projected sales tax collections of $134 million
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Importantly, with the exception of potentially progressive taxes on indi-
vidual incomes (and in a few states on estates and gifts),63 on all levels the
additional sources of revenue described—major and minor—are gener-
ated through the use of flat-rates.  Whether imposed annually (e.g., fed-
eral payroll taxes)64 or transactionally (e.g., retail sales taxes), structurally,
the levy is a single fixed rate imposed on a targeted transaction.  As such,
because the same flat rate is imposed over, and over, and over again, re-
gressive effect is unavoidable.  The federal income tax, on the other hand,
is an annually determined progressive tax.65  Those taxpayers who have
more pay more and, consequently, bear a larger share of the costs of gov-
ernment.  A caveat here: state income tax systems may or may not be pro-
gressive.  Progressivity may mirror that of the federal system or may be
muted primarily by virtue of a relatively tight state marginal rate struc-
ture.66  State income tax systems may, in fact, be regressive in effect if the
state relies upon a flat rate to determine liability.
V. WHY CARE ABOUT REGRESSIVE EFFECT?  ORIGIN AND MANAGEMENT
A quick example demonstrates regressive effect.  Again and briefly, to
characterize a tax or system of charges as regressive is to say that the levy
exacts more, relatively speaking, from those having less from which to pay
it.  Assume that we have two individual taxpayers.  Taxpayers A and B are
both domiciled in the State of Bliss.  Both are required to pay 10% of
incomes received during the calendar year to the State of Bliss.  Taxpayer
A has $10,000 in income from which to pay the tax and Taxpayer B has
$45,000.  Taxpayer A’s tax bill of $1,000 imposes a much greater real cost
from such transactions. See Jack Healy, Colorado Expects to Reap Tax Bonanza from
Legal Marijuana Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
02/21/us/colorado-expects-to-reap-tax-bonanza-from-legal-marijuana-sales.html
(explaining potential tax effects of legalization of marijuana).  Whether that out-
come will be realized is, of course, unknowable.  As noted in a recent Washington
Post editorial, “[o]ver time, the tax take from legal pot probably won’t live up to
the hype because producers, distributors and consumers could develop into a pow-
erful lobby opposed to taxation.”  Editorial, Tax Revenue from Legalized Marijuana
May Not Meet Expectations, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/tax-revenue-from-legalized-marijuana-may-not-meet-expectations/
2014/03/05/4b14865e-a2f7-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html.
63. See State Income Taxes, supra note 54.
64. Federal payroll taxes are flat-rate taxes that apply without exemption on
salaries up to (most recently) $106,800.  As a result, these taxes have a very regres-
sive effect.
65. See IRS, 2013 Form 1040 Tax Table & 2013 Form 1040 Tax Computation Work-
sheet (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf (demonstrat-
ing that federal income tax is annually determined progressive tax).
66. See State Individual Income Tax Rates, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.pdf [hereinafter State Income Tax
Rates] (showing that Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah all have single tax bracket, while, Hawaii, for
example, has twelve brackets ranging from 1.4%–11%).
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to A than will be true for Taxpayer B, whose $4,500 liability is higher but
who also has more disposable resources from which to pay the levy.
Regressive effect is not intentional.  Rather, it inevitably results from
the use of any flat rate levy.  As a policy matter, whether and how regres-
sion should or could be managed is a separate and important question.  The
extent to which mitigation can be realized will be driven by several factors.
These include (1) the level of government whose fiscal structure is under
the microscope; (2) its fiscal challenges; (3) the nature of the levy in ques-
tion in conjunction with other revenue sources; and, inevitably, (4) politi-
cal dynamics.  Regression in retail sales taxes, for example, is typically
eased by providing exemptions for designated transactions.67  For exam-
ple, exemptions for the cost of foods purchased for preparation and con-
sumption at home are in place in thirty-one of the forty-five states that
have a retail sales tax.  Of the remaining states, seven tax groceries at lower
rates than other goods, five tax groceries fully but offer credits offsetting
some portion of the cost, and two apply sales tax fully without relief.68
One should not necessarily take tax solace from this well-intentioned relief
provision, however.  As will be shown, relief from regressive effect may
prove illusory because of the happenstance of personal circumstance.
Broadly speaking, political considerations will inevitably come into
play as legislative bodies address fiscal issues including the mix of revenue-
generating systems.  Consider this hypothetical.  State A needs to raise ad-
ditional revenue in order to maintain its spending status quo.  This is not a
matter of providing additional services.  The legislature has three options:
(1) increase income taxes by raising marginal rates—coincidentally realiz-
ing a progressive effect; (2) increase sales taxes by raising the applicable
rate—exacerbating regressivity; or (3) increase the state cigarette tax—
also regressive in effect.  We will assume, reasonably, that all of the legisla-
tors have the best interests of State A in mind but of course included in
that calculus is the importance of retaining their seats!69  Practically, credi-
ble data establish that any of the three possibilities can generate the
needed revenues, but voters—through emails, tweets, and facebook post-
ings—have in no uncertain terms urged the decision-makers to refrain
from manipulating either income or sales tax rates.  Reasons pressed upon
lawmakers by these involved taxpayers are those that you can imagine and
may well have heard: among others, higher income tax rates will cause
67. See generally ANDREEA MILITARU & THOMAS STRATMANN, MERCATUS CTR., A
SURVEY OF SALES TAX EXEMPTIONS IN THE STATES: UNDERSTANDING SALES TAXES AND
SALES TAX EXEMPTIONS (Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://mercatus.org/publica-
tion/survey-sales-tax-exemptions-states-understanding-sales-taxes-and-sales-tax-
exemptions.
68. See State Sales Tax Rates and Food & Drug Exemptions, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS
(Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.pdf [hereinafter State Sales
Tax Rates] (showing differences in food and drug exemptions among states).
69. See generally WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLA-
TIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES (10th ed. 2000).
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affluent voters to exit the state70 and increased sales taxes will place retail-
ers at a competitive disadvantage.71  Ah, but an increase in cigarette
taxes—who cares?  Political action groups composed of smokers or others
interested in resisting an increase in a cigarette tax are rare and, in any
event, may be relatively dispassionate in light of an agenda unrelated to
the tax burden per se.  How much credence, after all, is the tobacco indus-
try now likely to enjoy as a proponent of lower taxes?72  And when last
have you seen a bumper sticker declaring that “I am a smoker and I vote!”?
An increase in a tax on sin often seems the path of least political resis-
tance, hence the proliferation of this category of levies in particular.73  As
a practical matter, many—non-smokers—never expect to be affected by
the levy, and those who will pay are unlikely to seek political sympathy.
Coincidentally, there is one interest group that would strongly support an
increased cigarette tax, but not for reasons of revenue enhancement.
Here we would find anti-smoker coalitions that would, quite rightly, antici-
pate reduced cigarette usage as an ultimate consequence of higher tax
cost.74  Cigarette tax revenues are price sensitive and have, in fact, de-
clined over time after a period of enhanced collections.75
To give this discussion more immediacy, let’s stop for a moment and
examine the Pennsylvania tax structure.  You have a tax on individual in-
comes that uses a flat rate, 3.07%, on incomes.76  By the way, Penn-
sylvania’s reliance on a flat rate makes it one of only eight states utilizing a
flat rate among the forty-five states that tax income.77  (Interestingly, one
of the other seven states is Massachusetts; both of these states are adjacent
to New York.78  There is likely an intriguing story of tax competition be-
70. But see Robert Smith, Studies: Rich Don’t Flee High-Tax States, NPR (Apr. 29,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/04/29/135813061/
studies-rich-dont-flee-high-tax-states.
71. See Jeff Bell, Tired of Disadvantage, Retailers Stump for Online Sales Tax, CIN-
CINNATI BUS. COURIER (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cin-
cinnati/print-edition/2011/10/28/tired-of-disadvantage-retailers-
stump.html?page=all.
72. See Michael S. Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Lobby Political Influence on
US State Legislatures in the 1990s, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 124 (2001), available at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/10/2/124.full.
73. See Katrina Trinko, Opinion, Political Cowards Love the Sin Tax, USA TODAY
(Sept. 20, 2010, 5:13 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/fo-
rum/2010-09-21-column21_ST_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip.
74. See generally Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control
Strategy, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 172 (2012), available at http://tobaccocon-
trol.bmj.com/content/21/2/172.full.pdf+html (demonstrating that over 100 stud-
ies have found that tobacco excise taxes are powerful tool for reducing tobacco
use).
75. Id.
76. See State Income Tax Rates, supra note 66.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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tween states here).  Your sales tax rate is 6%79—sixteenth highest in the
country—with exemptions for “not-ready-to-eat” food,80 most wearing ap-
parel, legally available drugs both prescribed and over-the-counter,81 and
some textbooks.82  The sales tax rate is 8% in Philadelphia and 7% in
Allegheny County (Pittsburgh).83  Cigarettes are taxed at the rate of
$1.60/pack—twenty-second highest in the country.84  Your tax on gasoline
has just been increased by $.095/gallon for 2014,85 setting you on course
to have the highest such tax in the country by 2017.86  Finally, I found
particularly interesting the fact that Pennsylvania generates over $1.4 bil-
lion annually from gambling revenues,87 more money from casino gam-
bling than any other state.88  In 2013, over half that amount, $782.5
million, will be used for property tax relief on the local level.89  The prop-
erty tax is the principal source of revenue on the local level (excluding
inter-governmental transfers)90 and is only levied on those who can afford
to own property.91  Thus, Pennsylvania uses levies on gambling revenues,
costs borne overwhelmingly by the poor,92 to alleviate property tax le-
vies—relief that benefits only the class of individuals who own property.
Overall, this is a pretty regressive structure.
79. 61 PA. CODE § 31.2 (1972).  For the proposition that the 6% rate is the
sixteenth highest in the nation, see State Sales Tax Rates, supra note 68.
80. 61 PA. CODE § 60.7(b)(5) (1994); see also State Sales Tax Rates, supra note
68.
81. 61 PA. CODE § 52.1(b) (1990).
82. Id. § 58.9 (1971).
83. See PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax, http://www.
portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/sales,_use_hotel_occupancy_tax/
14487 (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
84. See State Excise Tax Rates on Cigarettes, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cigarette.pdf.
85. See 43 Pa. Bull. 7360 (Dec. 14, 2013).
86. See Peter Mucha, Pa. Gas Tax to Rise Jan. 1, Again in 2015 and ‘17, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Dec. 31, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/Pa_gas_
tax_to_rise_Jan_1_again_in_2015_and_17_.html (explaining that by 2017, new tax
rate could add up to 25 cents to each gallon, making Pennsylvania’s gas tax rate
higher than any current gas tax rate in country).
87. Harold Brubaker, Pa. Leads in Casino Tax Revenue, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug.
26, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-26/business/41446163_1_casino-tax-
revenue-casino-advocate-gambling.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Roberton Williams & Yuri Shadunsky, State and Local Tax Policy: What
Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, TAX POLICY CTR. (May 7, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/state-local/revenues/lo-
cal_revenue.cfm (illustrating sources of local revenue).
91. The property tax, however, is not in itself progressive; it is technically re-
gressive for those upon whom it is levied.
92. See generally Mary O. Borg et al., The Incidence of Taxes on Casino Gambling:
Exploiting the Tired and Poor, 50 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 323 (1991) (discussing
impact of casino taxes on poor).
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I submit that regressive effect should be a policy concern.  Regression
imposes a greater financial burden on those with fewer resources from
which to service the levy.  This nagging question persists: should public
budgets, in the final analysis, be balanced on the backs of those least able
to pay?93
So where are we now in this analysis?  Recall point one: Americans
who do not pay federal income tax nonetheless have “skin in the game;”
they are subject to other federal taxes and levies as well as a wide range of
tax and non-tax levies on the state and local level.  Here I reiterate point
two: In light of the regressive effect of, especially state taxing structures,
less affluent Americans may actually bear more than their fair share of fi-
nancing the burdens of government!
VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, RACE, AND REGRESSION
Even more troubling, regression’s socio-economic skew has a racial
component.  This is inevitable in light of present income distributions and
given the long-term economic consequences of racial discrimination.  The
racial component is inevitable because less affluent Americans remain dis-
proportionately black and brown.94  The Great Recession of 2008 has
taken a fearsome toll on Americans generally—almost daily we hear re-
ports of the disappearing middle class.95  Adding to this concern is the
fact that Americans of color, latecomers to the middle class, are losing the
battle to remain there at greater rates.  Unemployment rates for African
Americans have persistently been twice those of non-Hispanic whites.96  As
of January 2014, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for whites was
5.7% (17.5% for sixteen to nineteen year olds); for black or African Amer-
icans, the comparable figures were 12.1% and 38%.97  Hispanic or Latino
Americans suffer rates greater than those of white Americans, though they
have been and remain less hard hit than African Americans.98  Average
household incomes show a similar disparity: As of 2009, white households
93. See generally Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing the Sins of the Poor: Do Two Wrongs
Make a Right?, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 54-104 (2000) (discussing regressive effect
of cigarette taxes and charges incident to state-run lotteries and suggesting that
cigarette taxes be reduced and government-sponsored lotteries be discontinued).
94. See SUZANNE MACARTNEY ET AL., POVERTY RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED
RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE: 2007–2011, US CENSUS BUREAU
(Feb. 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-17.pdf.
95. See, e.g., Robert Reich, America’s Vanishing Middle Class, SALON.COM (Aug.
31, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/08/31/americas_vanishing_mid-
dle_class; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Middle Class Is Steadily Eroding.  Just Ask the Busi-
ness World., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/business/
the-middle-class-is-steadily-eroding-just-ask-the-business-world.html.
96. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table A-2.  Employment Status of the Civilian
Population by Race, Sex, and Age (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
empsit.t02.htm.
97. Id.
98. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table A-3.  Employment Status of the His-
panic or Latino Population by Sex, and Age (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/
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had an average income of $51,861;99 black households had an average
income of $32,584;100 and Hispanic households had an average income of
$38,039.101  The “wealth gap” between white Americans and Americans of
color is widening.102  In 2011, the average white household had almost
eighteen times as much wealth as the average African American house-
hold and almost fifteen times that of the average Latino household.103
Americans generally are losing ground.  Income inequality is accelerat-
ing—presently the top 1% of Americans hold 42.1% of all financial
wealth;104 the bottom 80% hold only 4.7% of all financial wealth.105  In-
deed, since the onset of 2008’s Great Recession, the number of American
households with no marketable assets has increased from 18.6% to
22.5%.106
How does all of this lead to political invisibility?  Let me provide ex-
amples of the effects of intertwined lower socio-economic status and reli-
ance on regressive revenue generating systems—even with safe harbors
such as exemptions—on potential political leverage.
A. Income Taxes
Flat income tax rates have a regressive effect.  To the extent, however,
that tax relief measures protect those in the lowest income strata from
liability (for example, through the federal EITC, or a state equivalent
thereof), such taxpayers may be viewed as having no basis for complaint of
unfairness.  This is, of course, in spite of the fact that such tax relief can
only be provided to those least able to pay as the result of deliberate tax
policy.  On the other hand, you may be surprised to learn that—of the
forty-one states (including the District of Columbia)107 that tax individual
incomes—only twenty-four in addition to the District of Columbia permit
news.release/empsit.t03.htm (noting seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for
Hispanics, for January 2014, was 8.4% overall).
99. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table 691.  Money Income of Households—Median In-
come by Race and Hispanic Origin, in Current and Constant (2009) Dollars: 1980 to 2009
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s06
90.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. (showing from 2000–2009, median household income for white
households rose by 18.1% while rising just 9.8% for black households and 14.6%
for Hispanic households).
103. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Net Worth and Asset Ownership of Households: 2011
(June 21, 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/people/wealth.
104. G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?
(Feb. 2013), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html.
105. Id.
106. See Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle
Class 9 (Soc’y for the Study of Econ. Inequality, Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://appam.confex.com/data/extendedabstract/appam/2012/Paper_2134_ex-
tendedabstract_151_0.pdf.
107. See State Income Tax Rates, supra note 66.
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an earned income tax credit for reporting purposes.108  Further, in four of
those twenty-five taxing jurisdictions, the credit is not refundable.109  That
is, the taxpayer may be relieved from liability but will not receive a check
from the state treasury should liability be negative.  By the way, Penn-
sylvania does not have an EITC in its income tax system at all!110
B. Retail Sales Taxes
Retail sales taxes have a regressive effect, but that effect may be eased
through exemption.  As I have noted, “foods-not-ready-to-eat” are exempt
from sales tax but the exemption does not extend to prepared foods.  To
the extent then that Pennsylvanians purchase and consume prepared
foods, the retail sales tax applies.
This regressive effect remains particularly troubling when one consid-
ers the plight of those who live in fresh-food deserts111 or who for legiti-
mate non-recreational reasons frequently purchase prepared foods.  For
residents in fresh food deserts, because of generally impoverished eco-
nomic circumstances, the rates of participation in non-exempt transac-
tions may actually be higher than comparable rates for their more affluent
counterparts.  Of necessity, they purchase from prepared-food providers
in their neighborhoods.  Result: no exemption.
The second group?  Imagine the person who is trying to manage two
to three part-time jobs in a difficult quest to remain financially solvent.112
This is not an uncommon pattern in this tough economic environment.
The work demands of this arrangement will likely leave little time to
purchase and prepare “foods-not-ready-to-eat.”  Of necessity they, too,
purchase from prepared food providers.  Result: no exemption.  Who
would have thought that a sales tax exemption for “foods-not-ready-to-eat”
would prove particularly advantageous to suburban residents with nine-to-
five jobs who enjoy the convenience of neighborhood supermarkets while
providing relatively less relief, if any, for their less financially fortunate
counterparts?
108. IRS, State and Local Government EITC Programs, http://www.eitc.irs.gov/
EITC-Central/press/overview/stateeitc (last updated June 12, 2014).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See generally JUDITH BELL ET AL., THE FOOD TRUST, ACCESS TO HEALTHY
FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS (2013), available at http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/
media_items/access-to-healthy-food.original.pdf.  Food deserts are census tract lo-
cated in either urban or rural low-income areas having no ready access to fresh,
healthy, and affordable food available through grocery stores or affordable food
retail outlets. See id. at 9–11.  These areas are, instead, served only by fast food
restaurants and convenience stores offering few healthy food options. See id. at 6.
112. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table A-16.  Persons Not in the Labor Force
and Multiple Jobholders by Sex, Not Seasonally Adjusted (Feb. 7, 2014), http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t16.htm (showing that about 5% of workers hold
multiple jobs).
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C. Property Taxes
Property taxes, relied upon on the local level, are widely though not
universally viewed as having a regressive effect.113  Rates of ownership of
taxable property will almost certainly be lower among less affluent per-
sons.  Further, it logically follows that to the extent that the less affluent
are property owners, their properties are likely to have lower market val-
ues.114  Several studies have shown, however, that such property owners
are statistically more likely to have a higher percentage of that value sub-
jected to the property tax levy.115  In other words, assessment ratios for
such properties have been comparatively higher than for similar proper-
ties of greater value.  Hence, comparatively higher property tax burdens
will ensue.
Renters will also likely bear some part of the property tax cost for the
spaces in which they reside.  This cost may be passed through to those
renters from property owners in the form of higher rents.116  They will be
unable, however, to deduct any part of that levy for income tax purposes
should they be so fortunate as to itemize.  Further, as renters they have no
political voice.  Simply put, they are not property owners!
As noted earlier, income, retail sales, and property taxes are all major
sources of governmental revenues.  Because of the regressive structure of
most of these sources, in combination with income and wealth distribu-
113. Opinions differ. Compare George E. Peterson, The Issues of Property Tax
Reform, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM 5 (George E. Peterson ed., 1973) (asserting that
“[t]here is considerable agreement among the authors that the property tax as
administered today, with all the variations of property tax rates that actually occur
among jurisdictions, and with the flaws of assessment, is a regressive tax”), with
HENRY J. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX?: A NEW VIEW 38 (1975) (arguing
that property tax is not regressive).  The consensus view is likely best captured in
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 268 (3d ed. 1980) (arguing that property tax is mildly regressive).
114. See George C. Galster et al., Estimating the Costs of Concentrated Poverty to
American Neighborhoods 19 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr. Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 06-42, Oct. 2006), available at https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/
cpr/events/cpr_seminar_series/previous_seminars/Galster.pdf (showing that
property values decline substantially when neighborhood poverty rates exceed
20%).
115. See Alan Finder & Richard Levine, Unequal Burden: New York’s Property
Tax; Hodgepodge of Home Valuations Produces Disproportionate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (July
6, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/06/nyregion/unequal-burden-new-
york-s-property-tax-hodgepodge-home-valuations-produces.html. See generally Lee
Harris, ‘Assessing’ Discrimination: The Influence of Race in Residential Property Tax As-
sessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2004) (assessing extent to which levies
upon taxable property may be driven by relatively lower market values).
116. See Mireya Navarro, Among Cuomo’s Proposals, a Tax Break for Renters, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan 9. 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/nyregion/among-
cuomos-proposals-a-tax-break-for-renters.html?_r=0.  Again, the extent to which
this systematically occurs is difficult to determine.  Normatively, rents are likely a
product of supply and demand, and price would be divorced from the costs other-
wise incurred by landlords.  This outcome may be affected, however, when socio-
economic status and race are factored into the equation.
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tions, each source imposes additional costs, relatively speaking, on those
less able to bear those costs.  This economic reality is no less skewed with
regard to excise taxes—sin taxes, in particular.
D. “Sin Taxes”
Consider our current view of smokers.  Thirty years ago, cigarette ads
were ubiquitous on television.117  Iconic images from that bygone period
include the Marlboro Man, whose handsome, rugged demeanor as seen
through a haze of cigarette smoke depicted decisiveness, sophistication,
and poise—all desirable characteristics, to be sure.118  Further, the to-
bacco industry’s marketing effort cut across gender lines.  Television ad-
vertisements for Virginia Slim cigarettes targeted female smokers.  These
ads featured the newly liberated, pert, saucy, and attractive Virginia Slims
girl sashaying into camera view, cigarette in hand, as the jingle over in-
toned: “You’ve come a long way, Baby.  You’ve got your own cigarette now,
Baby.”119  As a society, we now look down upon smokers.120  Our present
smoker’s image is that of the haggard cancer victim in the public service
announcement who struggles to speak in spite of her tracheotomy.  She
implores the viewer not to smoke because smoking can kill you.121
Public attitudes about smoking mirror this shift in media messaging.
For example, in July of 2001, only 39% of adults surveyed in the United
States thought smoking should be “totally illegal” in “all public places”; by
July 2013, that percentage had risen to 55%.122  In addition, a 2012 survey
found that 94% of respondents viewed cigarettes as a problem to soci-
ety.123  Furthermore, the Surgeon General recently released a report
marking the fifty years since the first Surgeon General’s warning about the
harmful effects of smoking, a 978 page compendium railing against the
harmful effects of smoking.124
117. See generally Richard W. Pollay, Exposure of US Youth to Cigarette Television
Advertising in the 1960s, 3 TOBACCO CONTROL 130 (1994).
118. See JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP, SEX, AND CIGARETTES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ADVERTISING 235 (2012).
119. HAL WEINSTEIN, HOW AN AGENCY BUILDS A BRAND—THE VIRGINIA SLIMS
STORY 16 (1969), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/efc64e00/pdf; see
also SIVULKA, supra note 118, at 278.
120. See Omar Shafey et al., The Tobacco Atlas, THE AM. CANCER SOC’Y (3d ed.
2012), http://www.cancer.org/aboutus/globalhealth/cancerandtobaccocontrol
resources/the-tobacco-atlas-3rd-edition.
121. See Anti-Smoking Ads 2012: CDC Offers GRAPHIC Reasons to Quit Smoking,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2012, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/03/19/cdc-anti-smoking-ads-2012_n_1364946.html.
122. Tobacco and Smoking, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1717/to-
bacco-smoking.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
123. Id.
124. See generally OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2014), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.
gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf.
99
Brennan: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.: An Introduction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-4\VLR408.txt unknown Seq: 20 23-SEP-14 13:31
748 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 729
Similarly, gambling is negatively perceived by the public.  It is gener-
ally viewed as a socially harmful activity.125  For example, a 1999 Gallup
survey found that 56% of adults “believed that casinos damage everyday
family and community life.”126  Furthermore, in a recent survey of Iowans,
when asked whether “[g]ambling is dangerous for family life,” 64% of re-
spondents agreed,127 and 51% agreed that “[g]ambling is a harmful form
of entertainment.”128
Finally, those who drink (especially to excess) are regarded with suspi-
cion.129  While alcohol consumption on some level is the norm in the
United States, 86% of Americans believe that alcohol is a problem in soci-
ety.130  The likely targets of that sentiment are heavy drinkers and al-
coholics, who continue to be stigmatized.  For example, a 2011 study
found that, when asked whether a social stigma associated with alcoholism
persisted, 83% of psychiatrists and 70% of doctors asserted there was a
strong stigma.131
Think of what this portends insofar as political visibility is concerned.
How likely is it that successful taxpayer coalitions built upon patterns of
personal tobacco consumption might form and participate in the political
process?  Moreover, with public attitudes generally hostile to gambling’s
effects on society, it is unlikely that gamblers’ views receive much credence
in the political arena.  Finally, with attitudes generally averse to drinking
and drinkers, it is difficult to imagine such individuals organizing
powerfully.  Further complicating this picture, an economic skew clearly
exists with regard to cigarette and gaming taxes.  Numerous studies have
established that sin taxes—especially on tobacco and gaming—are dispro-
portionately borne by those lower on the socio-economic scale.132  Cur-
rently available data suggest that the disparity between the propensity to
smoke for individuals who live below the poverty level and smokers who
live above the poverty level is steadily growing.  In 1995, a person living
below the poverty level was 37% more likely to smoke than a person living
above the poverty level; by 2011, that number had risen to 62%.133  Simi-
125. See GERDA REITH, GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 226–27 (2003).
126. Id. at 227.
127. MELVIN E. GONNERMAN, JR. & GENE M. LUTZ, GAMBLING ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS: A 2011 SURVEY OF ADULT IOWANS 43 (2011), available at http://
www.csbs.uni.edu/dept/csbr/pdf/Gambling_Attitudes_Behaviors_Report.pdf.
128. Id.
129. See James W. West, Is There Still a Stigma with Alcoholism?, BETTY FORD CTR.
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.bettyfordcenter.org/treatment/doctors-office/is-
there-still-a-stigma-with-alcoholism.php.
130. See Alcohol and Drinking, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1582/Al-
cohol-Drinking.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
131. See West, supra note 129.
132. See generally Rosemary Hiscock et al., Socioeconomic Status and Smoking: A
Review, 1248 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCIS. 107 (2012).
133. Compare CDC, Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 1995,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Dec. 26, 1997), http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00050525.htm, with CDC, Current Cigarette Smoking
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larly, several studies have concluded that the implicit gaming tax falls dis-
proportionately on less affluent taxpayers.134  The picture with regard to
alcohol usage and consequent tax incidence is more mixed.  One recent
study reported that while patterns of alcohol use and problem prevalence
varied among ethnic groups, rates of abstention from alcohol use were
generally higher for black and Hispanic men than they were for white
men.  The study concluded that whites and Native Americans have a
greater risk for alcohol use disorders.135  Alcohol dependence, however,
when it occurred, was likely to be more problematic for black and His-
panic men.136  These data, however, provide little insight into tax inci-
dence.  Economists view taxes on alcohol as generally, relatively
underproductive.  Unlike taxes on tobacco products, alcohol taxes have
not been raised in recent decades.  Proponents for increases argue that
were taxes on alcohol raised, given patterns of alcohol consumption, the
vast majority of Americans would be unaffected.  In short, no definitive
conclusions can be drawn with regard to the likely incidence of taxes on
alcohol.
E. One Who Pays a Tax—Any Tax—Is a Taxpayer
I intend no value judgment in sharing with you, in particular, the
facts about the incidence of sin taxes.  The primary question remains: How
much political credence do we presently accord to these taxpayers?  I sus-
pect relatively little.  They are invisible.  Indeed, if, as Jean-Baptiste Colbert
asserted, “[t]he art of taxation consists of so plucking the goose as to ob-
tain the most feathers with the least possible amount of hissing,”137 sin
taxes are near perfect taxes, for they are “easier to collect than income
taxes and less visible than direct taxes.”138  The prevailing sentiment
among lawmakers and their advisors seems to be that, for example, “[n]o
Among Adults—United States, 2011, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6144a2.htm.
134. See Thomas A. Garrett, Earmarked Lottery Revenues for Education: A New Test
of Fungibility, 26 J. EDUC. FIN. 219, 237 (2001) (“[L]otteries are generally accepted
as regressive . . . .”); Ross Rubenstein & Benjamin Scafidi, Who Pays and Who Bene-
fits? Examining the Distributional Consequences of the Georgia Lottery for Education, 55
NAT’L TAX J. 223, 236 (2002) (“[T]he vast majority of research has found lotteries
to be a highly regressive method of raising revenue . . . .”).
135. See Karen Chartier & Raul Caetano, Ethnicity and Health Disparities in Alco-
hol Research, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, http://pubs.niaaa.
nih.gov/publications/arh40/152-160.htm (last visited Aug 6., 2014).
136. See Frank H. Galvan & Raul Caetano, Alcohol Use and Related Problems
Among Ethnic Minorities in the United States, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh27-1/87-94.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 6, 2014).
137. CHRISTOPHER SNOWDON, ADAM SMITH INST., THE WAGES OF SIN TAXES 5
(2012), available at http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/research/files/
The%20Wages%20of%20Sin%20Taxes%20CJ%20Snowdon%20ASI_0.pdf (quot-
ing Jean-Baptiste Colbert).
138. Id. at 8.
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one can get mad at you for taxing people who drink too much . . . .”139
Nevertheless, the persons who bear these costs—including the burden of
sin taxes—are taxpayers, and they should be heard.  They should not be
ignored—treated as invisible because they have been relieved of liability
for compelling policy reasons, or because the levies have a dimly appreci-
ated regressive economic effect, or because they are imposed upon behav-
iors that strike some as unseemly.
VII. CONCLUSION
Politicizing the federal tax policy discourse—indeed, tax policy dis-
course in general—with this most disingenuous demand for “skin” errone-
ously and wrongly characterizes a significant percentage of Americans as
free-riders who contribute little or nothing to government finances.  The
characterization distorts fiscal policy debate in several important ways.
First, at its extreme, the putatively unmet demand deprives affected citi-
zens of a political voice on that governmental level, whatever it may hap-
pen to be.  On the federal level, the vast majority of those who fall within
the 47% do so because of deliberate Congressional action.  I suspect that
the vast majority of these Americans would opt for more income, conse-
quent tax liability notwithstanding.  On the national level, taxpayers, al-
ready disproportionately burdened with low visibility taxes or levies
imposed upon behaviors deemed undesirable (i.e., smoking, drinking, or
engaging in gaming activities) on the state and local level, are likely fur-
ther disadvantaged both politically and fiscally on both the state and the
federal level. They become invisible. Second, meaningful tax reform at all
levels could be thwarted or stalled due to an incomplete understanding of
the demands and consequences of fiscal federalism leading—in a worst
case scenario—to further distortions of relative tax burdens. Third, un-
checked increased reliance on low visibility taxes, special taxes, and non-
general sources of revenue (the sin taxes, in particular, given the amounts
of revenue raised by these levies), all of which tend to be regressive, accel-
erates opacity rather than transparency in fiscal practices.  As a practical
matter, our failure to understand how we all pay compromises the effort to
reliably determine the extent to which any “share” could be deemed “fair.”
Too much of the aggregate tax burden is invisible, poorly understood, and
simply unknown.
Americans who do not pay federal income tax have “skin in the tax
game.”  They bear, at least, their fair share of the economic burden of
sustaining government.  Indeed, the argument that they bear more than
their fair share is compelling.  Yet because of the way in which this burden
is borne, these Americans may gain little in the way of political traction in
139. Catherine Rampell, For Cash Strapped States, Sin Is Sure Lucrative, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/weekinreview/
18rampell.html (quoting Peter L. Faber, tax lawyer and partner at McDermott Will
& Emery in New York).
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spite of their financial participation.  In the final analysis, attention to tax
matters has inherent within it elements of both economic justice and ra-
cial justice.  All Americans participate financially in bearing the burdens of
government; as such, all should share in the benefits of government.  Si-
multaneously, if some measure of economic justice is to be achieved, at-
tention must be accorded to the fairness and, as appropriate, remediation
of disparate tax burdens.
Overall, the demand for “skin,” with its dubious link to the realities of
aggregate tax burdens, ignores reality.  It is pernicious and potentially eco-
nomically and racially divisive.  It breeds a disregard for and foments a
failure to accommodate competing interests across the socio-economic
spectrum.  At worst, it leads to essential disenfranchisement—invisibility
for those taxpayers whose tax burdens go unrecognized.  Simply put, all
Americans but for those who are abjectly destitute have “skin in the tax
game.”  Through some mix of the several revenue-generating systems of
whatever description, all have financially invested in this “civilized society.”
Less affluent taxpayers are no less entitled than are their more affluent
counterparts to having questions of allocation of the burdens of govern-
ment at all levels resolved as fairly as possible.  The debate with regard to
tax issues on each level must, as a matter of fairness and economic justice,
acknowledge the revenue burdens concurrently borne on all levels.
In short, attention to economic justice in our revenue systems should
be a matter of national concern.
So I have now talked about the “taxes” paid and the “we” who pay
them.  That leaves the “civilized society.”
I will simply remind you of Dr. King’s vision of the civilized society.
Again, he believed that economic justice must necessarily include an eco-
nomic bill of rights, promising all citizens the right to a job, the right to an
adequate education, and the right to decent housing and a livable income.
I believe that, were he alive today, he would agree that economic justice
must also include attention to achieving a fairer allocation of the burdens
of financing government.
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Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture
WHAT IS RELIGIOUS “PERSECUTION” IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY?
SUSAN J. STABILE*
We hear about religious persecution throughout the [third]
world, but the Catholic Church is being persecuted right here in
the United States by our own government.”
—Rep. Ted Poe, February 1, 20121
“I’ve said a number of times that persecution is on a contin-
uum. . . . I think America today is in the process of moving from
level one [Social Persecution on the basis of religion] to level two
[Legal Persecution].”
—Rep. Rebecca Hamilton, March 15, 20132
“The persecution of religion in America has begun, with the
Catholic Church a prime target.”
—Russell Shaw, author and former communications direc-
tor for USCCB, November 16, 20113
“Do I believe Christians will face real persecution, such as loss of
livelihood, civil penalties, physical abuse or even jail?
Absolutely.”
—Matt Barber, VP of Liberty Counsel Action, June 28, 20134
* Robert and Marion Short Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St.
Thomas School of Law.  Professor Stabile is also Fellow, Halloran Center for
Ethical Leadership; Fellow, Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law and
Public Policy; and a member of the editorial board of the Villanova Journal of
Catholic Social Thought.  I would like to express my deep gratitude to Michael
Moreland and to the Villanova University School of Law for giving me the honor of
delivering the 2014 Giannella Lecture.
1. Ted Poe, Government Persecution of Catholic Christians—in America, U.S. CON-
GRESSMAN TED POE (Feb. 1, 2012), http://poe.house.gov/index.cfm/2012/2/gov
ernment-persecution-of-catholic-christians-in-america.
2. Rebecca Hamilton, Degrees of Christian Persecution: Where Does America Fit?,
PATHEOS (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/publiccatholic/2013/
03/degrees-of-christian-persecution-where-does-america-fit/.
3. Russell Shaw, The Persecution of Religion Has Begun, PATHEOS (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.patheos.com/Resources/Additional-Resources/Persecution-of-Relig
ion-Has-Begun-Russell-Shaw-11-16-2011.html.
4. Matt Barber, Mock ‘Marriage’ and the Death of Freedom, WND COMMENTARY
(June 28, 2013, 8:27 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2013/06/mock-marriage-and-the-
death-of-freedom/.
(753)
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON a cursory look one afternoon, I found several websites devoted tothe subject of religious persecution in the United States.  One site,
Christian Persecution in America, has as its tagline, “Bringing awareness, an-
swers and resources to the question of Christian Persecution in America.”
Another, Persecution.org, subtitled “Your Bridge to the Persecuted Church,”
has 668 entries for the U.S.
Even blogs and websites not fully devoted to the subject contain indi-
vidual entries discussing religious persecution in the United States with
titles like (and again, this was found with a pretty quick search):
• The Beginning of the Anti-Catholic Persecution in America—
Again
• The Coming Persecution
• Defending the Persecuted Faith
• Back to the Ghetto
• Confronting Religious Persecution in America
• Persecution and Martyrdom of the Catholic Church in
America
• Persecution in America
There is even a “Wiki How” entry for How to Handle Anti-Catholic
persecution in the United States.  And next month will see the release of a
star-studded film titled Persecution, about the suppression of Christians in
America.  A second film of the same name will be released later this year as
a short film to submit to the Cannes film festival.
Any number of issues have given rise to the use by various persons of
the label “persecution” to describe the treatment of Catholic or other
Christians in this country:
• The Health and Human Services mandate that employers (in-
cluding Catholic universities and hospitals) provide contracep-
tive coverage for their employees, which the outgoing
president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission char-
acterized as “by definition, a form of religious persecution.”5
• The lack of satisfactory religious exemptions in state statutes
governing same-sex marriage as well as lawsuits against compa-
nies who refuse to provide services to gay couples.
• Laws that seek to force Catholic adoption and foster care agen-
cies to allow gays to adopt children (or punish those who do
not).
• Restrictions on evangelization in the military.
5. Bob Allen, SBC Leader Calls HHS Mandate ‘Persecution’, ABP NEWS (Apr. 10,
2013), http://www.abpnews.com/culture/politics/item/8391-sbc-leader-calls-
health-care-mandate-persecution#.U1mx7-ZdVpE (quoting Richard Land, outgo-
ing president of Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission).
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• The scorning or ostracizing of certain public figures for their
religious beliefs—Tim Tebow and sportscaster Chris Broussard
are two that come to mind in recent years, as does the tempo-
rary suspension of Phil Robertson from A&E over anti-gay and
allegedly racist statements (although it is not clear to me the
last was anything more than a marketing ploy by A&E).
• Christian students being ridiculed for their beliefs or universi-
ties, or the denial of funding to Christian fraternities, sorori-
ties, or clubs because they restrict membership to Christians.
• Not being able to put Christian symbols on public buildings,
such as the Ten Commandments on school buildings.
Some of the language of persecution has come from individual Amer-
ican religious leaders, some from Catholic or conservative Protestant legis-
lators, some from conservative media, and some from ordinary citizens.
While I hope and expect there will be less of that language coming from
American bishops, given their shift in focus toward religious persecution
abroad—that is, places Cardinal Timothy Dolan referred to in his final
presidential address to the USCCB as the “dramatic front lines” of the
battle of religious freedom—there is little reason to think the language
will disappear in other venues.6
What I would like to explore in this talk is how we should think about
what we do and do not mean by religious persecution in a pluralist society
like the United States and whether we should be concerned with the use
of the term “persecution” for the kind of issues that have given rise to that
label in the United States.  (Spoiler alert: I think we should be
concerned).
To be very clear at the outset: I am not saying we do not have what we
might term a “religious freedom problem” in the United States (and a
fairly large one at that); I think there are numerous examples of things
that can fairly be characterized as failures to give sufficient respect for re-
ligious freedom.  I sadly think it is the case both that some people have too
narrow an understanding of what religious freedom should mean, and
that there is generally much less tolerance for religious-based claims in the
public square than there once was.  This translates into a grudging willing-
ness on the part of many to tolerate only a “private, personal freedom that
lacks space for public expression,”7 essentially equating religious freedom
with freedom to unobtrusively worship.  I think this is a serious problem
6. Cardinal Timothy M. Dolan, Archbishop of New York, President of the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), Presidential Address to the USCCB
General Assembly (Nov. 11, 2013), available at http://www.usccb.org/about/lead
ership/usccb-general-assembly/2013-november-meeting/farewell-presidential-ad
dress-cardinal-dolan.cfm.
7. R.R. Reno, Our Secular Future: The Redefinition of Religious Liberty in American
Society, AM. MAGAZINE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://americamagazine.org/issue/our-sec
ular-future.
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and nothing I say here is meant to minimize that.  My issue is with charac-
terizing these as instances of religious “persecution.”
II. WHAT DOES PERSECUTION MEAN?
Stepping back from this current use of the term for some of the ex-
amples I just mentioned, what do we understand by the word
“persecution”?
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “persecution” as “[v]iolent, cruel, and
oppressive treatment directed toward a person or group of persons be-
cause of their race, religion, sexual orientation, politics, or other beliefs.”8
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language says that “persecute”
means “[t]o oppress or harass with ill-treatment, especially because of
race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or beliefs.”9 Random House Col-
lege Dictionary says that “persecute” means “to oppress with injury or pun-
ishment, for adherence to principles or religious faith.”10
One of the places we see the term “persecution” used in the American
legal system is in the asylum context.  An applicant for asylum in this coun-
try must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.  As anyone who
has any familiarity with this system knows, it is not easy to meet this re-
quirement for being granted asylum in the U.S.  The Ninth Circuit ob-
served in Li v. Ashcroft11 that “caselaw characterizes persecution as an
extreme concept, marked by the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a
way regarded as offensive.”12  To constitute persecution for purposes of
asylum, the conduct in question must involve serious physical violence,
torture, threat of physical violence or torture, detention and confinement,
creating serious emotional or psychological harm (not merely harassment
or ostracism) or substantial economic deprivation (not merely economic
disadvantage).
In 1998, a bill was introduced in the House—the Freedom from Re-
ligious Persecution Act13—designed to take action against nations that
condone or conduct religious persecution.  Under the proposed law, the
activities that constituted “persecution” were “abduction, enslavement, kill-
ing, imprisonment, forced mass relocation, rape, crucifixion or other
forms of torture, or the systematic imposition of fines or penalties which
have the purpose and effect of destroying the economic existence of per-
sons on whom they are imposed.”14
8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009).
9. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed.
2013), available at http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=persecute&sub
mit.x=0&submit.y=0.
10. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1074 (rev. ed. 1980).
11. 356 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
12. Id. at 1158 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1998).
14. H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 3, at 3 (1998).
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Last summer, I spent some time in Amsterdam and Germany.  Several
experiences from that vacation came to mind as I was thinking about what
I would say on this subject.
In Amsterdam, we visited the Church of Our Lord in the Attic.  In the
late sixteenth century, public celebration of the Catholic Mass was out-
lawed in Amsterdam when Protestants took over control of the city.  Pri-
vate Catholic worship was tolerated, so long as it was hidden from public
view.  In 1661, a wealthy Catholic merchant constructed a hidden church
that occupied the entire top floor of his house and the two houses behind
it.  The Church of Our Lord in the Attic was essentially the parish church
for Catholics living in Amsterdam for 200 years.  A hidden church.
Amsterdam is also home to the Portuguese Synagogue.  The Syna-
gogue is the home of the oldest Jewish Community in the Netherlands, a
community founded by Jews who had fled the persecutions of the Inquisi-
tion in Spain and Portugal.  The Synagogue was home to a thriving com-
munity until World War II and today tells the story of the Jews who lived
there.  When Nazi Germany invaded Holland in 1940, there were around
140,000 Jews living there; after the war there were 20,000, most of the rest
having perished.
Not being able to worship in public.  Facing the Inquisition.  Per-
ishing in the Holocaust.  These are things I have no difficulty labeling per-
secution, as we understand that term from dictionary definitions and from
the use of the term in U.S. law.
And we see plenty of similar incidents in our world today.  The arrest
of Christian missionaries in North Korea and the physical assault and kill-
ings of people practicing their Christian faith there.  (In one reported in-
cident, a woman in North Korea was shot and killed because she kept a
Bible in her home).  Assyrian Christians have been told, “If you want to
come back, convert to Islam, or you will be killed.”  The kidnapping of a
clergyman in Syria.  A car-bombing near a church that kills twenty Coptic
Christians in Alexandria.  These are not isolated instances.  The Vatican’s
UN representative recently told a congressional panel that “flagrant and
widespread persecution of Christians rages in the Middle East even as we
meet.”15  And “[o]ther speakers at the hearing testified about violence
against Christians in Indonesia, Vietnam, Nigeria, Myanmar, Sudan and
Eritrea, among other [places].”16
Understandably, those who experience these kinds of suffering, as
well as those who observe them, raise an eyebrow to the characterization
of what goes on in the United States as persecution.  A cartoon was posted
not that long ago on Facebook that involved a conversation between two
people.
15. Persecution of Christians ‘Flagrant,’ U.N. Nuncio Tells U.S. Congress, AM. MAGA-
ZINE (Mar. 3, 2014), http://americamagazine.org/issue/persecution-christians-%E
2%80%98flagrant%E2%80%99-un-nuncio-tells-us-congress.
16. Id.
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The first person said: I’m a Middle-Eastern Christian.  In Egypt, we
can’t build new churches, and the authorities ignore the frequent violence
committed against us.  Almost all of us have been pushed out of Iraq.  In
Saudi Arabia, we have to hide inside to have church services.  In some
Muslim countries, converts to Christianity are sentenced to prison or
death.  In Sudan, we are decapitated for our faith by Islamists.  We face a
lot of religious oppression.
The second responds: Oh, I know about oppression too.  I’m an
American Christian.  In the U.S., we aren’t always allowed to put our relig-
ious symbols on every single public building.  Sometimes bosses aren’t al-
lowed to restrict their workers’ access to contraception.  People sometimes
say mean things about us on blogs.  And worst of all, during Christmas,
some people say, “Happy Holidays” instead of “Merry Christmas.”  I truly
understand what you mean by religious oppression.  I sure wish I had relig-
ious freedom.
After a pause, the first person replies with an expletive deleted.  The
cartoon was a caricature, but you get the point.
Another commentator posted a flow chart in November titled: Are
you being persecuted?  The first question was: “Did someone threaten
your life, safety, civil liberties, or right to worship?”  If yes—you are being
persecuted.  If no—the next question was: did someone wish you happy
holidays?  And for both no and yes, the next line read: You are not being
persecuted.
The question here is:
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY?
Let me try to address the question from the opposite direction, by
talking about what I do not think can fairly be characterized as religious
persecution.
First, failure to respect one’s religion is not persecution.  A lot of peo-
ple who have no religious faith lack respect for anyone who is a religious
adherent.  (That is not always the case: I know many people who have no
faith of their own who nonetheless respect the faith of others).  And a lot
of people who are religious have no respect for faiths other than their
own.  They see their faith as the one true way and see anything else as
deserving of criticism and ridicule.  (Listen to how some Christians talk
about Buddhism.  Or about how some mainline Protestants talk about
Mormonism).
I happen to think that is unfortunate: I have written about the value
of interfaith dialogue and why I think that we can all, whatever our own
faith tradition, learn from people of different faiths.  In my own case, I
returned to Catholicism after spending twenty years as a Buddhist.  De-
spite the fact that I no longer identify myself a Buddhist, I have enormous
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respect for Buddhism and the Buddhist practitioners I know, and my
Christian faith is all the stronger for what I learned from Buddhism.
But, while I think criticizing and ridiculing other faith traditions is
unwise and unwarranted, that lack of respect is not persecution.  No one
has an entitlement that others respect their views, whether religiously
based or otherwise.  Ridicule is not persecution.  Someone not wanting to
listen to you talk about your religion is not persecution.  Yet it is clear that
for some people, not being respected or being ridiculed because of their
religious faith, or not having their religious views respected, constitutes
persecution.
I should add here that it is also not persecution if someone decides he
or she does not like you anymore because of your religious views.  I have—
or had—a friend who no longer talks to me because of my faith.  It sad-
dens me deeply; I thought we had a real friendship.  But that my former
friend will no longer speak to me, while causing me great pain, is not
persecution.
Second, giving a group legal rights that another group does not think
they should have—that is inconsistent with the religious tenets of the sec-
ond group’s faith—does not constitute persecution against the second
group.  Granting legal recognition of same-sex marriage, for example, is
not itself an act of persecution against those whose religion holds that
same-sex marriage is immoral.  Nor is legalizing abortion persecution
against those whose religion opposes abortion as sinful.
That does not mean people cannot argue on the basis of their relig-
ion that the law ought not to do those things.  People are free to argue—
and should be free to argue—based on their religious beliefs that same-
sex parents are harmful for children or that a society that allows abortion
is a society that will not take sufficient steps to care for the marginalized
and less well-off.  Others may or may not find those arguments persuasive.
But the fact that they do not is not persecution.
That raises a question of how such laws impact those who have relig-
ious opposition to them.  We know that a law that, for example, allows
same-sex marriage will raise questions about the extent to which others
must respect those marriages, or that allowing abortion will raise questions
about access.  This leads to my next point.
Third, not every failure to give an exemption under the law or to
provide a religious accommodation, in the case of a law that places a bur-
den on religion, is persecution.  By definition, living in a pluralist society
means that not everyone shares the same views.  What is sacrosanct to
members of one faith may be something viewed as against the social good
as defined by others.  And by definition, not all freedoms can be absolute,
because the exercise of one person’s freedom may infringe on the free-
dom of others.
Conflicts inevitably arise, and take many forms, and have to be
resolved.
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How do we balance a state’s interest in compulsory education of chil-
dren against the Amish belief their children should not go to public
school?17
How do we resolve a conflict between a state law banning drug use
against the religious use of peyote?18
How do we resolve the conflict between the government’s determina-
tion that contraception is part of health care and therefore must be pro-
vided as part of the provision of preventive services against the religious
opposition of employers to the use of birth control?19
How do we reconcile the desire of Catholic social service organiza-
tions not to place children in same-sex households with our nondiscrimi-
nation laws?
And you can think of other examples.
In some of these cases, accommodations that protect religious beliefs
will be made, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes because a court deter-
mines that the Constitution or statutory law requires it.  But not always.
Sometimes law and society will determine that other protected rights take
precedence over religious claims for exemptions.
In my view, it is inappropriate to label such determinations persecu-
tion.  That is, it is not always persecution to fail to provide special treat-
ment or an exemption from a generally applicable law on the basis of
religion, even where the consequence is that a religious adherent may
have to pay a price for standing up for his or her religious convictions.
The price of living in a society where we do not all share the same views is
that not everyone’s view can always be accommodated, and some will face
some sacrifice as a cost of living consistently with their religious beliefs.
So, to use a couple of recent examples:
A federal judge ruled in November that a law that allowed clergy
members to avoid paying income taxes on compensation that is desig-
nated as a housing allowance is unconstitutional.20  The tax exemption
may be a desirable thing for clergy who do not receive very high incomes
(although the same could be said for other lower-paying jobs), but that
does not mean that the failure to provide it is religious persecution.
Or take the example of the New Jersey town of Ocean Grove.21  The
town had its origins in a campsite established by some Methodist preach-
ers.  Over time, the state of New Jersey granted the “Ocean Grove Camp
Meeting Association” a charter, letting them create a police force and es-
17. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
18. See generally Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
19. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
20. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051
(W.D. Wis. 2013).
21. See Jonathan V. Last, The Town FEMA Turned Down: The Tide Goes Out on
Religious Liberty, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.weeklystan
dard.com/articles/town-fema-turned-down_767137.html.
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tablish an infrastructure allowing them to set aside the land for “the per-
petual worship of Jesus Christ.”22  (This was in 1870).  Over the years, a
town grew up and thrived.  Although Ocean Grove later became a part of
a larger township, it continued to operate its own services and retain inde-
pendent authority over its laws.
When a storm destroyed the boardwalk of Ocean Grove in 1992,
FEMA provided emergency relief funding.  However, after Hurricane
Sandy in 2012, FEMA refused to provide assistance, explaining that as a
private, nonprofit organization, Ocean Grove was not eligible for federal
assistance to repair the boardwalk because the property was owned by the
Camp Meeting Association and the property was a “private religious ‘recre-
ational facility.’”23
The issue is not the wisdom of FEMA’s actions.  In fact, I think
FEMA’s decision is a bad one.  Ocean Grove and the state have managed
to reach reasonable accommodation for a very long time.  It has func-
tioned as a “town,” and the boardwalk is essentially a public place that is
one of the main attractions of the town.
But is it persecution to fail to provide federal relief to the town?  Is it a
violation of free exercise?  I think that is a harder question.
I’m not saying that a failure to accommodate should never be labeled
as persecution.
A failure to provide a religious exemption with costly consequences,
motivated by animus against a particular religion, might properly be char-
acterized as persecution.
A legal requirement that forced someone to violate his or her faith
that is accompanied by fines so crushing that the person simply cannot act
consistently with his or her faith may perhaps properly be characterized as
persecution.
To take a recent example, a German family who had been homes-
chooling their children fled to the United States to avoid Germany’s pro-
hibition against home schooling; Germany requires that all children be
sent to public schools to “counteract the development of religious and
philosophically motivated parallel societies.”24  In 2001, an immigration
judge in Memphis granted the family asylum, stating they would face per-
secution for their faith if they returned to Germany.  The Sixth Circuit
overturned that decision, saying “[t]here is a difference between the per-
secution of a discrete group and the prosecution of those who violate a
generally applicable law.”25  I think one could (and should) come to a
22. Id.
23. See FEMA Backs Down?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 27, 2014), https://
www.weeklystandard.com/keyword/FEMA.
24. Justice Department: Home Schooling Not a ‘Right’, CBN NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013),
https://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/politics/2013/February/Justice-Department-
Home-Schooling-not-a-Right/.
25. Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 528, 530 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1491 (2014).
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different conclusion.  That family cannot live in Germany and act consist-
ently with their beliefs, any more than the Yoders could, giving rise to our
exemption for the Amish from state education requirements.  The penal-
ties in Germany included not only crushing fines but criminal charges and
the potential that children will be taken away from their parents.
But that is a much more nuanced determination than some of the
current claims of religious persecution engage in.  Not everything that
might be labeled as discrimination (in the sense of burdening religious
practice) is persecution.
Fourth, efforts to protect third parties from intrusive and uninvited
religious proselytization are not persecution.
Many Christians view evangelization as a foundational part of their
discipleship.  It is not hard to understand why.  “Go therefore and make
disciples of all nations,” said Jesus to his disciples before his Ascension.26
In his Apostolic exhortation, Christifideles Laici, Pope John Paul II wrote:
“The entire mission of the Church, then, is concentrated and manifested
in evangelization,” quoting Paul VI who wrote that, “[t]o evangelize . . . is
the grace and vocation proper to the Church, her most profound
identity.”27
Different Christian traditions have different ideas about what evangel-
ization means.  And some Christians are fairly aggressive in their efforts to
try to bring other people to the Christian faith.
How do we decide when one person’s unwanted efforts to evangelize
interfere with another person’s right not to be harassed?
In many circumstances, there is no need for government or any other
third party interference to resolve this.  If young Mormons ring my door-
bell and want to talk to me about how Joseph Smith is the true prophet of
God, I can say no thank you and close my door.  When I lived in Brooklyn
Heights in New York, ten blocks from the Watchtower Building, and was
confronted on the street corner on an almost daily basis by Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses who wanted to thrust copies of their literature in my hand, I could
say no thanks and be on my way.  (Sometimes I had to say it firmly or more
than once, but no one forced me to listen).
There clearly are, however, circumstances where the object of the
evangelization efforts cannot just say no.  Those include situations where
the person doing the evangelizing is in a position of authority over an-
other or where the object of the evangelization is a captive audience.
In those circumstances, government and society need to consider how
to balance competing interests.  It seems to me it is neither illegitimate
nor an instance of religious persecution to express concern, for example,
26. Matthew 28:19.
27. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI ¶ 33 (1988), available at http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-
ii_exh_30121988_christifideles-laici_en.html.
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at a teacher’s aggressive efforts to proselytize his or her students, or superi-
ors in the military using their authority to try to convert subordinates.
The Second Vatican Council, in its Declaration on Religious Free-
dom, Dignitatis Humanae, recognized that “in spreading religious faith and
in introducing religious practices everyone ought at all times to refrain
from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion
or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy . . . .”28
That same sentiment was expressed by Pope Paul VI in Evangelii Nuntiandi,
where the Pope distinguished between “propos[ing] . . . the truth of the
Gospel and salvation in Jesus Christ, with complete clarity and with a total
respect for the free options which it presents” and coercively imposing the
Gospel on others.29  That same language was quoted by Pope Francis in
his Message for World Mission Day.30
To be sure, deciding what is or is not intrusive or coercive is not al-
ways easy.  Some people will say evangelization is permissible but prosely-
tization is not.  (And, indeed, Pope Francis was quoted this past year as
saying Catholics should be engaged in evangelization, not proselytization).
But that requires a shared definition of what those terms mean, and I
think we lack that.  (If you go to the dictionary, the two words have the
same meaning: to convert or attempt to convert someone.)
What is intrusive?  What is unwanted?  Can we define these on an ex
ante basis, or is it something to be handled on a case-by-case basis, the
latter of which would not be very helpful in letting anyone know what is
permissible and what is not.
The fact that such determinations are difficult, however, does not
mean that all efforts to protect some against unwanted contact by those
who would seek others to their faith are instances of religious persecution.
Fifth, mere efforts to limit religion in public schools and universities
are not persecution (although Catholic online encyclopedia refers to the
exclusion of religion in public schools with precisely that term).
Conflict over religion in public schools has existed for years.  Today,
we see a conflict between those who are troubled by what they see as an
effort by courts and others to exclude God and religion completely from
public schools.  Others are concerned that conservative Christians are try-
ing to impose their values on students.  Both claim the First Amendment is
on their side.
Going back to the point I just made about proselytization, it is clear
that the Constitution prohibits public schools (as it should) from indoctri-
28. POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ¶ 4 (1965), available at http://www
.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_1965
1207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
29. POPE PAUL VI, EVANGELII NUNTIANDI ¶ 80 (1975), available at http://www
.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-vi_exh_
19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi_en.html.
30. See Francis’ Message for World Mission Day, ZENIT (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www
.zenit.org/en/articles/francis-message-for-world-mission-day.
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nating children in religion.  But the range of things short of that, that
could and has given rise to conflict, is enormous: student-led prayer, non-
sectarian prayer, teaching of creationism as well as evolution, Bible read-
ings in school, Bible study in school, and so-forth.
It may be that in the effort to avoid indoctrination, some courts have
gone too far.  It may be that those who would prefer to see a country and a
world where no one has any religious belief push further than reasonable.
But, again, absent animus toward a particular religious group because
of its beliefs, I am troubled by labeling the resolution of these conflicts
persecution, even where I might disagree with the conclusion reached.
Finally, even freedom to worship is not absolute.  By that I mean sim-
ply that there may be limits to the obligation of others to accommodate
my worship needs.  The most obvious example is the Supreme Court’s
Smith decision, saying that the Free Exercise clause permits the state to
prohibit sacramental peyote use.31  Sometimes worship needs may inter-
fere with other legitimate interests.  Or employers have to try to accommo-
date an employee’s religious practices, but the requirement is a
“reasonable” accommodation, not any accommodation an employee asks
for.
In connection with some comments he made recently about the fate
of Arizona’s failed proposed legislation to protect religious freedom (and
I recognize different people have different ways of characterizing this leg-
islation), Ross Douthat gave some examples that I think draw helpful
distinctions.32
First, “[i]f the federal government suddenly closed all religious
schools in the United States, banned homeschooling, and instituted an
anti-religious curriculum in public schools,” he would have no hesitation
labeling that persecution.33  In contrast, “denying religious colleges access
to public dollars would not rise to the same level.”34  While “[i]t would
certainly create hardship and disruption, and weaken institutional religion
in significant ways,” it is not persecution.35  Withholding a subsidy
“leave[s] the basic liberty to educate one’s children in one’s own faith
intact . . . .”36
Second, a law requiring businesses to fire Christians would deserve
the label persecution.37  “But having the rules of a few professions sud-
31. See generally Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
32. See Ross Douthat, On Persecution, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:50
PM), http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/on-persecution/.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
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denly pose new ethical dilemmas for religious believers” is “a challenge” or
“a hardship,” but not persecution.38
We can conceive of things that would constitute persecution in the
United States, short of rounding up Christians and feeding them to the
lions.  But I do not see the label appropriately applied to any of the situa-
tions in which it is currently used.
IV. USE OF THE WORD “PERSECUTION” IN THIS CONTEXT
Let me now address a different question, that is: Is there a problem
with the use of the term “persecution” to describe the way Christianity is
viewed or treated societally and politically in the United States today?
I did not major in either government or theology as an undergradu-
ate at Georgetown.  I was an English major, which may explain why, when
Michael Moreland told me I could speak to you about any subject broadly
relating to law and religion, I settled on something having to do with lan-
guage.  I sat in an Honors English class as an undergraduate at Ge-
orgetown and happily spent forty-five minutes discussing the significance
of the fact that Gerard Manley Hopkins begins the last quatrain of his
poem God’s Grandeur with the word “and” rather than the word “but.”
Thus, my starting point is that words matter.  The language we use to talk
about issues has a significant effect.
In this particular case, I worry about the effect of the use of the term
“persecution” both on those who utter the words and those who hear
them.
Let me start with the effect on those who claim to be persecuted—
those who speak in terms of persecution.  Once people see themselves as
“persecuted,” their instinctive reaction is to fight and resist.  And the fight
becomes fierce because a kind of circle the wagon mentality arises and
anyone outside that circle is the enemy.  And when we are talking in relig-
ious terms, the enemy is evil.  If I believe I am persecuted, I must fight to
defend myself.  It is not just that someone disagrees with me, I am being
attacked.
The result of language of persecution is demonization of those who
disagree.  In The Myth of Persecution, Candida Moss writes:
The myth of persecution is theologically grounded in the division
of the world into two parties, one backed by God and the other
by Satan.  And everyone knows that you cannot reason with the
devil.  Even when the devil is not explicitly invoked, the rhetoric
of persecution suggests that the persecutors are irrational and
immoral and the persecuted are innocent and brave.  In a world
filled with persecution, efforts to negotiate or even reason with
one’s persecutors are interpreted as collaboration and moral
compromise.  We should not attempt to understand the other
38. Id.
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party, because to do so would be to cede ground to injustice and
hatred.
This, then, is the problem with defining oneself as part of a per-
secuted group.  Persecution is not about disagreement and is not
about dialogue.  The response to being “under attack” and “per-
secuted” is to fight and resist.  You cannot collaborate with some-
one who is persecuting you.  You have to defend yourself.  When
modern political and religious debates morph into rhetorical
holy war, the same thing happens: we have to fight those who
disagree with us.  There can be no compromise and no common
ground.39
Not surprisingly, this kind of attitude inhibits the ability to find any
kind of common ground—indeed, to even acknowledge the possible exis-
tence of common ground.  It also inhibits the ability of those who would
stand fast to their religious beliefs to, in one commentator’s words, pre-
pare “for a future as a (hopefully creative) religious minority, because it
conditions them/us to constantly expect some kind of grand tribulation
that probably won’t actually emerge.”40
There is also an unfortunate effect on those who hear the words.
First, the more the language of religious persecution is used for things that
are not really persecution, the greater the danger of trivializing the real
persecution that exists.  There becomes a real credibility problem that
makes it much harder for people to take real threats against religion seri-
ously.  There is a bit of the “boy who cried wolf” too many times reaction.
Moreover, many people feel that calling the kinds of things I have men-
tioned as examples here “persecution” cheapens and detracts from “real”
instances of persecution around the world.
Second, the more the language of persecution is used, the more likely
it is that opponents of a broad concept of religious freedom will tend to
argue that anything short of persecution ought to be acceptable.  It makes
persecution that which we seek to avoid, rather than claiming a strong
positive space for things that fall short of an accepted definition of
persecution.
Third, people accused of persecution are also likely to go into a fight
mode, creating the possibility of backlash that results in an even narrower
understanding of what constitutes persecution and what kinds of protec-
tion ought to be granted on religious grounds.
For both those who claim to be persecuted and those accused of do-
ing the persecution, the language of persecution ratchets up the “crazy”
emotion, creating dangerous polarization.  Candida Moss calls the lan-
guage of persecution “discursive napalm” and “dialogue-ending lan-
39. CANDIDA MOSS, THE MYTH OF PERSECUTION: HOW EARLY CHRISTIANS IN-
VENTED A STORY OF MARTYRDOM 254 (2013).
40. Douthat, supra note 32.
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guage”—and I think there is much truth in her conclusion that “[i]n the
political and religious arenas, [abandoning the narrative of persecution]
would allow us to find common ground in debates that are currently
sharply polarized.  Rather than demonizing our opponents, we could try
to find points of agreement and work together.”41
The failure to do so risks turning some people off to Christianity alto-
gether.  That is a sad and unfortunate result—if people view Christians as
cry-babies who rant about persecution, our evangelization efforts will fal-
ter; people will be much less likely to be able to hear the message of
Christ.
In an interview with CNS News not long ago,42 Archbishop Chaput
was asked whether Christians are being persecuted in the United States.  I
think his response was a good one: “ ‘Persecuted’ is a big word,” he said,
going on to say, “We’re not in Pakistan or North Korea.  But it would be
very unwise to ignore the implications of government coercion like the
HHS mandate, or the misuse of the IRS, or political and judicial attacks on
the nature of marriage.”43  His language was not incendiary, yet it conveys
that we have a real problem to deal with.
And that is what we have to do—to speak truth, but to do so aggres-
sively but peacefully, if that conjunction makes sense.  I think that means
being willing to speak truth to both sides—being critical both to those who
are insufficiently sensitive to religious freedom in the United States and to
those who would turn this into a war between good and evil.  I say that
recognizing that there are some Christians who really believe this is a “war
against evil,” who believe we are in the final stages of the war prophesied
in the Book of Revelation.  I think that is neither a correct, nor a particu-
larly helpful way to characterize what is going on in the United States
today.
I mentioned before the effect of language of persecution on the abil-
ity to find common ground.  Much of our debates about issues of law and
public policy are anything but meaningful debates.  Rather, they are little
more than shouting matches between extremely polarized positions—and
not even shouting to each other, but shouting past each other.  I some-
times wonder if either side is listening to the other.
Almost anytime I suggest criticism of the tactics of the extremists (on
either side), I hear the equivalent of “he started it,” “she behaved badly
first.”  (I failed to find that excuse acceptable when uttered by my daugh-
ter when she was in grade school; it is even less acceptable in this context).
I believe we need to get beyond that, to truly seek to find a way to move
41. MOSS, supra note 39, at 13, 257.
42. See Barbara Hollingsworth, Archbishop: ‘The More That Gov’t Mandates Evil
Actions, the More Likely Civil Disobedience Becomes’, CNS NEWS (Feb. 14, 2014, 2:59
PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/barbara-hollingsworth/archbishop-more-
govt-mandates-evil-actions-more-likely-civil.
43. Id.
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debates forward by finding common ground.  Language of persecution
does not aid that effort.
V. FINAL POINT: ASSUMING THE LABEL PERSECUTION IS AN ACCURATE
ONE, HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO THAT?
Let’s assume the label persecution is the correct one; that the lack of
respect, failure to affirm, failure to sufficiently accommodate, scorning,
etc. are worthy of the label persecution.  What should be our reaction?
First, should Christians be surprised at this?  After all, the Incarnate
God, in whose name we call ourselves Christians, was put to death for what
he preached.  God came into the world and preached a message antitheti-
cal to the power structure of his day, upsetting the way things had been
done.  And when that happens, the existing power structures do not play
nice.
This is what we signed up for.  It is not as though Jesus did not prom-
ise us that following him would lead to some unpopularity:
Remember the word I spoke to you, ‘No slave is greater than his
master.’  If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you.44
Behold, I am sending you like sheep in the midst of wolves. . . .
You will be hated by all because of my name.45
Before [the end], they will seize and persecute you, they will
hand you over to the synagogues and to prisons, and they will
have you led before kings and governors because of my name. . . .
You will even be handed over by parents, brothers, relatives, and
friends, and they will put some of you to death.  You will be hated
by all because of my name.46
From the beginning, Jesus was clear that walking with him was not a
blissful walk in the park.  That it was not going to be all turning water into
wine at wedding feasts, healing the sick, and feeding the multitudes.  That
it was not all going to be pleasant.
David Steindl-Rast, a Benedictine monk, has a wonderful book on the
creed, titled Deeper than Words: Living the Apostles’ Creed.  Speaking about
the line in the creed in which we say that Jesus suffered under Pontius
Pilate, he writes:
All those whose faith in God finds expression in their faith in
Jesus Christ who suffered under Pontius Pilate must realize what
they are in for.  Citizens, for instance, who demonstrate against
the use of torture by their government take the kind of stance
that Jesus took.  They commit themselves to speak up for justice
44. John 15:20.
45. Matthew 10:16, 22.
46. Luke 21:12, 16–17.
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and compassion and peace, as the Spirit guides them—like
Jesus . . . .47
There is a cost to Christian discipleship.  To be a Christian is to share
in the Paschal Mystery.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote: “Just as Christ is Christ
only in suffering and rejection, so also they are his disciples only in suffer-
ing and rejection, in being crucified along with Christ.  Discipleship as
commitment to the person of Jesus Christ places the disciple under the
law of Christ, that is, under the cross.”48
More recently, Pope Francis preached a homily in March of this year
in which he called persecution a “reality of Christian life,” saying that the
Cross is always present when we follow Christ.49
So not being popular, not being respected, not having every accom-
modation we might like to have—whatever label we give that—is kind of
built into our faith.
Second, Jesus is very clear how we are to react to such persecution:
Bless those who persecute you, bless and do not curse them.50
But I say to you, love your enemies, and pray for those who perse-
cute you, that you may be children of your heavenly Father . . . .51
And part of how we are to react is to stand firm in the face of any
persecution.  That is the lesson of the parable of the mustard seed.  We are
not to be like:
The seed sown on rocky ground[—]the one who hears the word
and receives it at once with joy.  But he has no root and lasts only
for a time.  When some tribulation or persecution comes because
of the word, he immediately falls away.52
Finally, Jesus reminds us that persecution is not simply some horrible
thing we have to suffer, but something we should, if not welcome, at least
recognize the blessing in, reminding us that the persecution is not the end
of the story:
Blessed are they who are persecuted for the sake of righteous-
ness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  Blessed are you when
they insult you and persecute you and utter every kind of evil
against you [falsely] because of me.  Rejoice and be glad, for your
47. DAVID STEINDL-RAST, DEEPER THAN WORDS: LIVING THE APOSTLES’ CREED 79
(2010).
48. DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, MEDITATIONS ON THE CROSS 12 (Douglas W. Stott
trans., 1998) (1996).
49. See Elise Harris, Pope: More Martyrs Exist Today than in the Early Church,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 4, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://www.catholicnewsagency
.com/news/pope-more-martyrs-exist-today-than-in-the-early-church/.
50. Romans 12:14.
51. Matthew 5:44–45.
52. Id. 13:20–21.
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reward will be great in heaven.  Thus they persecuted the
prophets who were before you.53
You will be hated by all because of my name, but not a hair on
your head will be destroyed.  By your perseverance you will se-
cure your lives.54
Now, to be clear, I am not saying Christians should not work to ensure
just structures, or that Christians should not take advantage of the protec-
tions of our faith afforded by the First Amendment or the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act.
But I am suggesting that there is something about the tone with which
this issue of “persecution” is often addressed (whether or not that term is
used) that seems to me inconsistent with Jesus’s preaching.  (For that mat-
ter, the same is true even when the language employed is that of lack of
religious freedom).  Specifically, there is a sense of entitlement—as
though we have the one true way and everyone ought to facilitate our
living of it and spreading it to others.
As I have said, I do not think the term “persecution” is a good one to
be tossing about.  But if we as Christians are being persecuted, well,
blessed are we.
Most importantly, whatever term we use, our response should be to
continue to witness our truths—at whatever cost.  If we believe in the
power of our truths, we will, no matter how difficult, continue to be, to
borrow a phrase, the “counter-cultural salt of the earth.”55
Thank you again for allowing me to be with you this afternoon.
53. Id. 5:10–12.
54. Luke 21:17–19.
55. Andrew Sullivan, Surrender Douthat!, THE DISH (Mar. 4, 2014, 1:23 PM),
http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/03/04/surrender-douthat/.
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